Pre-Award Waiver of Annulment – Where Does it Now Stand in International Commercial Arbitration?

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Stephanie Papazoglou
Lawyer
MIDS Geneva 2018

S.K.Joy Ramphul
Senior Partner
MIDS Geneva 2014

Pre-Award Waiver of Annulment – Where Does it Now Stand in International Commercial Arbitration?

The use of advanced waiver of annulment in civil and common law systems has gained popularity in the last few decades[1]. The main reason of its popularity is because it demonstrates the trust that parties to an arbitral agreement have in such process. However, the issue of advanced waiver is particular problematic as there is a tension between finality and fairness, a subject of a never-ending debate within the international arbitration community. The scope of this paper is to provide the detailed overview of the debate and to understand how currently international commercial arbitration deals with this legal framework.

A comparative approach of the validity of advanced waiver of setting-aside an award

  1. Legal systems allowing advanced waiver

 Domestic legal systems explicitly allowing parties to fully waive a set-aside action

 It is true that multiple legal systems tend to allow parties to fully waive a set-aside award. For instance, Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (“CPIL”) in its Article 192 (1) affords the parties an opportunity to conclude an exclusion agreement, waiving expressly their right to challenge an award before the courts of the seat of the arbitration. According to Article 190 (2) of the CPIL, the parties may exclude one, more or any grounds for annulment of arbitral awards.

  1. Legal systems restraining or even prohibiting the practise of advanced waiver Under German Law GCPC

Nevertheless, other legal systems prefer to take a more restrictive approach to the practice of advanced waiver. Under Section 1059 (2) of the German Civil Procedure Code (“GCPC”), the possibility to waive is limited into four grounds including validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, the parties’ right to be heard, the formation of the arbitral tribunal. These grounds are in the interest of the parties, thus can be waived. Section 1059 (2) prohibits the waiver when questions of non-arbitrability and violation of public policy are raised. These grounds are considered as mandatory grounds and thus cannot be waived under any condition.

  1. Advanced Waiver recognized by International Arbitral Institutions

The use of advanced waiver of annulment is also recognized by a considering number of international arbitration institutions through their arbitration rules. For instance, Article 35 of Arbitration Rules of the Jerusalem Arbitration Centre (JAC) provides a clear and express waiver of set-aside and states that “the parties shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse, including appeal and setting aside or annulment, before any judicial authority against any decision of an arbitral tribunal and the Court, insofar as such waiver can validly be made”.

The arbitration rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) provide also the possibility to waive its right to object an award, but there isn’t any express reference to set-aside proceedings. Article 26 (8) of the LCIA Rules 2017 provides that “every award shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out any award immediately and without any delay (subject only to Article 27); and the parties also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other legal authority, insofar as such waiver shall not be prohibited under any applicable law”.

A critical analysis of the effect of advanced waiver of annulment

In light of the above, it is important to examine the effectiveness of those types of waivers. Indeed, if the parties’ waiver is valid and enforceable, the immediate consequence is that the latter are barred from seeking to set aside the award before the national courts at the seat. Evidently, this can be problematic in a situation when there is a tension between finality and fairness or even correctness of the award. However, and importantly, this does not mean that those national courts cannot control the award in any way whatsoever[2]. In many jurisdictions the stage of recognition differs from the stage of annulment. This is specifically provided under Swiss and French law; Article 1522(2) of the French Civil Procedure Code (CPC) states that even in case of a set-aside waiver, “the parties nonetheless retain their right to appeal an enforcement order on one of the grounds set forth in Article 1520”. Similarly, according to Article 192(2) of the Swiss PILA, “if the parties have waived fully the action for annulment against the awards and if the awards are to be enforced in Switzerland, the New York Convention applies by analogy”. In other words, the local award (ie made in France or Switzerland) is treated as if it was foreign (ie made outside France/Switzerland), and is thus submitted to the control of foreign awards at the recognition and enforcement stage.  In the same logic an award can be enforced outside Switzerland in a member of state of New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards (NYC). As a result, even if the parties have expressly waived the right to set-aside an award by concluding an exclusion agreement, the final award can still be challenged on any of the grounds provided by the Article V of the NYC. So national courts are able to maintain some control even where waivers are valid, given the grounds for setting aside an award are typically repeated as the grounds for challenging enforcement.

Furthermore, the use of exclusion agreement raises another question, which addressed whether arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract and if so, why shouldn’t parties have the autonomy to define by concluding an agreement what is fair and what is not fair? In the author’s view, the interaction between parties and society is very tide and parties cannot act independently. Excess on the freedom to waive any grounds of annulment may render arbitration an unattractive adjudicative process repugnant to natural justice and public policy. In Hoeft v. MVL Group 2003 decision from the United States, the court held the waiver invalid on the basis that contractual freedom must have certain limits. The Second Circuit Court considered that it is not for private parties to agree to restrict public interests. Waivers are therefore appropriate only for excluding private (party) rights and interests, and not for excluding grounds in the public interest. The public interest includes ‘public policy’, the ‘fundamental notions of justice and fairness’, including the rules of natural justice.

Conclusion

To summarize, on a practical level, whether a waiver of the right to challenge an award is desirable, will depend on the goals that the parties are trying to achieve in light of the nature of the contract, the amount potentially in dispute and the risk of dilatory tactics by one party. As a result, a partial waiver may be more often suitable rather than a full waiver. Finally, the tide of time is yet to provide legitimate reasons to fundamentally alter or not this paradigm.

[1] Kenneth M. Curtin, “An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards” (2000) 337, 359

[2] Domitille Baizeau, “Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Article 192 (Waiver of annulment) (2007), 283, 288

A Guide To Survive And Thrive In The Post-Pandemic World, COVID-19

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Ajay Advani
Vice President, Tableau Partners,
Asia Pacific & Japan

S.K.Joy Ramphul
Senior Partner

A guide to survive and thrive in the post-pandemic world

COVID-19 has changed the world. Over the past six months, our lives have been upended by the viral outbreak, and we have had to drastically change the way we live and work. There have been numerous commentaries about what the “new normal” looks like in a post-pandemic world, and businesses are busy planning for this. What must they do to stabilize things now? What can they do to safely restart offices and operations and what can they do to grow and thrive in the future?

At the core, businesses need to have empathy. We are in an unusual situation where everyone is faced with similar concerns and challenges at the same time. Customers are experiencing heightened levels of stress and uncertainty. Bearing that in mind, businesses have a unique opportunity to connect with their customers in a meaningful way. By putting the customer at the heart of the organization and listening to their needs, businesses can strengthen existing relationships. and grow trust with with their customer base.

Being agile and adaptable to changes is another key attribute that can help businesses successfully navigate these difficult times. With changing business priorities, what has worked a few months ago may no longer be relevant. While staying close to customers, businesses need to pivot quickly to solve customers’ most pressing challenges. Starbucks is one company that has managed to do that. For instance, when its customers were staying at home due to lockdown measures, it modified its operations to focus on Drive-Thru, Delivery, Mobile Order and Contactless Pick-up, or Entryway Handoff only, store by store. Not that the lockdown is being eased, it has quickly brought back the store experience valued by its customers.

The crisis has provided all of us a window into the future. One of the key differentiators for organizations that are able to succeed is their ability to predict customers’ future needs and innovate fast enough to meet them. Some of the greatest brands that we know today have emerged out of crises. Apple and Netflix are great examples. They transformed themselves in the dot com crisis and have revolutionized how we listen to music and watch television. Their genius was that none of us knew we needed these new ways to enjoy music and television, but now we cannnot live without them. We can say the same thing about Uber and ride hailing, Grab and good delivery and Amazon and shopping. As with past crises, this downturn will also spur organizations to think about what customers really need which will, in turn, inspire new innovations to make life better.

For those in the technology world like me, the pandemic has unveiled trends we can all learn to ride on, one of them being the importance of helping businesses to see and understand data. Governments have turned to data when the pandemic hit to learn about the spread of the virus and to how to respond appropriately. As economies open up, businesses, too, will leverage data to make decisions about how to get back to business safely. With the abundance of data collected during the first wave, insights gleaned from this data can help organizations to put in place the planning, logistics, and communication to resume operations, monitor change and respond to new demands while protecting employees.

Another trend that businesses will prioritise is building resilience. Many will transform their business to be able to operate from anywhere and at any time; diversify and strengthen their supply chains and reduce redundancy. Companies that support these needs will thrive. At the same time, let’s not forget that there are also new growth opportunities. Industries like health and wellness are seeing a huge boom as people start to pay more attention to their well-being. Organizations that can unlock these new opportunities will continue to find new revenue streams to stay in business.

Over the last 20 years, we have faced many challenges—the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the 9/11 economic downturn, the SARS outbreak, the global financial crisis of 2008, and now, the COVID-19 pandemic. Each time the world’s economy crashed, it has managed to bounce back. However, the world that emerged was very different. Businesses that can adapt quickly to changes, identify new trends innovate to meet customers’ needs will be the ones that thrive in the post-pandemic economy.

Trend In Investor State Settlement In Asia Pacific

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Datuk Prof. Sundra Rajoo

TRENDS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC: REASSESSING THE ROLE OF ASIAN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE (AIAC)

INTRODUCTION

The profile of international transactions in South East Asia has no doubt owed its existence to the development of trade and investment throughout the region. This ‘Golden Asian Era’ of growth began to find its roots in the late 20th Century and has continued relentlessly into the 21st Century, as evidenced by the influx of foreign and domestic investments within the region.

Such tremendous development in an increasing globalized world has induced deep and significant changes in South East Asian countries’ policies regarding foreign investments.

For example, the multiplication of international investments agreements is particularly insightful. These agreements date back to the 1960s and aim to create a neutral legal environment conducive to foreign investments, notably by setting up a framework for the settlement of investor-state disputes and ensuring that commitments that countries have made to one another to protect mutual investments are respected. Today there are more than 2,900 international investment agreements containing investor-state dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) provisions. 2

Behind this trend, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) has played a significant role. ICSID is the leading arbitration institution whose purpose is to facilitate alternative dispute resolution(‘ADR’) between foreign investors and states.Establishedin1966by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and Nationals of Other States (the ‘ICSID Convention’ or ‘Washington Convention’) under the auspices of the World Bank, the ICSID Convention counts over 150 countries as members. 3

Since their emergence, ISDS mechanisms have met with a resounding success. One of the most striking testaments to this success is the steady increase in the number of investor-state arbitrations over the past several years.

However, over the past decade an increasing sceptical attitude of states towards ISDS mechanisms is palpable. One of the recurring themes in the current debate around investor-state dispute settlement clauses is that they are tools of crafty multinationals or big capitalist investors looking to dictate policy to governments or impede their sovereign regulatory power.

The overall consensus that this article intends to draw out would be the discernible shift in the approach to ISDS whose culmination is the note worthy Philip Morris v Australia case and whose repercussions extend to South East Asian waters and beyond.

Focus will also be on the debate surrounding the inclusion of ISDS clauses in major Free Trade Agreements (‘FTAs’) such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (‘TTPA’) under negotiation between several groups of states in the region and Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BITs’) more broadly.

The discussion reveals that ISDS mechanisms are also making headline news around the world, and particularly in Europe within the context of the now not so successful attempt a trade pact, namely, the Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’).

Building on the Asian International Arbitration Centre example, the article finally examines the role of Asian arbitral institutions have played so far in promoting ISDS in the region and in fostering the trust and confidence of states and investors in ISDS mechanisms as a response to the growing tense climate.

OVERVIEW OF THE PHILIP MORRIS CASE AGAINST AUSTRALIA

The Philip Morris v Australia case is one of the main chapters of along running saga and legal battle initiated by one of the biggest players in the international tobacco industry.

Following a first pending case started on February 2010 against Uruguay,4 a second case won against the Thai Government5 and a third case lost against Norway in 2012,6 Philip Morris’ action against Australia stands testament to the company’s ambition to hinder states from adopting restrictions targeting the tobacco industry.

The Philip Morris v Australia case is the first investor-state dispute that has been brought against Australia.

Philip Morris Asia (‘PMA’) is a company incorporated in Hong Kong and is the regional command post of the Philip Morris International group of companies for the Asia Region since 1984.7

PMA holds all of the shares of the Australian branch of the group, Philip Morris Australia (‘PM Australia’),8 which in turn owns all of the shares of Philip Morris Ltd (‘PML’), a trading company in corporated in Australia, whose corporate purpose is the manufacturing, import and export, sale, marketing and distribution of tobacco products within Australia, New Zealand the Pacific Islands.9

On 1st December 2011, the Australian government passed the Tobacco PlainPackagingAct2011(‘theAct’).10TheActformsarangeoftobaccocontrol measures aiming at making tobacco products less attractive to consumers in Australia. The Act requires notably that all tobacco products sold in Australia were to be sold in plain packaging from 1 December 2012. In concrete terms, the Act obliges players in the tobacco market to cover a substantial portion of their products with health warnings and prohibits all logos, visual specificities along with different colouring and layout on cigarette packs.

Following UK’s and New Zealand’s winding attempts to adopt similar restrictions for cigarette packaging,11 Australia was the first country to implement such measures.12

Building on the provisions of the agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (‘the Hong Kong agreement’),13 PMA challenged the Australian tobacco plain packaging legislation.

The two main grounds of PMA’s challenge were article 2(2) relating to the parties’ commitment to give the other party’s investors fair and equitable treatment, and article 6, which addresses the issue of expropriation.

The arbitral tribunal that has been constituted is composed of three prominent arbitrators. PMA appointed Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, while Australia appointed Professor Don McRae of the University of Ottawa. The Secretariat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration appointed Professor Dr Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel as the chair arbitrator.

The arbitration is being conducted under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) Arbitration Rules 2010.

In its Notice of Arbitration, PMA has raised a number of arguments. As already mentioned, PMA alleged that the Australian measure constitutes an expropriation of its Australian investments that is inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under the Hong Kong Agreement.

The Claimant further argued that those new restrictions are in breach of the respondent’s commitment to accord fair and equitable treatment to Philip Morris Asia’s investments in the light of article 2(2) of the investment agreement. In addition, the company asserted that the new legislation constitutes an unreasonable and discriminatory measure, violating their trademarks and intellectual property rights, and would make it difficult for consumers to distinguish cigarette brands from one another.14

Concluding its notice of arbitration, PMA sought the suspension of the enforcement of the legislation and compensation for the loss suffered through compliance of the legislation; or the compensation for loss suffered as a result of the enactment and continued application of the legislation.

Australia, on the other hand, argued that those restrictions do not breach the Hong Kong agreement as they are just part of a reasonable approach to public health issues raised by tobacco consumption in Australia. By adopting those measures, Canberra alleged that the government’s simply exercised its legitimate regulatory powers with the aim of protecting the health of its citizens.15

Besides, the Australian government raised three procedural objections relating to the admission of the claimed investments and an abuse of process and claimant’s legal ownership of key assets including cigarette trademarks.16 Canberra requested that its procedural objections be heard in a preliminary phase of the proceedings, prior to any consideration of the merits of PMA’s claim.

In a decision on bifurcation, the arbitral tribunal decided that the Respondent’s first and second procedural objections should be examined in a solepreliminaryphaseandruledthattheanalysisofthethirdobjectionshallbe reserved to an eventual merits phase.17

The arbitral tribunal agreed to the procedural objections raised by the Respondent.18 PMA not only lost but was criticised by the Arbitral Tribunal which found the case to be ‘an abuse of rights’.

The Philip Morris’ collateral effects are far reaching. Apart from Australia’s attitude change towards ISDS, this case has influenced the negotiations surrounding major FTAs and by way of consequence, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms.

IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (‘TPPA’) AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (‘BITS’)

Philip Morris’ legal battles have changed the landscape of investor-state arbitration. The Australian chapter of the saga, whose bill for the country reached about USD50 m19 has significantly impacted its international relations and attitude towards investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms.

In the wake of Philip Morris’ notice of arbitration, Australia announced that it would no longer include investor-state arbitration provisions in its future international treaties.20

In its statement, the Australian Government noted that the greater legal rights granted by international treaties to foreign investors are unfair for local business which cannot benefit from the protection deriving from such instruments. It has also noted that such dispute resolution mechanisms have gutted the country’s legitimate right to determine its own public policy, and by way of consequence its sovereignty.21

Indeed, opponents of ISDS provisions argue that such clauses effectively undermine free trade, by giving an unfair advantage to globa corporations who can dictate legislation and cement their market power.22

As one concrete illustration of the Australia’s rejection of investor-state arbitration, the Australia-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement (‘MAFTA’), which entered into force on 1 January 2013, contains no investor-state dispute settlement provisions, but limits itself to establish a dispute resolution mechanism for inter-state disputes.23

In this respect, Chapter 20 of MAFTA establishes a process for consultations and for settlement of disputes between contracting states but it does also specify that its scope does not extend to disputes arising from Chapters on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Chapter on Electronic Commerce, the Chapter on Economic, technical co-operation and the Chapter on Competition policy.

The Chapter sets out procedures and timelines for consultations and if they are unsuccessful, it also provides for arbitration. The Chapter then provides for implementation of the findings of such arbitral tribunal.

The Chapter also contains commitments on non-violation complaints, which will provide for consultations between the Parties in the event that any measures are taken by a contracting state, which, while not inconsistent with MAFTA, have the effect of nullifying and impairing benefits that could reasonably have been expected to accrue to the other Party. Should the Parties not be able to resolve the matter through consultations, the matter may be referred to the FTA Joint Commission, which may meet at Ministerial level.

The Australian intelligentsia also expressed its concerns about the impact of ISDS provisions on the Australian judicial system and the country’s sovereignty. Robert French, Chief justice of the High Court of Australia, expressed the following views in the Eli Lilly v Government of Canada case:24

After losing two cases before the appellate courts of a western democracy should a disgruntled foreign multinational pharmaceutical company be free to take that country to private arbitration claiming that its expectation of monopoly profits had been thwarted by the court’s decision? Should governments continue to negotiate treaty agreements where expansive intellectual property-related investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement are enshrined into hard law?25

Likewise, in the context of negotiation of the TPPA, Australia is resisting other prospective parties’ requests to include such kind of provisions in the instrument,26 and is raising numerous restrictions and exceptions to the application of a dispute resolution clause.27

There is then a question whether other countries will follow Australia’s attitude and join the backlash and the answer is seemingly yes.

Within the framework of negotiation of the TPPA, other countries have expressed reluctance to the inclusion of ISDS provisions,28 notably New Zealand,29 Mexico,30 Chile31 and Canada,32 in such a way that the current version of the draft dispute resolution clause is surrounded by numerous exemptions.33

On a wider scale, a shift in the attitude of a certain number of states towards investor-state arbitration is perceptible.

A number of countries beyond the Pacific waters are actively reconsidering their exposure to these processes. One may say that Australia is setting a trend, but more likely, the country is following a trend that finds its roots in the beginning of the second millennium.

In Latin America, Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2007, then in July 2009, Ecuador in turn announced its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention;34 example followed by Venezuela in 2012, which has also signalled its intention to terminate its existing BITs.35 Argentina, facingclaims totalling USD65 billion, announced in early 2013 that it would withdraw from the ICSID Convention.36

Nicaragua has passed legislation to avoid investment arbitration.37 Romania attempted to withdraw from the Swedish-Romanian BIT, while the Philippines negotiated to exclude investment arbitration in its free trade treaty with Japan in 2007.38 In South Africa, the Government Cabinet decided to stop negotiating new BITs and to re-negotiate existing ones.39

Recently, India started a review of its existing BITs and suspended all BIT negotiations to protect itself from frivolous litigation.40

A palpable increasing phenomenon is also noticeable in South East Asia, close to Malaysia’s borders. After having terminated the BIT with Germany in 2014, Indonesia announced on 12 May 2015 its intention to renegotiate its BITs with the aim of providing greater certainty and balance both to foreign companies carrying out business in Indonesia and to the Indonesian government.41 It also highlighted its intention to narrow the dispute resolution clauses’ scope and to all eviate the protection granted to foreign investors under those treaties.42

Someobserversnotethatthisrecenttrendinthedevelopingcountriesfinds its roots in the growth of their economies that allows them to share the same playground as established economies and, by way of consequence, to renegotiate or reject the international treaties they have signed when their economies were just starting to flourish.

Another common critic to ISDS, and that explains the frustration of a growing number of emerging countries, is the developed-countries based framework: on one hand, the main investment arbitration institutions are based in developed countries, so are the vast majority of key players such as arbitrators and counsels. Indeed, it has been reported that only 15 arbitrators, nearly all from Europe, the US or Canada, have decided 55% of all known investment-treaty disputes in the world.43

With regard to Malaysia, sofar, the government’s attitude towards investor state arbitration is much more friendly. Malaysia has signed more than 70 BITs and the vast majority of them provide for arbitration as one of the dispute settlement procedures available to foreign investors.

Malaysia is also a signatory to the ICSID Convention44 and enacted the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act in 1966.45

Malaysia is also a signatory of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement that was signed by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2009 (‘the 2009 ASEAN Agreement’). It is worth mentioning that section B of the said agreement provides for the resolution of investment disputes between an investor and a member state. In particular, article 33 the same section allows for such disputes to be referred, inter alia, to the AIAC.

In the discussions on major FTAs, notably the TPPA, Malaysia’s position has been on the whole supportive of the inclusion of an ISDS clause in the treaty.46 However,itdoesnotmeanthattheISDSisnotacontroversialissuein Malaysia. Indeed, several business, professional and public-interest groups exert pressure on the government aiming to exclude ISDS from the TPPA negotiations.47

InthelightofthewordsofthethenPrimeMinisterofMalaysia,investment policy and ISDS are one of the issues in the TTPA that may impinge on national sovereignty.48

Nevertheless, Putrajaya said yes to the inclusion of the ISDS clause in the treaty.49

THE DEFUNCT TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (‘TTIP’)

The discussions surrounding the now defunct TTIP, a major international trade and investment agreement between the United States and the European Union (‘EU’) mark the culmination of the increasingly sceptical attitude of EU Member States and more strikingly the EU, which handles trade policy for 28 European Countries, towards ISDS mechanisms.

On 8 July 2015, while debates and negotiations relating to the agreement were raging, the European Parliament voted favourably on a non-binding resolution that aims to remove investor-state arbitration from the TTIP.50 As an alternative, the European Parliament moved towards:

[A] new system for resolving disputes between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny where potential cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent professional judgesin public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where consistency of judicial decisions is ensured, the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is respected, and where private interests cannot undermine public policy objectives.51

ISDS is dead. It must be replaced by a new public and transparent system of investment protection, in which private interests cannot undermine public policy and which is subject to public law.52

Although the European Parliament in not involved in theTTIP negotiations, a final agreement would be impossible to reach without its prior approval. By drawing up recommendations on the TTIP, the European Parliament sends a clear message on what it wants to see in the final version of the agreement.

Another addition to the hot debate on the ISDS issue has to be mentioned. Matthias Fekl, the French Minister of Foreign Trade, submitted to the European Commission a comprehensive set of proposals regarding the ISDS mechanism that was inserted in the previous version of the draft.53

The measures proposed by the Minister included provisions aiming to safeguard and ensur estates’ legitimate power to decide on their public policy as to regulate, and states’ power to sanction foreign investors for violation of national legislation or regulation; and above all, the creation of an European permanent court for investment arbitration that would have jurisdiction over arbitrations against the EU or EU Member States.54

Although this proposal did not encounter the success that was hoped by its initiators, it can be argued that it echoes the perceptible shift in developed states’ policies and attitude towards investor-state arbitration, to such an extent that some observers wonder if the end of the era of investment treaties and investment arbitration has come.

Throughout the discussions, Germany has also expressed its concerns through its Economy Minister, Brigitte Zypries: ‘From the perspective of the [German] federal government, US investors in the European Union have sufficient legal protection in the national courts’, therefore, there is no reason for the inclusion of a ISDS mechanism in the treaty.55

In such a tense atmosphere, arbitral institutions may play a key role in rebuilding trust in investor-state arbitration.

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF AIAC
The AIAC, a mission based international organisation established under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation, has made a point of setting up a comprehensive and efficient framework for investment disputes in South East Asia.

The abiding cooperation between the AIAC and leading institutions devoted to investment dispute settlement stands testament to this.

Since 1979, the AIAC and ICSID have been collaborating partners. The AIAC signed its first collaboration agreement with ICSID in 1979 and this latter agreement has been renewed and updated in 2014. The present agreementsupersedesthepreviousversionandfurtherencouragescooperation and knowledge sharing between the two institutions.56

In addition to fostering cooperation between the AIAC and ICSID, the agreement provides, inter alia, that the AIAC can be used as an alternative hearing venue for ICSID cases and participate in the administration of cases, should the parties to proceedings conducted under the auspices of ICSID desire to conduct proceedings at the seat of the AIAC. The AIAC was in the process of finalising a similar agreement with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Besides the agreements concluded with key institutions in the investment arbitration field, the AIAC is one of the designated venues for settlement of disputes that may a rise from the 2009 ASEAN Agreement.57 Indeed, pursuant to Article 33 of the agreement, investors are allowed unilaterally to commence a claim against an ASEAN host state. It also provides for dispute resolution through various fora, including ICSID and the AIAC.

Knowledge sharing and capacity building is also a cornerstone of AIAC’s policy with regard to investment arbitration that also aims to restore the trust of the main key players in ISDS.

TheAIACcommonlyshareswithvariousplayers,eclectictypesofresources and expertise, and cultivates with them a dynamic information and discussion platform through seminars, conferences and numerous other events.

As an illustration, AIAC had conducted workshops to educate legal stakeholders on the workings and advantages of using ICSID as a preferred institution for settlement of investment disputes. It is through such education that both sides inforeign investment will boast greater awareness of their rights and obligations under international law.58

CONCLUSION

The ISDS system was designed to create neutral dispute resolution fora for both investors and states and to promote capital exchanges and investments in an increasingly globalised economic world.

Proponents of ISDS state that it benefits nations at every stage of development. It allows states to enhance their attractiveness towards foreign investors while companies can invest safe in the knowledge that, if they end up in a dispute with the host state arising out of their investment, they can take their dispute to a neutral forum that complies with widespread practices and applies international standards. It ensures that foreign companies will be treated on an equal footing with their competitors and that their investments are safeguarded.

Today, over 2,900 treaties providing for ISDS mechanisms link numerous countries around the world; they connect emerging countries with developed nations and leading companies with resourceful nations.This multilateral flux of information, technology and capital fostered by investment treaties is crucial for the global economy and each player in this field, states just as well as investors. Proponents opine that such bridges are essential and have to be preserved.

However, opponents say that ISDS mechanisms as in the Philip Morris v Australiacasehavebeenmisused.Theyinsistthatitisnotrandomabuse.There is now an element of disquiet in the ‘Investment Dispute Resolution Era’. Further developments are to be expected as states opt to settle disputes outside the ISDS system. How these mechanisms will emerge and morph is left to be seen.

Only the future will tell whether the palpable mistrustful state’s attitude towards ISDS is volatile and purely the result of a transitory trend or if it is indeed an established and irreversible approach.

1 President, Asian Institute of Alternate Dispute Resolution (AIADR), Certified International ADR Practitioner (AIADR) (2019 to date), Chartered Arbitrator (CIArb) (1999 to date), Advocate & Solicitor (Non-Practising). Architect and Town Planner, Director, Asian International Arbitration Centre (2010–2018), Chairman, Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (2018), Deputy Chairman, FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber (2018), Member of the Monetary Penalty Review Committee under the Financial Services Act 2013 (2014–2019), President, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2016), President, Asian Pacific Regional Arbitration Group (APRAG)(2011), Founding President, Society of Construction Law Malaysia, Founding President, Malaysian Society of Adjudicators, Founding President, Sports Law Association of Malaysia.

2 Investment Treaties (International Institute for Sustainable Development), http://www.iisd. org/investment/law/treaties.aspx accessed 4 May 2020.

3 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes | ICSID Arbitration (International Arbitration Law) http://www.internationalarbitrationlaw.com accessed 4 May 2020.

4 The company brought its claim before ICSID under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. It claims that Uruguay’s regulatory measures violated the investment protection agreement signed in 1991 between Uruguay and Switzerland, where Philip Morris is headquartered. Specifically, Philip Morris complained about three measures imposed by Uruguay: (1) an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packets from 50% of the total pack size to 80%; (2) the design of six messages that will fill the 80% space; and (3) a regulation that forces companies to sell only one variation of cigarettes per brand. For more information: Jim Armitage, ‘Big Tobacco puts countries on trial as concerns over TTIP deals mount’ (TheIndependent,21October2014),http://www.independent.co.uk/accessed2September 2015.

5 In June 2013, Philip Morris International and The Thai Tobacco Trade Association (TTTA), which represents 1,400 retailers across the Kingdom, sued theThai government over a new anti-tobacco regulation that required the area covered by graphical health warnings on cigarette packs be increased from 55% to 85% on each side. In August of the same year, the court ordered suspension of the government’s 2nd October deadline to implement the new rule until it reaches a decision on the pending litigation. For more information: Khettiya Jittapong, Jason Szep & Michael Perry, ‘Thailand to appeal after PhilipMorriswinstobaccocase’(Reuters,28August2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2013/08/28/us-thailand-tobacco-philipmorris-idUSBRE97R0AB20130828 accessed 10 September 2015.

6 Philip Morris sued Norway before the Oslo District Court, alleging that the Norwegian ban on tobacco advertising, which included a prohibition on visual product displays in retail locations, was incompatible with the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA). Accordingly, quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having the same effect are prohibited unless they are justified by non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory public health grounds. Prior to issuing an opinion in the case, the district court requested two preliminaryrulingsfromtheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanFreeTradeAssociationStates (EFTA) Court. The EFTA Court determined that if the ban did not affect the tobacco products manufactured in Norway as much as it affected the tobacco products imported from other EEA States, the ban would be incompatible with the EEA. Further, the EFTA Court declared that the district court would have to decide whether Norway’s ban was necessary—thatNorway’slegitimatehealthobjectiveofreducingtobaccousecouldnotbe achieved by measures less restrictive than a tobacco product display ban. Formoreinformation:‘PhilipMorrisLosesTobaccoLawsuitagainstNorway’(TheNorway Page, 14 September 2012), http://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/3204-philip-morrisloses-tobacco-lawsuit-against-norway accessed 2 September 2015.

7 Pmi.com, ‘Philip Morris International Hong Kong’, http://www.pmi.com/marketpages/ pages/market_en_hk.aspx accessed 2 September 2015.

8 Pmi.com,‘PhilipMorrisInternationalAustralia’,http://www.pmi.com/marketpages/pages/ market_en_au.aspx accessed 2 September 2015.

9 ‘Philip Morris (Australia) Limited — Retail’ (IBIS Word), http://www.ibisworld.com.au/ enterprisefull/default.aspx?entid=94 accessed 2 September 2015.

10 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (No 148, 2011).

11 Hannah Kuchler, Jim Pickard & Duncan Robinson, ‘UK government abandons plain cigarette packaging plan’ (Financial Times, 2013) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ d44ff478-b2ff-11e2-b5a5-00144feabdc0.html accessed 10 September 2015). Howard Schneider, ‘Australia ‘plain packaging’ stubs out cigarette branding, prompting backlash’ (WashingtonPost,29October2013),http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ australias-plain-packaging-stubs-out-cigarette-branding-prompting-backlash/2013/10/29/ 317e58cc-3ccd-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c_story.html accessed 10 September 2015).

12 ‘PhilipMorrisLaunchesLegalBattleOverAustralianCigarettePackaging’(BridgesVolume 15 – Number 24, 29 June 2011, http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/philipmorris-launches-legal-battle-over-australian-cigarette-packaging accessed 2 September 2015).

13 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments [1993] ATS 30.

14 Notice of Arbitration — Philip Morris Asia, (21 November 2011). http://www.ag.gov.au/

15 Response to Notice of Arbitration — Australia, (21 December 2011). http://www.ag.gov. au/.

16 Philip Morris Asia Challenge (Mccabecentre.org, 2015), http://www.mccabecentre.org/ focus-areas/tobacco/philip-morris-asia-challenge accessed 2 September 2015).

17 LukeEricPeterson,’LatestdevelopmentsinthePhilipMorrisarbitrationsagainstAustralia and Uruguay’ (Investment Arbitration Reporter, 12 February 2015) http://www.sfc.org.nz/ documents/263-latest.pdf.

18 PhilipMorrisAsiaLimitedvTheCommonwealthofAustralia,UNCITRAL,PCACaseNo. 2012-12 | (italaw, 2015) http://www.italaw.com/cases/851 accessed 2 September 2015).

19 GlynMoody,‘Australia’sLegalBillForFightingPhilipMorrisCorporateSovereigntyCase: $35 million — So Far’ (Techdirt, 5 August 2015) http://www.techdirt.com/ accessed 2 September 2015.

20 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity spec. 14 and seq. (2011).

21 Ibid, p 14.

22 For illustration: Finbarr Bermingham, ‘Meet the Aussie politicians hoping to derail TPP’ (Global Trade Review, 17 June 2015) http://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/australia-tppopponents/ accessed 10 September 2015.

23 Malaysia-AustraliaFreeTradeAgreement(MAFTA),enteredintoforceon1January2013.

24 Eli Lilly and Company v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2 — See more at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/1625#sthash.jJtWkUY8.dpuf.

25 Melissa Parke, ‘Why support the TPP when it will let foreign corporations take our democracies to court?’ (The Guardian, 29 October 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2014/oct/29/why-support-the-tpp-when-it-will-let-foreign-corporationstake-our-democracies-to-court accessed 2 September 2015.

26 ‘Leaked TPPA trade chapter: Australia says no to investor rights to sue, fair trade groups demand release of all text’ (Australian Fair Trade & Investment Network Ltd, June 2012), http://aftinet.org.au/cms/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement/leaked-tppa-trade-chapteraustralia-says-no-investor-rights-sue- accessed 2 September 2015.

27 Tom Iggulden, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership opposition blamed on dispute clauses’ (ABC News, 31 March 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-01/ transpacific-partnership-why-so-much-opposition/6363326 accessed 2 September 2015.

28 Henry Farell, ‘People are freaking out about theTrans Pacific Partnership’s investor dispute settlement system.Why should you care?’ (Washington Post, 26 March 2015), http://www. washingtonpost.com/ accessed 2 September 2015.

29 Liam Hehir, ‘Concerns about redress overstated’ (Stuff, 20 July 2015), http://www.stuff. co.nz/national/politics/opinion/70360101/concerns-about-redress-overstated accessed 2 September 2015

30 Symone Sanders & Lori Wallach, ’TPP Leak Reveals Extraordinary New Powers for Thousands of Foreign Firms to Challenge U.S. Policies and Demand Taxpayer Compensation’ (Public Citizen, 25 March 2015), http://www.citizen.org/documents/tppinvestment-leak-2015-release.pdf accessed 2 September 2015.

31 Greg Grandin, ‘Never Mind ISIS, It’s ISDS That’s the Real Threat’ (The Nation, 11 November 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/never-mind-isis-its-isds-thats-realthreat/ accessed 2 September 2015.

32 Scott Sinclair & Stuart Trew, ‘The implications for Canada of a fast-tracked Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 4 June 2015), http://www.policyalternatives. ca accessed 2 September 2015.

33 ‘Sovereigntyatstake?WikileaksreleasesdraftTPPAchapteroninvestment’(CutYourTeeth, 2015), http://cutyourteeth.co/2015/03/27/sovereignty-at-stake-wikileaks-releases-drafttppa-chapter-on-investment/ accessed 2 September 2015.

34 Tolga Yalkin, ‘Ecuador Denounces ICSID: Much Ado About Nothing?’ (Ejiltalk.org, 30 July 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ecuador-denounces-icsid-much-ado-about-nothing/ accessed 2 September 2015.

35 Sergei Ripinsky, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’ (Investment Treaty News, 13 April 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/ venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/accessed2September 2015.

36 DanielEGonzálezetal.,‘IfArgentinawithdrawsfromtheICSIDconvention:implications forforeigninvestors’(Lexology,4February2013),http://www.lexology.com/library/detail. aspx?g=080c79bc-cce7-485f-97aa-27a5b2bdec5c accessed 10 September 2015.

37 Scott Appleton, ‘Latin American arbitration: the story behind the headlines’ (International Bar Association, 31 March 2010) http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail. aspx?ArticleUid=78296258-3B37-4608-A5EE-3C92D5D0B979 accessed 2 September 2015.

38 Leon Trakman, ’Investor State Arbitration or Local Courts: Will Australia Set a New Trend?’(2012)46JournalofWorldTrade83-120http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1333&context=unswwps-flrps12.

39 ‘South Africa begins withdrawing from EU-member BITs’ (Investment Treaty News, 30 October2012),http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9/accessed10September 2015.

40 Kavaljit Singh of Madhyam, ‘Guest post: India and bilateral investment treaties – are they worth it?’ (Financial Times, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/21/guestpost-india-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-are-they-worth-it/ accessed 10 September 2015.

41 Out-law.com, ‘Indonesia ‘to renegotiate investment treaties’, says economic minister’ (Pinsent Masons, 20 May 2015), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/may/ indonesia-to-renegotiate-investment-treaties-says-economic-minister/ accessed 10 September 2015.

42 JohnLumbantobing,‘RenegotiatingthebiteofourBITs’(TheJakartaPost,18May2015), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/18/renegotiating-bite-our-bits.html accessed 2 September 2015.

43 Martin Khor, ‘Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom’ (IDN-InDepthNews, 2013), http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/ 1702-fuelling-an-investment-arbitration-boom accessed 2 September 2015.

44 Signature (22 Oct 1965); Deposit of Ratification (8 August 1966).

45 (Act 392).

46 Sheridan Mahavera, ‘Putrajaya okay with investor-state dispute clause in trade pact, says DAP lawmaker’ (The Malaysian Insider, 2015), http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ malaysia/article/ putrajaya-okay-with-invester-state-dispute-clause-in-trade-pact-says-dap-la accessed 10 September 2015.

47 Martin Khor, ‘Investor treaties in trouble’ (The Star, 24 March 2014), http://www.thestar. com.my/ accessed 11 September 2015.

48 Ibid.

49 Sheridan Mahavera, op. cit.

50 RobinEmmott,‘EUlawmakersbackarbitrationinU.S.tradedeal’(Reuters,28May2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/28/eu-usa-trade-idUSL5N0YJ25120150528.

51 European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘TTIP: EP recommendations for an EU-US trade deal’ (European Parliament Research Service Blog, 14 July 2015), http://epthinktank. eu/2015/07/14/ttip-ep-recommendations-for-an-eu-us-trade-deal/ accessed 2 September 2015. Text of the resolution: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0252+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.

52 Aline Robert, ‘European Parliament backs TTIP, rejects ISDS’ (EurActiv, 9 July 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/european-parliament-backs-ttip-rejectsisds-316142 accessed 2 September 2015.

53 CécileBarbière,‘MatthiasFekl:‘TheEUshouldhaveitsownarbitrationcourt’’(EurActiv, 3 June 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/matthias-fekl-eushould-have-its-own-arbitration-court-315073 accessed 2 September 2015.
54 Athina Fouchard Papaefstratiou, ‘TTIP:The French Proposal For A Permanent European Court for Investment Arbitration’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 22 July 2015), http:// kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/07/22/ttip-the-french-proposal-for-a-permanenteuropean-court-for-investment-arbitration/.

55 Sheridan Mahavera, op. cit.

56 Icsid.worldbank.org, ICSID News Release (2014), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ AllNewsItems.aspx.

57 ASEANComprehensiveInvestmentAgreement(2013),http://investasean.asean.org/files/ upload/Doc%2005%20-%20ACIA.pdf accessed 8 June 2020. Date of adoption: 26 Feb. 2009; Date of entry into force: 29 March 2012.

58 ‘ICSID 101: ICSID Practice & Current Trends In Investment Arbitration’ Asian International Arbitration Centre, 21 November 2014), http://www.aiac.world/news/79/ ICSID-101:-ICSID-Practice-&-Current-Trends-In-Investment-Arbitration accessed 8 June 2020.

Avocats Et Service En Ligne

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Par Me Nicolas Torrent
Titulaire du brevet d’avocat (Genève, Suisse)

AVOCATS ET SERVICE EN LIGNE À LA CLIENTÈLE RÈGLES D’HYGIÈNE, TRAVAIL À DISTANCE ET PERSPECTIVES POUR LE FUTUR POST-COVID 19

1. La situation évolue, nos clients évoluent, nous évoluons

1.1 La situation évolue – état des lieux 
En tant qu’individus ou entreprises, nous nous organisons progressivement pour effectuer nos tâches de la manière qui nous convient le mieux. Et nous itérons quotidiennement, améliorant notre façon de fonctionner, en fonction de nos priorités. Cette manière qui nous convient n’est pas optimale ou déficiente en elle-même; simplement, elle nous convient le mieux.

Pour réaliser ces tâches, nous utilisons et leur allouons nos ressources (temps, disponibilité d’esprit, argent, équipes, matériel) selon nos priorités, des critères d’allocation de ressources qui nous sont propres. D’après mon expérience, dans les études d’avocat, ces critères comprennent souvent:

  • Respecter les règles sur la profession d’avocat et des codes de déontologie;
  • Trouver de nouveaux clients;
  • Respecter le devoir de diligence, des délais et autres règles de procédure;
  • TimeSheet et recherches juridiques;
  • Encaissement de factures.

Or, ces critères d’allocation de ressources ne nous laissent guère le temps de nous tenir informés des évolutions du marché, d’effectuer des enquêtes de satisfaction auprès des clients, de découvrir les nouveaux outils technologiques qui arrivent sur le marché.

Ainsi, un avocat choisira souvent de prendre un entretien ou un déjeuner client – même si celui-ci n’est pas prioritaire – plutôt que de recevoir un représentant voulant lui proposer une solution de gestion de documentation. Il ne s’agit pas d’une erreur – il s’agit d’une décision allouant des ressources en priorité à la clientèle, par rapport à la modernisation de son étude.

Souvent, les priorités des avocats n’allouent que peu de ressources à la satisfaction client, à la modernisation de l’étude et à l’écoute des tendances du marché.

Il en résulte un décalage croissant entre les attentes des clients et les services juridiques proposés par les avocats. Ainsi, depuis de nombreuses années on observe une stagnation du marché du droit [PDF]1:

“In terms of demand growth for law firm services (…) stagnation continued in 2019, with demand growth virtually flat from the preceding year.”

Et ceci était la situation ante-covid 19. Il semble que cette situation soit appelée à se péjorer post-covid. La façon de fonctionner traditionnelle apparaissant peu compatible avec les exigences d’hygiène pour bloquer la propagation du coronavirus.

1.2 Nos clients évoluent – Tendances dans les autres industries et l’amélioration continue
Dans les autres industries, on observe naturellement l’utilisation d’autres critères d’allocation de ressources. Mais on observe surtout l’utilisation d’un processus d’amélioration continue.

Ce processus permet, en résumé, de définir des indicateurs de performance pour l’entreprise et de mesurer l’évolution de ces indicateurs. Ceux-ci révèlent notamment leur importance et leur utilité lorsque l’entreprise souhaite tester une nouvelle idée ou un nouveau service sur sa clientèle ou lorsqu’elle souhaite améliorer sa performance.

Dans le cas d’une étude d’avocat, on peut imaginer de mesurer – par exemple – les indicateurs suivants:

  • Satisfaction client – via un formulaire de satisfaction
  • Taux de succès de l’étude en procédure
  • Taux de succès de de l’étude en négociation
  • Taux d’encaissement des factures et rapport entre le montant finalement encaissé et le montant de la facture initiale
  • Taux de clients qui font appel à nouveau aux services de l’étude
  • Rapidité de traitement d’une demande client – combien de temps un client doit-il attendre en moyenne avant de recevoir une réponse de son avocat?
  • Combien de clients sont amenés par un client satisfait?
  • Visibilité de l’étude et retours clients sur les médias sociaux

Quels que soient les indicateurs de performance choisis par l’étude, il est important pour elle de les surveiller constamment, car ils lui permettront à la fois de détecter une tendance préjudiciable – et donc la nécessité de prendre des contre-mesures – ou de savoir quelles décisions/actions prendre si elle souhaite améliorer sa performance sur un indicateur ou de manière générale.

L’amélioration continue consiste à chercher, en continu, à améliorer nos indicateurs de performance en fonction de nos objectifs stratégiques.

Ceci est important car, en parallèle, nos clients évoluent et s’habituent à d’autres façon de consommer. Les géants de l’internet investissent en effet des sommes colossales dans la satisfaction client et dans la recherche sur les comportements utilisateur. Ainsi, leurs produits sont souvent les plus attirants et faciles à consommer pour la clientèle. Les tendances définies par les GAFAM et autres grandes plateformes internet sont ainsi reprises par la majeure partie des acteurs du marché. Ainsi, Coop@home
2 affiche les produits de sa boutique en ligne selon les mêmes codes qu’Amazon et le “like” de Facebook s’est propagé sur la majeure partie des plateformes en ligne, comme le 20min (qui, comme Facebook, n’autorise pas le “dislike” pouce bleu vers le bas).

Le client, progressivement, s’est habitué à cet environnement et ses modes de consommation. Il s’attend ainsi à pouvoir lire des avis d’autres consommateurs, à consulter une évaluation de service, à pouvoir commencer une démarche en ligne, à gérer ses données personnelles et disposer d’un compte utilisateur.

Si l’industrie du droit n’est pas compatible avec toutes ces évolutions, elle est certainement compatible avec certaines d’entre elles; il appartient à chaque étude d’envisager quels outils sont pertinents pour son activité et, pour ce faire, elle doit définir ses objectifs commerciaux.

C’est à ce stade que nos critères d’allocation de ressources évoqués plus haut agissaient en obstacle à l’évolution des études. Aucun d’eux ne permettait d’allouer des ressources, telles que du temps et de la disponibilité d’esprit, pour mesurer la performance de l’étude au moyen de ses indicateurs – encore moins pour mettre en oeuvre un système de management pour leur gestion et leur maintenance.

Ceci a toutefois été remis en cause par la covid-19. En effet, le respect des règles professionnelles, réglementaires et contractuelles a contraint les avocats à prendre en compte les nouvelles technologies.

1.3 Nous évoluons – Le travail à distance rendu nécessaire par la covid-19
Quel que soit le modèle prédictif examiné, il est vraisemblable que la pandémie de covid-19 ne soit pas prête à s’éteindre, n’en déplaise à certains dirigeants. La plupart des modèles la voient encore présente en 2022. La distanciation sociale semble dès lors devoir perdurer au point qu’elle devrait progressivement entrer dans nos habitudes comportementales – dont une persistance du travail à distance.

Ainsi, récemment, de grandes entreprises ont commencé à réévaluer leur besoin en immobilier3: “Selon une enquête du géant du conseil immobilier Cushman & Wakefield, réalisée en avril auprès de 300 entreprises dans le monde, 89% d’entre elles estiment que le recours au travail à distance se poursuivra au-delà de la pandémie.”

Ainsi, de nombreux consoeurs et confrères se sont également adaptés et ont travaillé davantage à distance. Les tribunaux ne s’étant pas arrêtés avec la pandémie, les avocates et avocats, se sont vus contraints d’explorer les outils technologiques afin de respecter leurs obligations contractuelles et réglementaires.

La covid-19 a ainsi eu pour effet inattendu d’intégrer la technologie dans les critères d’allocation de ressources des avocates et avocats.

Pour les études d’avocats, ceci présente des avantages: on peut notamment envisager une opportunité de réduction des coûts en réduisant la taille des locaux. Cette possibilité n’est pas anecdotique, car toute entreprise cherche en permanence à réduire ses coûts – en accord avec son modèle économique – afin de rester compétitive. Il va de soi que chaque étude d’avocat a sa propre clientèle et ses propres besoins, ses propres services, son propre modèle économique; une solution globale n’existe pas.

Ainsi, une grande étude de la place appliquant une stratégie de différenciation concentrée sur une très haute – et toujours plus haute – qualité de service aura une structure de coûts et un modèle économique bien différents de celles d’une étude boutique spécialisée.

Quoi qu’il en soit, chacune d’elles pourra saisir l’occasion de s’interroger sur nombre de facteurs pouvant influencer sa structure de coûts et – par voie de conséquence – sa rentabilité. Ainsi, l’étude pourrait se demander:

  • Si ses dossiers peuvent être entièrement numérisés pour éviter le stockage physique;
  • Si l’étude fournit essentiellement des services sur internet ou chez le client et pourrait donc se passer de salles de réunion;
  • Si les collaborateurs et associés ont besoin d’être physiquement présents dans des locaux de l’étude toute la semaine ou non – certains préférant travailler à distance pour éviter les interruptions;
  • Quel est le besoin réel en surface de travail et si une optimisation est possible;
  • Si la qualité des locaux est en adéquation avec les demandes de la clientèle: celle-ci est-elle d’accord de payer plus pour être reçue dans de beaux locaux ou, au contraire, refuserait-elle (ou refuse-t-elle) de payer un surplus pour cette qualité?

Toutes ces questions reviennent à mettre l’accent sur le client en le plaçant au centre des préoccupations et à ainsi appliquer le concept de “Customer-centricity4”. Ainsi, le client et sa satisfaction pourraient occuper une place plus importante dans les critères d’allocation de ressources des études d’avocats.

Être customer-centric, i.e. centré sur le client, demande de pouvoir mesurer et améliorer sa performance en permanence par rapport aux objectifs stratégiques et à la satisfaction du client.

2. Quels services en ligne pour le client post-covid?

2.1 Les règles de l’OSFP5 risquent d’être coûteuses et rendre complexe le travail en étude
Servir un client post-covid va demander de l’adaptation. Ainsi, non seulement les contacts physiques sont appelés à être durablement réduits mais la clientèle, soucieuse de sa santé, devrait également privilégier les prestataires de services juridiques qui lui évitent de se déplacer. Ainsi, l’entretien traditionnel en l’étude devrait devenir moins fréquent.

La réglementation, elle, engendre un changement important dans la gestion de l’étude et ses coûts. L’OSFP prévoit notamment dans son Plan pour les entreprises dont l’activité comprend du travail de bureau et un contact occasionnel avec la clientèle [PDF]6 les mesures suivantes pour l’accueil physique des clients (non-exhaustif):

  • À leur arrivée, les clients se lavent les mains à l’eau et au savon. Mettre à disposition une possibilité de se laver les mains avec du savon ou, si ce n’est pas possible, du désinfectant pour les mains. Informer la clientèle.
  • Les clients peuvent garder une distance de deux mètres entre eux. Ne pas aménager de zone d’attente, ou alors installer des chaises espacées de deux mètres et condamner des places sur les bancs avec du ruban de signalisation.
  • Ne pas toucher les objets appartenant à la clientèle (p. ex. ne pas suspendre leur veste).
  • Si possible, laisser les portes ouvertes afin qu’il ne soit pas nécessaire de les toucher.
  • Les personnes évitent de toucher les surfaces et les objets.
  • Enlever les objets inutiles que les clients pourraient toucher, p. ex. les magazines et les documents dans les salles d’attente et dans les parties communes (comme les coins café et les cuisines).
  • Privilégier le paiement sans contact.
  • Séparer les différentes zones : zones de passage, zones de travail et zones d’attente. Indiquer la distance à respecter à l’aide de marquages au sol ou de ruban de signalisation. Si nécessaire, indiquer clairement les voies et les marques de distance avec un ruban adhésif de couleur.
  • Déterminer le nombre de personnes pouvant être présentes dans l’établissement (collaborateurs et clients) de sorte qu’une distance de deux mètres puisse toujours être maintenue.
  • Demander aux clients de prendre rendez-vous avant de se rendre dans l’entreprise. Éviter ou réduire la clientèle de passage.
  • Si possible, ne proposer des entretiens de conseil que sur rendez-vous, ou utiliser des moyens de communication numériques (p. ex. téléphone, vidéoconférence).
  • Garantir le maintien d’une distance de deux mètres dans les salles de réunion et limiter le nombre total de collaborateurs à une personne pour 4 m2 environ. Condamner ou supprimer des sièges dans les salles de réunion et de séjour afin de respecter les distances.
  • Proposer d’autres possibilités d’interaction aux clients vulnérables (p. ex. entretien téléphonique, représentation par un proche).
  • Afficher les mesures de protection de l’OFSP devant chaque entrée.
  • Informer les clients que les personnes malades doivent être placées en auto-isolement, conformément aux consignes de l’OFSP.

Ainsi, non seulement les entretiens traditionnels physique en l’étude devraient décroître, mais le coût de leur mise en oeuvre devrait augmenter significativement – avec la menace par ailleurs constante de l’inspection du travail: mise en place de procédures complexes et de nettoyages fréquents, stock de savon et gel hydroalcoolique, interruptions fréquentes du travail, etc. A noter que cette évaluation du coût ne tient pas compte du risque accru pour l’équipe de l’étude d’elle-même contracter la covid-19 et se retrouver ainsi handicapée, potentiellement à une période délicate.

Il est à relever que ces règles seront difficilement mises en oeuvre dans certaines plus petites structures, exposant ainsi davantage avocats et clients.

Ces exigences, et le coût de leur mise en oeuvre, combinés au risque sanitaire, devraient ainsi conduire avocates et avocats à une digitalisation anticipée et à repenser leurs services, avec un accent tout particulier sur la fourniture de services en ligne.

2.2 Le service en ligne pour la clientèle – que lui proposer?
Penser les services au client de façon customer-centric, c’est-à-dire centrée sur le client, doit conduire l’étude à se demander comment le client peut effectuer chacune des tâches qu’il effectuerait normalement selon les process traditionnels.

La réponse à cette question dépend principalement des objectifs stratégiques de l’étude et de ses indicateurs de performance. Mais nous pouvons donner quelques exemples de tâches que le client pourrait devoir accomplir en ligne:

  • Comment prendre rendez-vous?
  • Comment transmettre un dossier?
  • Comment conduire un entretien avec le client et les collaborateurs?
  • Comment évaluer un dossier en interne avec l’équipe et proposer un debrief au client?
  • Comment préparer le client à l’audience?
  • Comment le tenir informé de l’évolution de son dossier?

C’est ici que le site web de l’étude peut prendre une importance particulière. Bon nombre de services peuvent en effet être rendus au client par l’intermédiaire du site web de l’étude, qui peut ainsi devenir un élément à part entière du modèle économique de l’étude. A titre personnel, il me paraît évident qu’un site web d’une étude doit être conçu pour générer de la clientèle – si certains parmi vous souhaitent un conseil, n’hésitez pas à me contacter par email: nicolas.torrent@elex.io.

Parallèlement au site web, des outils tels que Jitsi 7(pour la vidéo conférence) peuvent aider, zoom n’étant pas considéré comme sûr8. On peut aussi songer à la numérisation des dossiers clients, via un service cloud, dans le respect des recommandations de la FSA9 et des plateformes de travail collaboratif pour avancer sur les dossiers client et travailler en équipe, à distance.

L’investissement dans les outils technologiques apparaît ainsi d’autant plus justifié aujourd’hui et peut permettre aux avocats de moderniser leur offre, réduire leurs coûts et contrer la stagnation du marché du droit.

Par surabondance de motifs, le déploiement de la plateforme Justitia 4.010 est également appelé à avoir un fort impact sur la digitalisation des études et des process. Cela me semble une bonne raison de commencer déjà ce travail de modernisation.

3. Gestion d’une équipe à distance – quelques propositions

Il ne paraît pas inutile de proposer quelques pistes pour aider à l’organisation du travail à distance. Voici un résumé de celles qui me paraissent le plus important:

  • Fonctionner par objectifs: un collaborateur qui travaille à distance livrera en principe de meilleurs résultats s’il s’est vu fixer des objectifs clairs à atteindre. Exemple: Réaliser un projet de courrier; rédaction de la duplique, effectuer une recherche juridique sur tel ou tel sujet.
  • Chaque objectif doit être associé à un délai: le collaborateur doit savoir quand chacun des objectifs est dû.
  • Clarifier les critères d’évaluation des objectifs: il est important pour le collaborateur de comprendre selon quel(s) critère(s) son travail sera évalué. L’objectif est ici d’éviter les itérations inutiles ou le travail superflu. Exemple: travail de fond, structuré, sans fautes, selon la stratégie discutée, mise en page non-nécessaire à ce stade.
  • Utiliser un outil de suivi d’objectifs: Pour avoir un aperçu de l’avancée du travail, il est très utile d’utiliser un outil de gestion – de nombreux outils sont disponibles sur internet mais un simple calendrier Outlook ou une fiche Excel pourront faire l’affaire.
  • Responsabiliser le collaborateur: Lorsque le collaborateur travaille à domicile, sa réalité et son environnement sont différents. Ainsi, il peut notamment avoir des urgences domestiques. Responsabiliser le collaborateur signifie principalement partir du principe que le travail sera livré dans les délais. Si le travail exige des vérifications intermédiaires, alors celles-ci devraient idéalement être placées dans l’outil de suivi des objectifs. Le corollaire de la responsabilisation est que, du moment que le travail est livré dans les délais, il n’est pas nécessaire de savoir ce que fait le collaborateur ou le collègue à telle ou telle heure de la journée. Seul importe qu’il ou elle soit présent ou présente aux moments convenus et qu’il y ait une réactivité en cas d’urgence.
  • Priorisation des objectifs: Lorsque des objectifs sont fixés, il est important de convenir avec le collaborateur quels objectifs peuvent être livrés pour quels délais. Les délais de livraison sont idéalement convenus d’un commun accord, sous réserve de délais légaux qui s’imposent d’eux-mêmes. En effet, il est souvent contre-productif d’imposer un délai sans tenir compte de la charge de travail du collaborateur; celui-ci la connaît mieux et connaît également mieux sa force de travail. Fixer les délais et priorités avec le collaborateur contribue à responsabiliser ce dernier.
  • Exploiter les outils collaboratifs: On trouve de nombreux outils sur internet qui permettent à une équipe de travailler en commun sur un projet: cloud sécurisé, gestion d’objectifs, gestion de documents, gestion de versions de documents, répertorier les recherches, priorisation des tâches, transfert de relais à la prochaine personne dans la chaîne, etc. Ces outils permettent de mieux suivre l’évolution d’un projet (soit un ensemble d’objectifs) et de détecter les éventuels blocages.
  • Sécuriser les échanges: Dans un tel contexte, il est fortement recommandé de s’assurer que les échanges sont sécurisés – l’envoi d’emails n’est souvent pas considéré comme sûr.
  • Clarifier les rôles: Chacun doit savoir à qui s’adresser pour chaque requête; ainsi les responsabilités devraient être clairement établies pour fluidifier les échanges et éviter que l’équipe ne se gêne.
  • Itérer: Il est vraisemblable que les premiers essais révéleront des dysfonctionnements; en effet, s’habituer à une nouvelle façon de travailler demande du temps. L’équipe affinera toutefois progressivement ses process pour que le modèle initial devienne efficient. L’importance est de pouvoir faire évoluer le travail à distance pour que l’équipe gagne en efficacité. Attention toutefois : certains points, tels que la sécurité, ne devraient pas être sujet à régression.

4. Conclusion

Chaque étude a sa propre réalité, son organisation, sa structure, ses ressources et ses priorités. Il semble toutefois clair que chacune sera impactée – de façon positive ou négative par ailleurs – par la pandémie et l’évolution sociétale qui en découle. Cet article avait pour but d’explorer les pistes à disposition des études et contribuer à la réflexion.

Le point essentiel pour l’avenir de la profession étant à mon sens que la façon de fonctionner traditionnelle risque de devenir plus coûteuse et moins acceptable pour les clients, ce qui était d’ailleurs déjà le cas avant la pandémie vu la stagnation du marché du droit malgré le contexte d’une économie croissante.

Ma proposition modeste est de saisir l’occasion pour repenser les services de l’avocat autour du besoin client, de repenser la façon de fonctionner et de réaliser les adaptations nécessaires en explorant notamment les opportunités offertes par un site web performant, les outils collaboratifs et la digitalisation en général.

Mon expérience dans le domaine de la digitalisation aurait tendance à montrer qu’il faut du temps à une équipe pour adopter de nouvelles façons de travailler, développer des réflexes et se sentir à l’aise avec et comprendre les clients / s’adapter aux clients.

Plus l’équipe est à l’aise avec les outils, plus elle comprend et peut influencer ses indicateurs de performance, mieux elle connaît les besoins de ses clients, et plus elle est capable d’être pertinente pour la clientèle. Commencer tôt signifie prendre une avance qu’il sera difficile à la concurrence de rattraper.

Si certains parmi vous souhaitent évoquer leur situation de manière plus concrète, n’hésitez pas à m’écrire sur nicolas.torrent@elex.io.

Corona Virus and Contractual Obligations

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Vinod Boolell
Former Judge Supreme Court, Mauritius
Former Judge, United Nations

Corona Virus and Contractual Obligations

The corona virus presents a unique and an unprecedented situation. Though its occurrence was unforeseeable and unpredictable, could measures have been taken to limit its spread right from the moment when it came to be known, in view of its impact on people’s health, the business and economic sector? The difficulty arises, as China waited, according to available information, 40 days before disclosing the virus to the world. And it was only on 30 January 2020 that the World Health Organisation declared the Covid 19 “a public health emergency of international concern”.

 Was it open to countries to take necessary measures from the moment of disclosure to prevent   its spread which could have avoided a total lockdown in many jurisdictions? In countries around the world, including Mauritius, it was business as usual. Gradually the grim reality hit the world and countries had to resort to the extreme measures of a complete lockdown and curfews to prevent the spread of the pandemic and to save lives. The health of the population, and not the economy, became the priority in the initial stage.

It is beyond dispute that the corona virus has brought about a real turmoil in many sectors of personal life and economic activities. In the midst of the health crisis, many individuals, business people and professionals are asking questions about the fulfilment of their obligations, whether contractual or not. Some may feel they are covered for any breach of their obligations because of the epidemic, whereas others may be grinding their minds at the idea of not being able to execute a contract as planned. But the one question that has to be addressed is whether the corona virus can be a cause of exemption in the event of a breach of a contractual obligation?

In contractual matters, there are two types of exemptions that would allow a party to a contract to escape liability. Some are legal while others are conventional. The legal exoneration cases are the force majeure for a total or partial exemption of liability. Conventional cases are limiting liability clauses and penal clauses.

A party who fails to fulfil his obligations will be held liable for the breach of the contract in the absence of good grounds to justify the breach. In the context of the corona virus, one of the grounds that may be raised is force majeure resulting from the mandatory lockdown decided by the government.

Force majeure is a legal concept that is known in many legal systems. In Mauritius it is provided for in the Civil Code under the chapter dealing with contracts. As a general rule contracts will have a force majeure clause and list out the different events that may amount to force majeure, like natural cataclysms or epidemics. Whether contracts would have included a clause on complete lockdowns as a force majeure remains to be seen. And it would be important to decide whether the government restrictions made performance under a contract impossible.

Force majeure has been explained as an event which is reasonably unforeseeable [imprévisible] at the time the contract was entered, irresistible [irrésistible] during the performance of the contract, and beyond the control of the person who is invoking it as he cannot no longer perform his obligations. In a very interesting decision in 2011, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court, five judges, held in relation to force majeure, that “It is not enough to stop at the element of prévisibilité or imprévisibilité to determine force majeure. One should move one step further. Prévisible or imprévisible, the question to ask is whether the event was irresistible either by its occurrence or by the manner in which the dire consequences of its occurrence were managed.  What is irrésistible is judged from the objective point of view to decide whether it is so overpowering as to go beyond the means of humans to resist or manage its consequences.” 

The situation created by the corona virus is not comparable to other epidemics and pandemics. The lockdown and curfews are having an impact on businesses. For example, supply chains may have been affected. As the situation is uncertain, a party to a contract may seek to rely on force majeure to avoid liability for non-performance of his contractual obligations.

Can force majeure therefore be successfully invoked on the ground that the measures taken following the corona virus were unforeseeable, irresistible and beyond the control of a contractual party and over which he could not have any control and performance was impossible? There cannot be a definite or straightforward answer. The strain on businesses will no doubt give rise to all types of legal issues or disputes.

Could the virus have prevented contractual obligations from being implemented? There was a gap between the outbreak of the virus and the measures taken by the government on lockdown and curfews. During his gap could businesses still have   functioned?

Epidemics by themselves cannot amount to force majeure. Courts are usually reluctant to uphold the force majeure defence when there is a breach of a contractual obligation. In a very interesting article that appeared in Business Magazine, issue 1435,  15 to 21 April 2020,  Barrister Bilshan Nursimulu after analysing the case law in Mauritius on force majeure,  concludes that “The court’s analysis… did not consider whether the epidemic in itself constituted force majeure, but rather the relationship of cause and effect between the epidemic and the non-performance of a specific contractual obligation”.

French courts, English courts and courts in the United States, just like the Supreme Court in Mauritius, have ruled that a pandemic or an epidemic is not sufficient by itself to constitute force majeure. In a recent decision given on 12 March 2020, the Cour d’Appel of Colmar held that the absence of an asylum seeker at a hearing « était justifiée en raison des circonstances exceptionnelles et insurmontables revêtant le caractère de force majeure liées à l’épidémie en cours de Covid-1». This is a very interesting decision and it remains to be seen to what extent it can be used in contractual obligations.

The following epidemics were held not to constitute force majeure by the French Courts: H1N1 influenza; the plague bacillus; the dengue virus; the chikungunya virus; SARS; Ebola. The major difference between the corona virus and the other epidemics or pandemics is that the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has led to complete lockdown and the imposition of curfews with a number of persons being quarantined. With the onset of other epidemics or pandemics, there was no total lockdown and businesses continued their activities.

In 1918, the Spanish Flu infected millions of people worldwide. Many events were cancelled. People were quarantined.  Many died. The situation was no more different from what we are experiencing with the corona virus. The United States imposed restrictions on activities and people were quarantined. In such a context the question arose whether employers were bound to pay their workers. Two courts reached different conclusions on this point.  One court held  that an employer who did not pay its employees during this time was excused from performance, Another court concluded that  the restriction on activities could not excuse non-performance of obligations because an employer knew that the government “had authority to shut down facilities and, thus, the employer should have included a provision in the contract explicitly excusing performance in the event of a government shutdown”. 

A party invoking force majeure will have to establish that there was a causal link between the inability to perform contractual obligations and the measures taken by the government to combat the spread of the virus. If working from home was an option following the mandatory lockdown, can force majeure be invoked? Could alternative measures have allowed the execution of the contractual obligation?

Businesses today are conducted transnationally and many, if not, all around the world, are suffering from the effects of lockdowns.  Many parties to such contracts may be unable to execute their contractual obligations due to coronavirus lockdown and they may invoke force majeure. To what extent will a force majeure clause in such transnational contracts be successfully invoked in different jurisdictions remains to be seen? It has been reported, for example, that in China, the Council for the Promotion of International Trade, has issued several force majeure certificates to companies to enable them to avoid execution of their contracts. These certificates may work between Chinese companies but it is not certain they would in relation to international contracts.  One such example is the rejection by the French oil giant Total of a force majeure notice from a liquefied natural gas buyer in China. There is no doubt that this is an area where difficulties will crop up.  

Given that unprecedented situation where contracting parties may find themselves in uncertain waters legally, views expressed at international level, advise that parties should seek ways and means to mitigate damages. One advice that been given is that “downturn in revenue will have a huge impact on working capital, and those businesses without sufficient reserves may find themselves suffering cash-flow issues. If this occurs, business operators should seek assistance immediately to try to minimise the impact”.

Contracting parties, who find themselves in that situation, would be well advised to send notices to their counterpart to explain and discuss the difficulties they may be facing or will face. Negotiations must be started to see whether the execution of the obligations can be suspended during the pandemic and whether the contract can be renegotiated. In contracts where time is of the essence there would be no point in suspending its operation and the contract will have to be terminated subject to conditions.

English law encourages parties to enter into negotiations. The French Civil Code enables parties to renegotiate the contract if there is a change in circumstances that was unforeseeable at the time of signing of the contract and which renders performance excessively onerous for a party who had not accepted the risk of such a change. If negotiations fail the parties may agree to the termination of the contract, on a date and under the conditions to be determined, or request the court by mutual agreement to adjust the content the contract. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable time, the court may, at the request of a party, revise or terminate the contract, on the date and on the conditions it chooses.

Thank you.
1st May 2020

Arbitration And Its Development In Malaysia

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Datuk Prof. Sundra Rajoo

Dr. Joy Ramphul

Arbitration And Its Development In Malaysia

Introduction

Arbitration is one of the methods of alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’).2 The importance of the history and origin of arbitration cannot be overstated. Pearl S Buck has stated that ‘[i]f you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday’. An examination of the background presents a platform for understanding the prevalence of certain practices in present-day Malaysia as compared to the position globally.

Similar to the ancient use of the mediation process in China and the panchayat system of village justice in India, the customary method of dispute resolution inMalaysia is associated with adat. It represents an archaic system of dispute resolution practised as customary rites.

The Shariah inMalaya dealt with personal and family law inMalaya and the coastal areas of Borneo. During the 15th Century, it evolved into Islamic dispute resolution practices like shafa’a and tahkshim. This form of a

1. Certified International Arbitrator (AIADR) (2019 to date), Chartered Arbitrator (CIArb) (1999 to date), Advocate & Solicitor (Non-Practising). Architect and Town Planner, Director, Asian International Arbitration Centre (2010-2018), Chairman, Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (2018), Deputy Chairman, FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber (2018), Member of the Monetary Penalty Review Committee under the Financial Services Act 2013 (2014–2019), Founding President, Asian Institute of Alternate Dispute Resolution, President, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2016), President, Asian Pacific Regional Arbitration Group (APRAG)(2011), Founding President, Society of Construction Law Malaysia, Founding President, Malaysian Society of Adjudicators, Founding President, Sports Law Association of Malaysia.

2. It is sometimes referred to as external dispute resolution and includes meditation, conciliation, neutral evaluation, expert determination, mini-trials and last-offer arbitration (where disputing parties submit their final offers to an arbitral tribunal who must decide on one of the offers). The last method pushes the parties to make a reasonable offer and is intended to counter any tendency by the arbitral tribunal to make compromise decisions between the parties’ offers as in John SMurray, et Al, Arbitration 240–243, Foundation Pr s2003.

peremptory type of arbitration used for dispute resolution was part of the long-standing arrangement of resolution of differences in the community.3

The Quran, Sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad), Ijma’ (consensus among recognised religious authorities) and Qiyas (inference by precedent) combine to form the Shariah.The Shariah provides a foundation of principles that apply to arbitration as well. Peremptory-like prescription for arbitration can be derived from the Quran and Prophetic traditions.

For example, in the following Quranic verse, arbitration was prescribed as the primary method to resolve a marital dispute:

If you fear a breach between them twain (husband and wife), appoint (two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from her (family); if they both wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation. Indeed, Allah is ever All-Knower, Well-Acquainted with all things. (Surah al-Nisa’ (4):35).4

Another verse in the Quran states:

And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. However, if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. Moreover, if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed,

Allah loves those who act justly.5

Arbitration in Islamic Law is limited essentially to property and personal matters where private rights are involved. Parties to a dispute relating to property can go for arbitration. The arbitration agreement has to be fulfilled as a matter of principle. Arbitration clauses are valid as they are necessary for the efficacy of the contract and are beneficial to both the parties.

In Malaya, the origin of the common law legal framework for arbitration as enacted by the dominant colonial power started with the Arbitration Ordinance XIII 1809 in the British-controlled Straits Settlement of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. Thereafter, all states of the Federation of Malaya adopted the Arbitration Ordinance 1950. This was subsequently replaced by the Arbitration Act 1952 (‘the AA 1952’) and later the Arbitration Act 2005 (‘the AA 2005’) followed by subsequent amendments in 2011 and 2018.

3. See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd Ed Kluwer Law

International, 1999).

4. Dato Syed Ahmad Idid and Umar AOseni, Appointing a Non-Muslim Arbitrator in Tahkim

Proceedings: Polemics, Perceptions and Possibilities [2014] 5 MLJ xvi.

5. Quran 49.9.

While arbitration is the focus of this article and is reflective of the developments in dispute resolution in Malaysia, the growth of other areas of ADR cannot be overlooked. They are indeed equally important. With the world of commerce rapidly innovating at a fast pace, dispute resolution has also had to evolve from dispute avoidance, dispute prevention, dispute management and finally when all fails into dispute resolution.

When arbitration is considered as conventional and rigid, there have been attempts to seek alternatives to it. Normally such ADR methods like mediation, conciliation and adjudication preceding arbitration are used as part of a multi-tiered dispute resolution regime. Such regimes were either set up by way of legislation or through institutional structures.

Even though in the international domain frameworks for domestic legislation are provided by international texts such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002), this has not been necessarily the case in Malaysia. For example, the Mediation Act 2012 is a mere facilitative legislation without any bite.

Most commercial disputes often resort either to court or to arbitration. Other forms of ADR are gaining popularity. Although the AIAC is the leading arbitral body and ADR provider in Malaysia, it operates in a competitive environment where arbitrations, both domestic and international, and other niche forms of ADR, are also administered by other associations and professional bodies.

They include the Malaysian Institute of Architects (‘PAM’), the Institution of Engineers Malaysia (‘IEM’), the Institution of Surveyors Malaysia, the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce, and the Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Chambers of Commerce, as well as commodity associations like the Malaysia Rubber Board and the Palm Oil Refiners Association of Malaysia (‘PORAM’).

With the rise in transactions in the capital markets, the Security Industry Dispute Resolution Centre (‘SIDREC’) was constituted to cater to the needs of disputes related to unit trusts, derivatives and other capital market products. Presently, all capital market intermediaries, which are corporations holding licenses under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 to deal in securities and futures and engage in fund management, are members of SIDREC. SIDREC offers an evaluative dispute resolution mechanism. It is efficient and effective, based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness.

Another prominent ADR provider in Malaysia is the Financial Mediation Bureau (‘FMB’), which was set up under an initiative taken by Bank Negara Malaysia to resolve disputes between financial service providers and their customers. The FMB’s jurisdiction is limited to conventional and Islamic banking products and services, as well as insurance and takaful products and services.

Islamic finance, as an alternative to conventional banking, is a growing financial industry, with a unique set of commercial challenges and issues. The different basis and nature of Islamic finance mean that there are far fewer legal experts and judges with the requisite training and knowledge than in conventional finance.

The AIAC emerged as the first institution to constitute ‘i-Arbitration Rules’ to balance the principles of Islamic finance with arbitration. The AIAC’s i-Arbitration Rules 2018 are Shariah-compliant and provide for, amongst other provisions, the power for the arbitral tribunal to seek reference from the Shariah Advisory Council or a Shariah Expert.6

The rise of sports in Malaysia has seen the emergence of multiple professional and amateur associations being formed to advocate and uphold the interests and well-being of their respective fields. The Sports Law Association of Malaysia which has no restrictions on foreign membership was formed to support the study and practice of sports law.

While the Sports Development Act 1997 was amended in 2018 to provide for a Sports Dispute Committee, the AIAC had been providing sports arbitration training with the attendant aim of encouraging the use of arbitration in sports-related disputes. It has also proposed an Asian Sports Arbitration Tribunal with its own arbitration rules and panel of sports law trained arbitrators to provide sports dispute resolution services.

Malaysia’s maritime sector has a well-defined set of domestic and international maritime laws, regulations, standards and practices. However, the increasing complexity of the maritime sector has demanded a system that has a good grasp of the law to enable governments, industry players and other maritime stakeholders to ensure their interests are protected and not be

Over whelmed by the vast and complex ecosystem of the maritime sector.

6. See the AIACi-Arbitration Rules 2018, r 11.The Shariah Advisory Council was established

in May 1997 as a part of Bank Negara Malaysia. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009

(Act 701) stipulates the roles and functions of the Shariah Advisory Council.

The Malaysian maritime community welcomed the establishment of the International Malaysian Society of Maritime Law (‘IMSML’) in 2015.The idea of IMSML was mooted and promoted by AIAC, which now provides the premises for the IMSML’s secretariat. The eventual aim is to build capacity and provide ADR services for maritime disputes.

Malaysia has introduced statutory adjudication for payment disputes in the construction industry in the form of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (‘the CIPAA’). It came into force on 15 April 2014. It has been a runaway success. The number of disputes being resolved under the CIPAA has continued to increase year by year.

The CIPAA applies to all construction contracts made in writing after 22 June 2012 including those entered by the Government of Malaysia. The procedure applies to construction contracts, and adjudicators are appointed by the AIAC unless otherwise chosen by the parties.

The adjudicator has 45 working days after the issue of a response to an adjudication claim (or a reply) in order to issue a written decision. The CIPAA has absorbed the most successful features of adjudication and security of payment legislation that have been enacted around the world.

Mediations are conducted by the FMB, the Malaysian Mediation Centre (‘MMC’), the AIAC and the Biro Bantuan Guaman (‘BBG’). Not all types of complaints can be referred to the FMB.Only claims involving Islamic banking and financial matters not exceeding RM100,000, and insurance and takaful product and services, can be referred.

The MMC offers a comprehensive range of services including professional mediation services, training in mediation, accreditation and maintenance of panel mediators, and the provision of consultancy services.

The BBG only provides mediation services for civil and Shariah cases. The Mediation Act 2012 came into force on 1 August 2012, with the main aim of promoting and facilitating the mediation of disputes for settlement in a fair, speedy, and cost-effective manner.

The Mediation Act 2012 does not provide for mandatory mediation. Parties can mediate concurrently with any civil court action or arbitration. The judiciary has set up its own mediation centre to cater for court-annexed mediation as set out in the Chief Justice’s Practice Direction.

The AIAC, apart from arbitration, also provides mediation services under the AIAC Mediation Rules 2018. The AIAC Mediation Rules 2018 is a set of procedural rules covering all aspects of the mediation process to help parties resolve their domestic or international disputes.

As part of its improved services, the AIAC has produced the updated Arbitration Rules 2018 with the name change from KLRCA. The Rules are modern and up-to-date. It caters for most types of disputes or differences including investor-State disputes. As a result, it is one of the institutions in the region and globally to model its rules after the IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation.

One of the more recent developments in ADR is that of Domain Name Dispute Resolution. The Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (‘ADNDRC’) is one of only four providers in the world, and the first and only one located in Asia, to provide dispute resolution services for generic top-level domain names.

The ADNDRC (Kuala Lumpur office) is governed by the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (‘UDRP’) and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Rules as well as the ADNDRC Domain Name Dispute Supplemental Rules adopted by the ADNDRC.

Only disputes over ‘.my’ country code top-level domain name can be settled through domain name dispute resolution proceedings in Malaysia. This is because only ‘.my’ country code top-level domain names can be registered in Malaysia with the Malaysian Network Information Centre (‘MYNIC’).

All domain name disputes are governed and administered in accordance with MYNIC’s Domain Name Resolution Policy (‘MYDRP’), Rules of the MYDRP and the AIAC Supplemental Rules. The Malaysian model of the UDRP is the Malaysian Network Information Centre’s Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy succinctly known as MYDRP. MYDRP was designed by MYNIC together with the Rules of the MYDRP and the Supplemental Rules for the AIAC.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION LEGISLATION

During the 19th Century, the English Common Law was introduced in what was then called Malaya. It began in the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore and spread into the Federated and Unfederated Malay States as English colonial power expanded.

Likewise, the English Common Law followed British privateers and commercial trading companies that colonised the northern states of Borneo of Sarawak and Sabah. Later, the administrations of these states were taken over by the British authorities.

Arbitration in Malaysia can be traced back to as early as 1809 with the first arbitration legislation being Ordinance XIII of the Straits Settlement 1809 in the pre-independent states of Malaya, comprising what is now known as Penang, Malacca and Singapore.

The 1809 ordinance was replaced by the Arbitration Ordinance of 1890. Later in 1950, the Arbitration Ordinance 1950 (No 12 of 1950), which was based on the English Arbitration Act 1889 replaced the Arbitration Ordinance of 1890 for all Malayan states. The Arbitration Ordinance 1950 remained in force after the Declaration of Independence in 1957.

Subsequently, the English Arbitration Act 1950 was adopted by British North Borneo (now known as Sabah) in 1952 as its primary legislation on arbitration. The same was enacted as the Sarawak Ordinance No 5 of 1952. North Borneo (now known as Sabah) and Sarawak were incorporated into the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Thereafter, the arbitration laws of Sabah and Sarawak became the backbone of Malaysian arbitration legislation.

This is because, pursuant to the Revision of Laws Act 1968, the Sarawak Ordinance No 5 of 1952 was extended to the rest of Malaysia and became the Malaysian AA 1952. The AA 1952, like its English precursor, was a model of clarity and simplicity. It was the lex arbitri until 2005.

Unfortunately, such longevity in an era of relentless economic change and growth revealed its shortcomings. The AA 1952 failed to maintain its early usefulness as promised by its simplicity and clarity. By the early 2000s, the general view was the need for reform.

The AA 1952 was decried as a product of a bygone era. Complaints arose regarding excessive court supervision which was viewed as a negative interference in the arbitral process (including in case management and the enforcement of the award). The net result was that the interweaving of court processes undermined the arbitral process.

In addition, the 1952 Act itself was deficient in promoting party autonomy, not providing the arbitral tribunal with sufficient powers to carry out its functions effectively. It did not deal sufficiently with interim measures.

Its test for the challenge against the arbitral tribunal was couched in terms of misconduct of the arbitral tribunal itself or misconduct in conducting the proceedings.

The notions of equality and due process were implied but not explicitly laid out. The grounds to challenge the arbitral tribunal were not rooted in the notions of justifiable doubts arising out of partiality or the lack of independence. This had to be constructed in the light of the availability of the UNCITRAL Model Law recommended for enactment as an adjunct to the New York Convention.

Malaysia’s ratification of the New York Convention in 1985 constituted a milestone in that it became a modern arbitral jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. By then, the AA 1952 was an archaic anomaly. This did not dampen the increasing popularity of arbitration as arbitration agreements were being inserted in standard form contracts domestically and in international commercial matters involving transnational arrangements.

In turn, this led to more court applications and the resulting case law while generally, pro-arbitration did regularly throw up decisions which exposed the shortcomings of the AA 1952 for a modern economy. In addition, there were two separate enforcement regimes for domestic and international awards. In 1978, the AIAC, then known as the Regional Centre for Arbitration,

Kuala Lumpur (‘RCAKL’) was established under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (‘AALCO’). It was the first regional centre established by AALCO in the Asia Pacific Region to provide institutional support as a neutral and independent venue for the conduct of domestic and international arbitration proceedings.

RCAKL was also established pursuant to a host country agreement with the Government of Malaysia. Being a non-profit, non-governmental and independent international body, interestingly, it was also the first arbitral centre in the world to adopt the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976.

At this point, it is pertinent to highlight that there was a solitary amendment in 1980 to introduce a new s 34 to the AA 1952, which created an odd divide based on the choice of regime dictated by the arbitration agreement (‘1980 Amendment’). Section 34(1) of the AA 1952 stated:

Notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or in any other written law but subject to subsection (2) in so far as it relates to the enforcement of an award, the provisions of this Act or other written law shall not apply to any arbitration held under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 or under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 1976 and the Rules of the Regional Centre for Arbitration.

The 1980 Amendment totally excluded the operation of the AA 1952 and any written law for the two categories of arbitrations named in the section. All other institutional arbitrations, whether conducted under other institutional rules such as HKIAC, SIAC, ICC, and LCIA or conducted ad hoc, remained subject to the full supervisory jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts under the AA 1952. In effect, it re-emphasised the dichotomy between arbitrations conducted under the Centre and other types of arbitration.

The purpose of the 1980 Amendment was clearly to try to encourage the use of RCAKL by parties who did not want the Malaysian courts to be involved in any form in their arbitral process except for enforcement.7 There was then no opportunity for any party to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, thereby causing delay and escalation of costs. There was no issue regarding interference by the court either in support of or in supervising the arbitral process.

In effect, the statutory exclusion of the AA 1952 under s 34 was based on the choice of arbitration rules provided for in the arbitration agreement. It did not require the parties to agree on the exclusion specifically. It was not only the AA 1952 which was not to apply but also ‘other written law’.

In practice, the court’s jurisdiction was totally ousted. In turn, there emerged concerns on whether Malaysian courts could play a supportive role in the arbitral process which was the hallmark of modern arbitral regimes. As it then stood, the courts could not intervene nor assist.

The lacunae were highlighted by situations where the arbitral tribunal did not always possess the powers like the court to ensure the arbitral proceedings were conducted properly and led to a fair and just award. An example of this was the production of witnesses by way of subpoena of the court in aid of arbitration.

This odd divide introduced by s 34 as per the 1980 Amendment did not follow the normal and logical divide between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ arbitration, it followed the choice of regime in the arbitration agreement.

7. See PG Lim, Practice and Procedure under the Rules of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration [1997] 2 MLJ lxxiii.

The decision in Jati Erat Sdn Bhd v City Land Sdn Bhd 8 confirmed that the 1980 Amendment applied to any arbitration held under the then RCAKL Rules regardless of whether the parties were local or international (as compared to the earlier curiously reasoned decision of Syarikat Yean Tat (M) Sdn Bhd v Ahli Bina Pamong Sari Sdn Bhd 9 which seemed to suggest otherwise).

The uncertainty coupled with the anomalous dichotomy away from arbitral regimes in other developed jurisdictions set the stage for a wholesale reform of the arbitral regime itself.

THE ARBITRATION ACT 2005

On 30 December 2005, Parliament enacted the AA 2005 (Act 646) which was based on the UNCITRALModel Law. The AA 2005 repealed and replaced the AA 1952. It also incorporated provisions of the New York Convention relating to the recognition and enforcement of international awards. The AA 2005 came into force on 15 March 2006.

Thus, since 15 March 2006, all arbitral proceedings have been conducted under the AA 2005 which applies to all arbitrations commenced after its commencement date, including matters relating to the setting aside, recognition and enforcement of awards.

The AA 2005 categorised arbitrations into two types, namely international and domestic arbitrations. While the AA 2005 applies to both international and domestic arbitrations, Part III of the AA 2005 contains provisions that only apply to all domestic arbitrations. The default position is that Part III does not apply to international arbitrations. The parties will have to by way of an

agreement opt-in for Part III to apply to international arbitrations. For domestic arbitrations, the parties can nevertheless agree expressly to opt out of Part III. This is regardless of whichever arbitration rules are involved.

Despite the change in the law, the High Court in Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd v Digital Green Sdn Bhd 10 decided that parties may choose whether to be governed by the previous enactment or the prevailing enactment.

Unfortunately, it can be said that this is an example of the court’s intervention in arbitration proceedings that appears not to be supportive of the AA 2005.

8. [2001] MLJU 768; [2002] 1 CLJ 346.
9. [1996] 5 MLJ 469; [1995] 2 AMR 2058.
10. [2008] 7 MLJ 757; [2008] 3 AMR 177.

The facts show that the defendant in Putrajaya Holdings had carried out some works for the plaintiff company, and since the plaintiff defaulted in making payment and owed a debt to the defendant, the defendant commenced winding-up proceedings against the plaintiff, to which the plaintiff objected. The defendant then filed a defence and counterclaim.

There was an arbitration clause in the agreement. The plaintiff sought to stay the court proceedings, as it wanted to proceed to arbitration. Since the arbitration was commenced in 2007, the plaintiff naturally assumed that the AA 2005 would be the governing law. The defendant contended that the matter should be governed by the AA 1952.

The issue before the court was which statute was applicable. The salient issues to be considered were as follows: If the AA 2005 was to apply, then the defendant would not have been able to proceed with its court proceedings, and the matter would have had to go to arbitration. There was no provision under the AA 2005 for the court to set aside the proceedings, or to revoke the power of the arbitrator as provided for in s 25 of the AA 1952.

Under the AA 2005, the court could only stay proceedings if there was no arbitration agreement, or if there was no dispute that could be arbitrated. It appears that theHigh Court was dissatisfied with the removal of s 25 of the AA 1952 from the AA 2005. The court explained:

The changes in the new 2005 Act is very substantial as it oust [sic] the court’s jurisdiction to interfere when the parties agree in writing to refer the dispute to arbitration and there is no similar provision to s 25(2) of the 1952 Act in the new 2005 Act. The defendant shall have not entered into the arbitration agreement with the plaintiff if the defendant were aware that it cannot refer the dispute to the court as provided under s 25(2) of the 1952 Act.

Although this reasoning seems inconsistent with the provisions of the AA 2005, it is tied back to a translation error perhaps because of misunderstanding or incompetency in translating ability as shown in the Bahasa Malaysia version when compared to the English version. The result was there was a discrepancy between the Bahasa Malaysia version and the English version of the AA 2005 as regards the commencement date.

Unfortunately, the court failed to appreciate that the English version of the AA 2005 was the authoritative text as it was declared so by the then Prime Minister under the National Language Acts 1963/67.11

An English representation of the Bahasa Malaysia version of s 51(2) of the AA 2005 would read as follows:

Where the arbitration agreement was made or the arbitral proceedings were commenced before the coming into operation of this Act, the law governing the arbitration agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be the law which would have applied as if this Act had not been enacted.

The court held that an arbitration even if commenced today, may fall within the ambit of the AA 1952 so long the arbitration agreement was executed before the coming into force of the AA 2005.

However, the approach has been remedied in Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang v Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor,12 where the court held that although the subject arbitration clause referred to the AA 1952, the applicable legislation was the AA 2005. The ratio is that s 51 of the AA 2005 provided for the repeal of the AA 1952.

The enactment of the AA 2005 was a reform which was overdue. The AA 2005 at its original enactment was modelled extensively on the UNCITRAL Model Law and, for the most part, is applicable to both international and domestic arbitrations except for Part III. Although the AA 2005 was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, the level of court intervention that was maintained by ss 41–43 in Part III was primarily aimed at domestic arbitrations. By so doing, it distinguished international and domestic arbitrations.

Given that it has been more than a decade since the commencement of the AA 2005, the jurisprudence surrounding the legislation has evolved as the courts have interpreted the various provisions of the AA 2005. Also, the AA 2005 was amended in 2011 and 2018. These amendments affect the law and practice of arbitration in Malaysia. This book analyses and comments on the various provisions of the AA 2005 as it stands with all amendments as of 8 May 2018.

11. PU(B) 61/2006; see also Sundra Rajoo Law Practice and Procedure of Arbitration —The Arbitration Act 2005 Perspective [2009] 2 MLJ cxxxvi.

12. [2007] MLJU 523; [2007] 10 CLJ 318 (HC).

THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION ACT 2005

The Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2010 was passed as the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2011 (Act A1395). It came into force on 1 July 2011 (‘2011 Amendments’).

The amendments dealt largely with areas of ambiguity and inconsistency in the interpretation of the provisions of the AA 2005, bringing the clarity sought by the arbitral community. The 2011 Amendments modified ss 8, 10, 11, 30, 39, 42 and 51 of the AA 2005.

Section 8 was recast to restrict court intervention. The amended s 8 makes it clear that court intervention should be confined to situations specifically covered by the AA 2005. This thus excludes the application of common law or the inherent powers of the court.

The amendment to s 10 removes the court’s power to stay arbitration proceedings where the court is satisfied that there is no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters to be referred to arbitration. The old provision placed an undue restriction on the arbitration process which was not contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law or the New York Convention.

In line with article 8A of the UNCITRAL Model Law, under the currents 10 of the AA 2005 the High Court is under the obligation to refer the parties to arbitration unless the High Court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. A further amendment was made through the inclusion of ss 10(2A)–10(2C) to deal specifically with admiralty proceedings.

This amendment enables the court to order that any property arrested, or bail or other security given, is to be retained as security for the satisfaction of any award that may be given in the arbitration proceedings, or to order that a stay of court proceedings be conditional upon equivalent security being provided for the satisfaction of any award that may be given in the arbitration proceedings.

The 2011 Amendments also introduced s 10(4), making it clear, in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, that the curial powers of the High Court apply not only to Malaysian seated arbitrations but also to foreign seated arbitrations.

Section 11 of the AA 2005 was similarly amended to recognise the court’s powers to order interim relief (particularly in admiralty proceedings) and to clarify that those powers applied both to arbitrations seated in Malaysia and elsewhere.

The 2011 Amendments to s 30 dispensed the arbitral tribunal from applying Malaysian law to the merits of the dispute where the parties to the dispute had agreed that the dispute was to be governed by the laws of a jurisdiction other than Malaysia. This amendment removed the mandatory imposition of Malaysian law in domestic arbitrations and upheld party autonomy to choose the substantive law applicable to the dispute.

The 2011 Amendments to s 42 of the AA 2005 imposed an obligation on the court to dismiss a question of law arising out of an arbitral award if the court finds that the question of law does not substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties. This amendment created a threshold for reference to the High Court for appeals against arbitral awards on a question of law.

It has been found that the s 42(1A) requirement ‘substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties’ has proved insufficient to restrict the use of the court system by parties to challenge the award issued in domestic arbitration.

In practice, the High Court and the Court of Appeal have valiantly attempted to interpret the scope of s 42 restrictively. However, it was ineffective in reducing litigation in challenging the finality of arbitration awards through the three tiers of appeal to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. There have been complaints that domestic arbitration had effectively become the first instance hearing from which all awards can be challenged until the Federal Court.

The Federal Court in Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor v Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang and other appeals13 decisively confirmed the same by expanding further the scope of matters which can be referred to the High Court pursuant to s 42 of the AA 2005. It essentially meant that every question of law arising out of an award could now be ventilated at and revisited by the courts starting from the High Court and moving up to the Federal Court.

13. [2018] 1 MLJ 1; [2017] 8 AMR 313.

There have been even further suggestions that there existed now the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts to set aside arbitral awards: both under ss 37 and 42.14 The existence and the exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction undermined the principles of finality of awards and minimum court intervention which underpinned the enactment of the AA 2005.

As such, it was no surprise that, with the support of the Bar Council, various arbitral bodies and business institutions, Parliament dealt with the difficulties by passing the Arbitration (Amendment) (No 2) Act in 2018. It became operative on 8 May 2018.

THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITATION ACT 2005

In December 2017, Parliament passed the Arbitration (Amendment) (No 1) Act 2018 to change the name of KLRCA to the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC). Parliament later passed the Arbitration (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2018 in April 2018. Both the Amendment Acts received royal assent and came into operation on February 28 and 8 May 2018 respectively (‘2018 Amendments’)

It is necessary to consider the background to the 2018 Amendments. Pursuant to the 2018 Amendments, the definition of ‘arbitral tribunal’ in s 2 of the AA 2005 has been amended to include emergency arbitrators. Emergency arbitrator applications have become common practice in international arbitration. This is consonant with Schedule 3 to the AIAC Arbitration Rules and the AIAC i-Arbitration Rules which set out the procedure for emergency arbitrator proceedings.

With these amendments, it is expected that emergency arbitrator proceedings will be made more efficacious as the status of an emergency arbitrator and its orders or awards in relation to emergency relief is now recognised in the AA 2005 itself.

Following the coming into force of the amendments to s 2 of the AA 2005 and the introduction of the news 19H into the AA 2005, the orders or awards granted by an emergency arbitrator would become enforceable.

14. See Huawei Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Maxbury Communications Sdn Bhd [2019]

MLJU 1755 (CA) and Bijak Teknik Sdn Bhd v Lembaga Pertubuhan Peladang (Court of

Appeal NoW-02 (NCC)(A)-1429–07 of 2017).

Foreign lawyers are allowed under an unrestricted fly in and fly out provision in the Legal Profession Act 1976 to represent parties in arbitrations seated in Malaysia. According to s 37A of the Legal Profession Act 1976 introduced by the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2014 that came into force on 3 June 2014:

Sections 36 and 37 [of the Legal Profession Act that does not allow non-

Malaysian qualified lawyers to practise] shall not apply to —

(a) any arbitrator lawfully acting in any arbitral proceedings;
(b) any person representing any party in arbitral proceedings; or
(c) any person giving advice, preparing documents and rendering any other assistance in relation to or arising out of arbitral proceedings except for court proceedings arising out of arbitral proceedings.

The 2018 Amendments also introduced a new s 3A into the AA 2005 that provides for parties’ freedom to choose any representative, not just a Malaysian lawyer or any foreign lawyer, to advise and represent their case in arbitral proceedings.

Such flexibility is necessary for commercial arbitrations. There may be situations where a party would prefer a representative with practical subject-matter expertise or even a foreign lawyer with whom they are more comfortable.

Such foreign representatives would be adept at responding to the queries of the arbitral tribunal. This can provide more choice to the parties when selecting their representative as opposed to appointing someone who is trained in the legal arts but requires the support of an expert witness to address such queries. Section 3A of the AA 2005 can be considered to have enhanced the concept of party autonomy in arbitration — that is, the generally recognised concept that parties to an arbitration agreement are free to choose for themselves the law (or legal rules) applicable to that agreement. The news 3A would also allow parties to arbitrations seated in Sabah or Sarawak to be represented by foreign legal practitioners or West Malaysian legal practitioners.

Section 4 of the AA 2005 has also been amended to make it explicit that the question of arbitrability not only requires consideration of public policy but also requires a consideration of whether the subject matter of the dispute is capable of settlement under the laws of Malaysia.

These amendments bring s 4 in line with the New York Convention and s 39 of the AA 2005, according to which the enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused, if the subject matter of a dispute is not capable of being settled by arbitration.

The writing requirement in s 9 of the AA 2005 has been expanded to include arbitration agreements concluded orally or otherwise, provided that the contents are recorded in any form. The definition of writing has also been broadened to include electronic communication.

The inclusion of electronic communications in the definition of written arbitration agreement promotes alternative dispute resolution as a go-to method for parties engaged in the business of electronic commerce (ie e-commerce), especially those with businesses in the recently established Malaysian Digital Free Trade Zone.

Historically, powers to order interim measures were reserved to national courts only. However, one of the most important improvements in the 2006 revision of the UNCITRAL Model Law was the introduction of the comprehensive framework for interim measures to balance the powers of

arbitral tribunals and national courts and to ensure efficient and effective resolution of disputes.

The 2018 Amendments follow the UNCITRAL Model Law framework by amending ss 11 and 19 of the AA 2005 and adding new ss 19A–19J. Now, arbitral tribunals will be able to issue the specified interim measures, just as the Malaysian courts are able to do so. However, these changes make it clear that the power of arbitral tribunals cannot and do not exceed the power available to the courts.

To the contrary, the courts retained additional powers to grant interim measures, namely, arrest of property or bail or other security pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction. This deviation from the UNCITRAL Model Law regime, albeit minor, is of great importance to the development of the Malaysian maritime industry.

The overhauled provisions on interim measures do also deal with the issue of recognition and enforcement of interim measures and provide for safeguards for parties against whom such measures are sought. As noted above, this brings much greater clarity in the enforcement process of interim measures, including those granted by an emergency arbitrator.

Section 30 now follows article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. This is a significant departure from the former expression of this provision. The wording of the AA 2005 prior to the amendments was restrictive and questioned the parties’ right to apply foreign law in arbitration proceedings. Section 30 now does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitrations. It requires the arbitral tribunal to decide disputes in accordance with the rules of law chosen by the parties to govern the substance of the dispute.

It has become the norm that a party is entitled to be compensated for the loss of opportunity to use money that is not paid in the form of interest (both pre-and post-award).

However, the Federal Court in Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor v Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang15 upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment that the AA 2005 does not empower the arbitral tribunal to give pre-award interest. As such, the right to pre-award interest is restricted to situations where the arbitral tribunal is empowered by the arbitration agreement or by arbitral institution rules.

The amended s 33 of the AA 2005 reinstates the powers of the arbitral tribunal to award interest. It is in line with the law in England, Singapore and Hong Kong.

The arbitral tribunal is now explicitly empowered to award either simple or compound interest at such rate and with such rest as considered appropriate for any period prior to the date of payment of: (a) the sum ordered by the arbitral tribunal; (b) the sum in issue before the arbitral tribunal but paid before the date of the award; or (c) costs awarded or ordered by the arbitral tribunal. The 2018 Amendments have also introduced confidentiality provisions, analogous toHong Kong’s ArbitrationOrdinance (Cap 609), through the new ss 41A and 41B.

Finally, and most importantly, the 2018 Amendments have repealed ss 42 and 43 of the AA 2005. The repeal of s 42 of the Act has two important implications.

Firstly, parties will no longer be able to bring questions of law before the High Court after an award has been rendered. Rather, if the parties, or the

15. [2018] 1 MLJ 1; [2017] 8 AMR 313.

arbitral tribunal, require clarification on a question of law, they will have recourse to the High Court during arbitral proceedings pursuant to s 41 of the AA 2005.

Secondly, s 37 of the AA 2005 is now the only recourse parties may have in seeking to set aside an award. This is the provision which has been used by Malaysian courts to set aside arbitral awards. The grounds for setting aside an award under s 37 is similar to the grounds under article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the relevant provision of the New York Convention.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration in Malaysia is here to stay. The recent developments are indicative of the approach taken by the jurisdiction to address shortcomings, improve the arbitral process and strengthen the finality of arbitral awards. The 2018 Amendments make Malaysia a safe seat for domestic and international arbitration. Ultimately, it is hoped that more international commercial arbitration will be attracted to Malaysia. Also, it will be more attractive to use arbitration domestically to resolve disputes thereby reducing the case burden in the courts and bringing tangible benefits to the country.

Also, the name change of KLRCA to AIAC is intended to enable the Centre to take a more international approach in offering its services. Given that the arbitral regime has now been overhauled and Malaysia is in tandem with the leading arbitral seats, it is likely that both domestic and international commercial arbitrations will thrive in Malaysia.

Recent regulatory taken by UAE Government in light of Covid-19

Ahmed Elmahdy
Author

History of Federal Law No. 14 for the year 2014 on combating the communicable diseases, analysis of the said law from the criminal perspective and the recent regulatory measures taken by UAE Government in light of the current global outbreak of Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic by Ahmed Elmahdy

April 15, 2020

A – Introduction and history of the Law No. 14 for the year 2014

Following the Emirates Union on 2 December 1971 and the formal declaration of the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, notable plans and strategies have taken place to encourage investments and economic growth. The positive outcome of the said economic growth strategies turned the UAE to be a very attractive environment for foreign investment. Large global economic entities and companies started to pump their investments in the UAE and the country became one of the largest destinations in the region and the world for foreign employment.

In the light of the above-illustrated facts, huge numbers of foreign employment, workers and aids began to enter and settle in the UAE, resulting in the  population statistics to jump from 232,000 in 1970 to 1,016,000 in 1980 with an increase rate of 337.9%. Considering the known global pandemics and communicable diseases at that time such as Plague, Cholera, and Malaria, the UAE government took the first legislative approach and issued Federal Law No. 27 for the year 1981 issued on 7 November 1981 concerning the prevention of the communicable diseases (the “1981 Law”).

The  1981 Law was significantly sought and required at that time to provide for and establish the requisite and necessary health standards and precautionary measures to ensure the public health of the UAE population and people living within its territories. The law defined communicable diseases as  diseases transferable to others by human beings or by animals, insects, foodstuffs, places or other things and substances contaminated by the microbes and toxins of such diseases. The 1981 Law further provided penalties applicable on the violators of the relevant provisions of the said law, which penalties include provisions for fines and imprisonment.

Post enforcement of the 1981 Law in the UAE, in 2014, one of the Corona Viruses Family began to spread in the Middle East Region and was called the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-Related Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). MERS-CoV, akin to the current global Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic, related to the infection and inflammation of the respiratory tract On 24 April 2014, the statistic shared by the World Health Organization confirmed 254 reported cases in the world, with 93 confirmed deaths. The statistic shared by UAE confirmed 33 reported cases with 9 confirmed deaths. It ought to be pointed out that the MERS-CoV was not identified as a communicable disease under the 1981 Law.

In light of outbreak of MERS-CoV in the UAE and considering the fact that the 1981 Law did not legally identify the same as a communicable disease, the UAE government realized the necessity of issuing  another law which provided legal coverage for a broader spectrum of “Communicable Diseases”.

In this regard, UAE issued the Federal Law no. (14) for the year 2014 dated 20 November 2014 on combating communicable diseases (“2014 Law”). The 2014 Law provides a broad and detailed schedule of the communicable diseases and is inclusive of more diseases which were not identified in the 1981 Law and provides for more effective and broad measures to be taken in regards to the same. Such diseases include, without limitation, (HIV/AIDS), Influenza Avian, Rubella, SARS, and any unusual emerging disease specified by the concerned department in the UAE Ministry of Health. It ought to be pointed that the 2014 Law shall now apply to the COVID-19 Coronavirus, as it has been formally identified as a communicable disease by the World Health Organization and consequently by the UAE Ministry of Health.

B – Preventive measures as prescribed by 2014 Law and comparing the respective penalties concerning the violation thereof with the relevant conducts penalized under the UAE Penal Code

In the light of the unprecedented outbreak of the pandemic viruses, including the Corona Viruses Family such as SARS-CoV in 2003 and MERS-CoV in 2013 and 2014 (discussed above), the UAE legislators provided for a more detailed and stricter preventive measures, obligations and penalties in the 2014 Law in order to combat the risk of such pandemics and to ensure the wellbeing of the society. The UAE Ministry of Health has announced that the 2014 Law shall also apply to the Covid-19 Coronavirus, and legally identified the Covid-19 Coronavirus as a communicable disease under the 2014 Law. The 2014 Law, amongst other things, provides for the following preventive measures, which, if breached, are punishable by imprisonment, fine or both (as applicable):

  1. the doctors, pharmacists, pharmaceutical technicians, and medical professionals are obligated to inform the competent health authorities that a person is suffering from or died of a communicable disease within a 24 hours’ time period. Any failure in this regard would subject the violator to be liable for imprisonment or a fine of no more than AED10,000 or both. The same obligation applies to any adult who came in contact with an infected person but failed to inform the UAE Ministry of Health, including, without limitation any professional superior, educational supervisor captain of a ship or airplane or a driver of a public transport vehicle who knowingly transports infected individuals etc.
  2. as per Article 38 of the 2014 Law, anyone who knows that he or she is infected or suspects an infection and fails to inform the health authorities while visiting any place other than a medical facility without the approval of the UAE Ministry of Health or any other concerned authority shall be punished with imprisonment and/or a fine of no less than AED10,000 and no more than AED50,000. The same applies to individuals who fail to show up for tests and treatment despite knowing that they are infected or suspect the possibility of an infection. Likewise, the law applies to those who refuse to adhere to the preventive measures advised or prescriptions and instructions given to them.
  3. as per Article 39 of the 2014 Law any person who knows that he or she suffers from a communicable disease and yet intentionally indulges in behavior that exposes others to transmission shall be punished with imprisonment of up to five years in jail and/or a fine between AED 50,000 to AED 100,000. In the case of repeated offences, such individuals shall be imprisoned for a period twice as that is stipulated by the said law.

Could a person get punished legally if any of the above stated prohibited acts were conducted  regardless of the issuance of the 2014 Law?

The answer to the above questions is absolutely yes. Such actions could potentially have been covered by Federal Law no. (3) for the year 1987 concerning the UAE Penal Code (“UAE Penal Code”).

The above discussed provisions and penalties stipulated by 2014 Law can be compared with the relevant and similar provisions and penalties stipulated in the Federal Law no. (3) for the year 1987 concerning the UAE Penal Code (“UAE Penal Code”). The said comparison would depict that the provisions of the UAE Penal Code provided for a comparatively lenient penalty, which was considered by the UAE legislators in 2014 Law, considering the severity of violations thereof.

The relevant provisions of the UAE Penal Code discussed are as follows:

Article 343 of the UAE Penal Code stipulates:

“Shall be punished with the detention for a term not exceeding one year and/or to a fine not in excess of ten thousand dirham, whoever transgress through his fault the body safety of others“.

The element of “fault” is discussed in Article 38 of the UAE Penal Code which states:

“the fault arises if a criminal result occurs by reason of the offender’s fault whether such fault is negligence, inadvertence, carelessness, recklessness, imprudence or non-compliance with laws, regulations, rules or orders“.

Article 348 from UAE Penal Code stipulates:

“Shall be sentenced to detention and/or to a fine, whoever deliberately perpetrate san act that exposes the life, health, security or freedom of human beings to danger. Without prejudice to a   prejudice any more severe penalty prescribed by law, the penalty shall be detention in case the act results in a prejudice of any kind“.

The period of detention is defined in Article 69 of the UAE Peal Code which states:

“Unless the law provides otherwise, the minimum period of detention is one month and the maximum may not exceed three years” 

Analysis of the relevant penalties prescribed under UAE Penal Code and 2014 Law (stated herein above)

  • Comparison of Articles 343 of UAE Penal Code and Article 38 of 2014 Law

Article 343 of the UAE Penal Code could be compared with the Article 38 of 2014 Law. It is evident that the fine prescribed in Article 343 of the UAE Penal Code is limited to AED 10,000, whereas the fine for the similar prohibition under Article 38 of 2014 Law is prescribed to be not less than AED10,000 and not more than AED50,000.

  • Comparison of Articles 348 of UAE Penal Code and Article 39 of 2014 Law

Article 348 of the UAE Penal Code could be compared with the Article 39 of 2014 Law. It is evident that the penalty prescribed under Article 348 of the UAE Penal Code is for the detention of maximum three years, whereas for the same offence, the punishment prescribed under Article 39 of 2014 Law is imprisonment up to five years in jail and/or a fine between AED50,000 to AED100,000.

The above stated comparative analysis indicate that the UAE legislators realized the severity of the violation of these respective obligations and recognised the requirement for the imposition of stricter penalties in this regard to ensure the public’s compliance with the same. Consequently, the UAE legislators enforced the 2014 Law to address this issue, which shall now also be applicable to the violators of the preventive measures put in place for Covid-19.

C – Recent regulatory measures taken by the UAE Government given the global outbreak of the Covid-19 Coronavirus pandemic

UAE is one of the leading countries in the healthcare field and has set precedents in achieving the idealistic strategic planning towards effectively curtailing the crises and emergencies posed by the unpresented global pandemics. This can currently be seen by the UAE Governments constant and consistent efforts to put in place requisite measures to control and prevent the current global outbreak of the Covid-19 Coronavirus pandemic.

In addition to the application and enforceability of the relevant provisions of 2014 Law, various other decisions and regulations have been promulgated by the UAE Government to combat the outbreak of Covid-19. On 24 March 2020, the UAE Cabinet promulgated Cabinet Decision No. (17) for the year 2020 (“Decision”), which requires all natural and juristic persons to comply with the measures mandated by the concerned authorities to combat Covid-19. The Decision further states that the failure to comply with these measures would be treated as a violation which shall expose the offender to penalties, including responsibility to bear the costs of any remedial measures, closure of premises, and fines (as applicable). The rationale of the imposition of such penalties is to deter individuals from the non-compliance of the preventive measures that have been put in place to control the spread of the Covid-19 virus and ensure that the public safety is not further and unnecessarily jeopardized by the violators.

The UAE Attorney General published Resolution No. 38/2020 (“Resolution”) comprising a list of violations and fines. The Resolution, taking effect from the date of its promulgation (i.e. 26 March 2020), provides for inter alia, the following fines:

  1. Violation of an order for mandatory hospitalisation and failing to abide by home quarantine or re-testing instructions – AED 50,000;
  2. Violation of prohibitions or restrictions on gatherings, meetings, private and public celebrations, and on gathering or being present at public locations, private farms, or agricultural estates:
    • AED 10,000 for the organisers; and
    • AED 5,000 for the participants/ attendees;
  3. Leaving home for unnecessary reasons, or for purposes other than work or the purchase of basic needs – AED 2,000;
  4. Exceeding the maximum permitted number of passengers in a car by more than three persons – AED 1,000 for the vehicle’s driver;
  5. Failing to wear medical facemasks in closed places or failing to observe the safe distance between individuals AED 10,000.

D – Conclusion:

Based on the discussion above, it is evident that UAE has always done all that is necessary and requisite, including putting in necessary measures in place to combat the outbreak of the various pandemics over time. In this regard, UAE has inter alia, passed and enforced requisite legislation to ensure the public’s compliance with the said measures. In the light of the statistics being announced every day regarding the increase of Covid-19 cases confirmed all over the world and especially in UAE, the individuals should now recognize the importance of the preventive measures and prohibitions put in place by the relevant laws and regulations issued by the UAE Government and more importantly, the consequences and penalties of the violations thereof.

Thank you!

Crimes Committed In Light Of The Spread Of The Coronavirus

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Rashed Jazzazi
Graded Judge Amman First Instance Court

Mr S.K.Joy Ramphul
Senior Partner

Crimes committed in light of the spread of the Corona virus, and its criminal liability in the Jordanian legislation

It is clear that the Corona virus is very dangerous as it threats the human lives and health. It spreads fast whether directly or indirectly between humans. The media and social media have contributed to enhancing the culture and knowledge of the symptoms of the virus infection. There is no doubt that isolating the infected person at home or quarantine, is almost the only way for protection and to prevent this dangerous virus of being spread between people.

Thus, an important question arises in the field of criminal law, specifically in the context of crimes of transmitting infection with an epidemic disease to others, which is: Is it possible to punish the infected person when he\she transmits this virus to others intentionally or by mistake if it leads to death or harm?

The criminal liability of an infected person who transmits it to others varies according to his\her intent, the result of the act, and also differs according to his\her awareness of being infected.

Therefore, it was necessary to discuss the cases in which the infected persons can use this virus in committing harm crimes and murder.

Introduction

On March 11th 2020, the World Health Organization announced that the Corona virus considers as a pandemic not a flu([1]), which prompted the whole world to take the necessary precautionary measures, and from those countries the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, where announced the suspension of education in schools, universities, institutes and all other organizations. Also the Prime minister declared the state of emergency and the Defense law has been activated, which states a curfew preventing people from being off the streets; to protect them from the virus infection.

There is no doubt that the human right of life and the right to live a normal life devoid of pain and suffering are the oldest and holiest rights that are protected by the monotheistic religions and all statutory legislation.

The Jordanian legislator stipulated severe penalties on harm and murder crimes, which is obviously in Articles 326 and beyond of the Jordanian Penal code. However, the problem arises when unconventional methods are used to assault the body and the human soul, such as microbes (bacteria and viruses), especially if the method of transmission is easy, which leads to a quick spread that may reach the level of the global epidemic, as what happened with the new Corona virus (COVID-19) at the beginning of the year 2020.

Perhaps the legal question that arises in this circumstance is:

  • What is the criminal liability of the virus’ carriers in case they transmitted it to others, whether intentionally or accidentally as a result of negligence and failure to observe laws and regulations, if it leads to harm or kill others?

This question will be answered in detail in this research paper, depending on the analytical method, by reviewing the pillars of each crime in the Jordanian legislation, supported by the judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court whenever it is possible.

Bodily Harming

Harming: An assault, whether in a positive or negative way, that affects the physical safety of the victim, as hitting, injuring or giving harmful substances, or by any other influential act. Physical safety means the normal functioning of the body’s organs and its freedom of pain. This means that any action that would disturb the normal functioning of the body’s organs, affect its safety, or cause pain, no matter how slight, is considered harming([2]).

The Jordanian Penal Law does not provide punishment for the intentional or unintentional transmission of the Corona virus. Therefore, it is a controversial issue to determine the proper legal adaptation of the committed acts. In this regard there are several descriptions of the transmission of the Corona virus which can be combined into two descriptions:

First description: Unintentional harm
By reviewing the Article (344\1 and 2) of the Jordanian Penal Code, which states:

“1. If the perpetrator’s fault only caused injury as the one stipulated in articles 333 and 334 the punishment shall be imprisonment from three months to two years or a fine from fifty to two hundreds dinars (JDs 50-200).

2. Any other involuntary harm shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months or a fine not to exceed fifty dinars (JDs 50).”

It is clear from the previous article that the physical pillar of the crime of unintentional harm consists of three elements:

  • Body assault: like knowing about being infected with Coronavirus and not complying with or neglecting isolation procedures.
  • Criminal result: infecting others with the virus and harming them without leading to death, or endangering their lives.
  • Causal relationship: when the result has been achieved by the perpetrator’s mistake or negligence.

In addition to the physical pillar, the unintentional harm must have its moral pillar, which takes the image of mistake or negligence, such as neglecting isolation procedures and socializing with people despite of the awareness of the infection.

According to the mentioned above, if all these pillars are met, an unintentional harm will be constituted which occurred through the transmission of the Coronavirus infection.

Second description: Intentional harm
By reviewing the Articles (333 and 334) of the Jordanian Penal Code, which state:

Article (333)
Whoever intentionally assaults a person through beating or injuring or harming him/her by any effective act of violence, and the assault resulted in an illness or that the victim is prevented from carrying out the duties of his/her work for a period more than twenty days, he/she shall be punished by imprisonment from three months to three years.

Article (334)
1. If the acts stipulated in the previous articles did not result in any illness or work prevention or resulted in an illness or a work prevention for a period not more than twenty days, the perpetrator shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed one year or a fine not to exceed one hundred dinars or by both penalties.

2. If the acts stipulated in the previous articles did not result in any illness or work prevention exceeding ten days, a legal action can only be taken based on a written or oral complaint by the victim, in such a case the complainant has the right to drop his/her complaint as long as there is no final judgment issued in the case.”

It is clear from the previous articles that the difference between both of them lies in the duration of the suspension, whereas if the duration is less than ten days, the person who has the right to pursue the perpetrator is the victim by filing a complaint, but if the duration exceeds that period of time, the perpetrator will be pursued without filing a complaint by the victim, and the punishment will be more severe.

The pillars of the intentional harm crime are:

  • The legal pillar: It is the presence of a text that bans the act of harm in its various forms, as stipulated in Article (333) of the Jordanian Penal Code and beyond.
  • The physical pillar: It has three elements: Criminal behavior, criminal result, and the causal relationship between that behavior and result.
  • The criminal behavior: the act of assault by hitting, injuring, giving harmful substances, or by any other effective act.
  • The criminal result: The harm of the victim’s body. This result must be actually achieved, as the legal description of the crime of harming depends on the result’s severity. If the result is not achieved, the harming act is not punishable. Taking in consideration the fact that the result should not be death or endangering the victim’s life; because in this case another crime will be committed, which is killing or attempted murder, as will be explained later.
  • The causal relationship: The act of hitting, injuring or giving harmful substances, or other effective acts related to the criminal result.
  • The moral pillar: The criminal intent, which is the will to commit a crime as defined by law (Article 63 of the Jordanian Penal Code)([3]) and consists of two elements: knowledge and will. This means that the perpetrator must know what he\she is doing, and his\her will must be directed to that act and to achieve that result. As this will must be free and aware.

According to the above, if all these pillars are met, As if a person infected with the Corona virus sneezes in the face of others for the purpose of transmitting the infection and harming them, and the result is achieved. Then, an intentional harm will be constituted which occurred through the transmission of the Coronavirus infection.

In this regard, Articles (22\b and 66) of the Jordanian Public Health Law must be highlighted, as these articles state:

Article (22\b) of the Jordanian Public Health Law states:
“Anyone who intentionally conceals an infected person or exposes a person to an epidemic disease or intentionally caused the transmission of infection to others or refrained from carrying out any requested action in order to prevent the spread of infection, it is considered that he\she committed a crime that is punishable under the provisions of this law.”

Article (66) of the Jordanian Public Health Law states:
“Taking into consideration any more severe punishment stipulated in any other legislation, he\she shall be punished by imprisonment from two months to a year or by a fine of no less than five hundred dinars and not more than one thousand dinars, or both of these punishments, whoever violates any of the provisions of this law or the regulations issued pursuant thereto to it and no punishment is stipulated in this law.”

According to the two Articles mentioned above, if the crime of intentionally transmitting of the Coronavirus causes a suspension for more than twenty days, there is no scope for applying the imprisonment punishment prescribed in Article (66) of the Jordanian Public Health Law, because the prescribed punishment for intentional harm crime stipulated in Article (333) of the Jordanian Penal Code is more severe than that prescribed in the aforementioned Article (66), and the article (66) confirmed that if there is any more severe punishment in another law for the same act, the most severe punishment must be applied, as this Legislative approach is in line with the legal multiplicity of crimes provision which stipulated in Article (57) of the Jordanian Penal Code([4]).

But if the suspension period is less than ten days, then the prescribed punishment in Article (66) must be applied, as an implementation of the rule of the private article restrains the public article, and because the punishment which is stipulated in Article (334) of the Jordanian Penal Code is lighter than the prescribed punishment in Article (66) of the Jordanian Public Health Law.

For instance, a video recently spread on social media for a person infected with the Corona virus who was asking the nurses to give him treatment, but the nurses answered that there is no treatment for the Coronavirus at the present time and he must adhere to the instructions, which caused his anger and led him to sneeze and spit on their faces to infect them. In this case, if they have been infected, – without dying or endangering their lives – then the perpetrator will be pursued with an intentional harm crime and the punishment will be according to the article (333) of the Jordanian Penal Code or (66) of the Jordanian Public Health Law depending on the result.

Finally, it is worth noting that there is no attempt in harm crimes, nor any punishment for attempting to commit intentional harm crimes, as the Jordanian legislator did not determine a punishment for attempting these kind of crimes, and there is no punishment for attempting to commit misdemeanors except by the law([5]) (Article 71 Of the Jordanian Penal Code([6])). Also, these crimes require the achievement of the result, which means it is not conceivable to attempt in general.

Consequently, if the person infected with the Coronavirus wanted to infect others with the intention of harming, and due to the circumstances beyond his control, this result was not achieved. Then, the perpetrator’s act forms a complete attempt ([7]) of intentional harm crime which is not punishable according to the Jordanian Penal Code.

Murder

Murder: It is eliminating life, or as Jurisprudence defines it: an assault on others’ life resulting in his\her\their death. Or it is taking away the soul of the living person ([8]).

The Jordanian legislator did not define the term murder, but only mentioned its types. The Jordanian Supreme Court considered the physical acts committed by the accused, which are strangling the victim by his both hands, sitting on his chest and pushing on his neck leading to his death, intentional taking away the soul of a living person([9]).

As mentioned previously there is no specific article in the Jordanian Penal Code that punishes the intentional or unintentional transmission of the Corona virus. Therefore, in this regard there are several descriptions of the transmission of the Corona virus leading to death which can be combined into three descriptions:

First description: Involuntary Murder
By reviewing the Article (343) of the Jordanian Penal Code, which states:
“Whoever causes the death of a person due to negligence or lack of due care or regard for laws or regulations, he / she shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to three years.”

It is clear from the previous article that the physical pillar of the crime of involuntary murder consists of three elements:

  • Life assault: knowing about being infected with Coronavirus and not complying with or neglecting isolation procedures.
  • Criminal result: infecting others with the virus which leads to death.
  • Causal relationship: where the result (death) has been achieved due to the perpetrator’s mistake or negligence.

Thus, a question arises, if a person transmitted a serious disease such as the Corona virus to another person, will it be an act of life assault constituting a murder crime if the result is achieved?

The answer to this question depends on whether or not considering the transmission of the corona infection as a method of killing. By reviewing the provisions of the Jordanian Penal Code, it is noticed that the Jordanian legislator did not indicate to a specific method for committing a murder, which means that there is no reason not to consider the transmission of the Coronavirus as a method to commit a murder as long as it led to death.

In addition to the physical pillar, the involuntary murder must have its moral pillar, which takes the image of mistake or negligence, such as neglecting isolation procedures and socializing with people despite of the awareness of the infection.

According to the above, if all these pillars are met, an involuntary murder will be constituted which occurred through the transmission of the Coronavirus infection.

Second description: Willful Murder
By reviewing the Articles (326 and 327) of the Jordanian Penal Code, which state:

Article (326)
Any person who willfully kills a person shall be punished by imprisonment for twenty years with hard labor.

Article (327)
Willful murder shall be punished by life imprisonment with hard labor if committed:

  1. As a prelude to the commission of a misdemeanor or in order to facilitate the escape of the inciters or perpetrator or abettors of such a misdemeanor or in order to prevent their punishment.
  2. Against a public official while in the course of executing the duties of his/her office or if he/she is killed as a consequence of such duty.
  3. Against more than one person.
  4. with torturing the victim viciously before killing him/him.”

It is clear from the previous two articles that the difference between both of them lies in the punishment limit, whereas the legislator states in Article (327) circumstances that would increase the punishment limit, as according to Article (326) the punishment is imprisonment for twenty years with hard labor, but if the willful murder is accompanied by one of the aggravating circumstances stipulated in Article (327), the punishment will be life imprisonment with hard labor.

The pillars of the willful murder crime are:

  • The legal pillar: It is the presence of a text that bans the act of killing, as stipulated in Article (326) of the Jordanian Penal Code and beyond.
  • The physical pillar: It has three elements: Criminal behavior, criminal result, and the causal relationship between that behavior and result.
  • The criminal behavior: the act of life assault.
  • The criminal result: Death. This result must be actually achieved, as if the result is not achieved, it will be a complete\incomplete attempting of murder.
  • The causal relationship: The act of life assault should be related to the criminal result (death).
  • The moral pillar: The criminal intent, which is the will to commit a crime as defined by law (Article 63 of the Jordanian Penal Code)([10]) which consists of two elements: knowledge and will. This means that the perpetrator must know what he is doing, and his will must be directed to that act and to achieve the result. As this will must be free and aware.

According to the above, if all these pillars are met, As if a person infected with the Corona virus sneezes in the face of other person for the purpose of transmitting the infection and killing him\her, and the result is achieved. Then, a willful murder will be constituted which occurred through the transmission of the Coronavirus infection. The article that will be applied if such a similar case filed before the court is Article (326) of the Jordanian Penal Code, and the punishment will be imprisonment for twenty years with hard labor, this on the one hand.

On the other hand, if any of the aggravating circumstances which are stipulated in Article (327) of the Jordanian Penal Code accompanied with the perpetrator’s act mentioned in the previous paragraph, for example if the perpetrator sneezes or spits in the face of others (more than one person) for the purpose of transmitting the infection and killing them, and the result is achieved. Then Article (327\3) of the Jordanian Penal Code will be applied and the punishment will be life imprisonment with hard labor.

Third description: Premeditated Murder
The act is more dangerous and the punishment is more severe in case that act related to willful murder and prior planning, if it is proven that the person concerned, despite of his awareness of the infection, worked to direct his will to do actions that would expand the spread of the epidemic (Coronavirus).

For example: a person infected with the Corona virus planned to use some tools and give them to others for reusing, taking advantage of their naivety or their young age, for the purpose of transmitting the infection and killing them, and the result is achieved.

In this case, the Jordanian Penal Code includes a severe punishment if the court opines to adapt the act as premeditated murder, as Article (328) of the law states that:

“Willful murder shall be punished by the death penalty if committed:

  1. With premeditation, then it is called premeditated murder.
  2. As a prelude to the commission of a felony or in order to facilitate the escape of the inciters or perpetrators or abettors of such felony or in order to prevent their punishment.
  3. Against one of the perpetrator’s ancestors.”

It must be noted that Article (328) of the Jordanian Penal code did not come up with a new description of the crime of murder; it is as same as Article (327) of the law stipulating aggravating circumstances that make the penalty more severe if it is accompanied by one of them. But because of the severity of the punishment, its explanation was singled out in a separate description.

Based on the mentioned above, to apply Article (328) of the Jordanian Penal Code, it is required that the perpetrator’s act contains all the willful murder pillars stated in Article (326) of the same law, and accompanied by one of the aggravating circumstances stipulated in Article (328).

For example: if a person infected with the Corona virus sneezes in the face of his father for the purpose of transmitting the infection and killing him, and the result is achieved. Then, a willful murder accompanied by an aggravating circumstance will be constituted which occurred through the transmission of the Coronavirus infection. The Article (328\3) of the Jordanian Penal Code will be applied if such a similar case filed before the court and the punishment will be death penalty.

In this regard, it is noticed that unlike it in harm crimes, there is attempt in murder crimes, and there are punishments for attempting a murder whether it is accompanied by an aggravating circumstance or not, as the Jordanian legislator stated in Article (71\1) of the Jordanian penal code that “An attempt to commit a misdemeanor([11]) is not punishable unless in the instances explicitly stipulated by the law” which means by the opposite explanation that the scope of criminalization in felonies([12]) extends to the attempting of these crimes([13]).

There are two different types of attempt:

  • Incomplete attempt ([14]): Which involves an actor who has taken some action toward the completion of the crime (a substantial step), but is stopped before his or her intended actions are completed.

For example: Having Coronavirus and trying to sneeze or spit to others’ faces intentionally to transmit the infection and killing them, and then being tackled by a police officer before the victims are infected.

  • Complete attempts ([15]): Which involves an actor who does everything that he or she thinks is necessary in order to complete the targeted crime, but through sheer luck or some other reason beyond the actor’s control, the targeted crime was not achieved successfully.

For example: Having a Coronavirus and sneezing or spitting to others’ faces intentionally, or hugging and kissing others intentionally to transmit the infection and killing them, but the infection has not been transmitted to the intended victims.

Consequently, if the person infected with the Coronavirus wanted to infect others with the intention of killing, and due to the circumstances beyond his control, this result was not achieved. Then, the perpetrator’s act forms a complete or an incomplete attempt of murder crime which is punishable according to Articles (68 and 70) of the Jordanian Penal Code.([16])

Finally, differentiation must be made between two issues, whether the perpetrator knew that he\she is infected or not?

The answer of this question is an affirmation of the necessity of the moral pillar of the intentional crimes previously explained in this research paper, which means that he\she must be aware that he\she is infected so we can adapt the previous descriptions on his\her acts, and the perpetrator must know what he\she is doing, and his\her will must be directed to that act and to achieve the result.

The intention of law enforcement is not to spread fear among innocent individuals and that they will be imprisoned if they spread the disease (Coronavirus) among those around them, but the purpose is to deter the violators of the Law and regulations. Thus, if he\she does not know that he\she is infected, he\she will not be punished.

Conclusion

The law exists to organize societies and protect individuals and public order within its three meanings: public security, public health and public tranquility. Therefore, the law must be used in a way to limit the spread of the virus among individuals in case of the abstaining from abiding by the instructions of the competent authorities intending to harm others. Those people should be deterred by imposing the maximum penalties on them for committing a criminal offense that is punishable by the law, to help reduce cases early without allowing the virus to penetrate among people.

Thus, the legislator must intervene explicitly to create a legislative text that punishes the transmission of infection between individuals intentionally or unintentionally by negligence, and explain in detail the pillars of each crime that is acted by this method and its punishment.

As much as we wish this epidemic will pass safely. However, the legislation must be amended and activated in order to face similar cases in the future, God forbid.

References

  • Abu Shamma, Ibrahim, Jordanian Penal Code – Crimes against people – lectures at the Judicial Institute of Jordan, (2018).
  • Coronavirus confirmed as pandemic by World Health Organization, BBC News, published on 11 March 2020, viewed on 20 March 2020, URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51839944
  • Husni, Mahmoud Najib, Explaining the Jordanian penal code, private section, (6th ed, 2018).
  • Indiana v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind.App.2nd Dist. 1989).
  • Najem, Mohammad Subhi, Crimes against people, (1th ed, 2002).
  • The Jordanian Penal Code (NO. 16 of 1960 with its amendments).
  • The Jordanian Public Health Law (NO. 47 of 2008 with its amendment

([1]) Coronavirus confirmed as pandemic by World Health Organization – BBC News

([2]) Abu Shamma, Ibrahim, (2018), Jordanian Penal Code – Crimes against people – lectures at the Judicial Institute of Jordan.

([3]) The article 63 of the Jordanian penal law states “Intent is the will to commit the crime as defined by law.”

([4]) The Article (57) of the Jordanian Penal Code states: “1. If the act has many definitions all of which were mentioned in the judgment, the court has to impose the most severe penalty. 2. If the act has a general and a specific definition, then the court has to take into consideration the specific one.”

([5]) Please read the Jordanian Supreme Court decision No. 3916\2019 date 22\1\2020, and the decision No. 2425\2018 date 18\9\2018, and the decision No. 1612\2018 date 19\7\2018.

([6]) The article 71 of the Jordanian penal law states “1. An attempt to commit a misdemeanor is not punishable unless in the instances explicitly stipulated by the law. 2. If the law provides for a penalty for the attempt to commit a misdemeanor, the penalty shall not exceed half of the maximum penalty prescribed for the crime, unless the law provides otherwise.”

([7]) There are two different types of attempt: complete attempts and incomplete attempts. A complete attempt involves an actor who does everything that he or she thinks is necessary in order to complete the target offense, but through sheer luck or some other reason beyond the actor’s control, the target offense is unsuccessful. (For example, having a Coronavirus and sneezing or spitting to others’ faces intentionally, or hugging and kissing others intentionally, but the infection doesn’t being transmitted to the intended victims.) An incomplete attempt involves an actor who has taken some action toward the completion of the crime (a substantial step), but is stopped before his or her intended actions are completed (For example, having Coronavirus and trying to sneeze or spit to others’ faces intentionally and then being tackled by a police officer before the victim is harmed.)

([8]) Husni, Mahmoud Najib, Explaining the Jordanian penal code, private section, page 320. And Najem, Mohammad, Crimes against people, page 12.

([9]) Please read the Jordanian Supreme Court decision No. 38\2007 date 11\3\2007, and the decision No. 744\2002 date 17\9\2002.

([10]) The article 63 of the Jordanian penal law states “Intent is the will to commit the crime as defined by law.”

([11]) A crime punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment for up to three years. As the Article (15) of the Jordanian Penal code states “Penalties for Misdemeanors: 1. Imprisonment 2. Fine 3. Bail bond”, and the Article (21) of the same law states “Imprisonment is the placement of the convicted person in one of the state prisons for the period of the verdict which ranges between one week and three years unless the law provides otherwise.”

([12]) A felony is a category of crimes that are often classified as the most serious type of offenses. As  the Article (14) of the Jordanian Penal code states “Criminal penalties are: 1. Death penalty 2. Life imprisonment with hard labor 3. Life detention 4. Temporary imprisonment with hard labor 5. Temporary detention.”

([13]) Please read the Jordanian Supreme Court decision No. 2550\2018 date 9\10\2018.

([14]) The Article (68) of the Jordanian Penal code states “An attempt is to begin executing one of the acts which appear to lead to the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor. If the perpetrator could not complete the acts needed to commit such felony or misdemeanor for reasons beyond his / her will, and unless the law provides otherwise, he / she shall be punished according to the following: 1. Life or temporary imprisonment with hard labor ranging between seven to twenty years if the attempted crime penalty is death, and at least five years of ——— said penalty if the original penalty is life imprisonment with hard labor or life detention. 2. Any other original temporary penalty has to be reduced from one half to two thirds.”

([15]) The Article (70) of the Jordanian Penal code states “If all the acts needed to complete the crime were taken but for reasons, independent from the perpetrator intent, the deliberate crime did not materialize, he/she shall be punished as follows: 1. Life or temporary imprisonment with hard labor from ten to twenty years if the attempted felony is punishable by death penalty. Seven to twenty years of the same penalty if the original penalty is life imprisonment with hard labor or life detention. 2. Any other penalty has to be reduced by one third to one half.”

([16]) In practice, there is a similar case of attempting murder by transmission HIV infection. Please See. Indiana v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind.App.2nd Dist. 1989). The Facts “On August 6, 1987, Lafayette, Indiana, police officers John R. Dennis (Dennis) and Brad Hayworth drove to Haines’ apartment in response to a radio call of a possible suicide. Haines was unconscious when they arrived and was lying face down in a pool of blood. Dennis attempted to revive Haines and noticed that Haines’ wrists were slashed and bleeding. When Haines heard the paramedics arriving, he stood up, ran toward Dennis, and screamed that he should be left to die because he had AIDS. Dennis told Haines they were there to help him, but he continued yelling and stated he wanted to f____ Dennis and “give it to him.” Haines told Dennis that he would “use his wounds” and began jerking his arms at Dennis, causing blood to spray into Dennis’ mouth and eyes. Throughout the incident, as the officers attempted to subdue him, Haines repeatedly yelled that he had AIDS, that he could not deal with it and that he was going to make Dennis deal with it. Haines also struggled with emergency medical technicians Dan Garvey (Garvey) and Diane Robinson threatening to infect them with AIDS and began spitting at them. When Dennis grabbed Haines, Haines scratched, bit, and spit at him. At one point, Haines grabbed a blood-soaked wig and struck Dennis in the face with it. This caused blood again to splatter onto Dennis’ eyes, mouth, and skin. When Dennis finally handcuffed Haines, Dennis was covered with blood. He also had scrapes and scratches on his arms and a cut on his finger that was bleeding. When Haines arrived at the hospital, he was still kicking, screaming, throwing blood, and spitting at Dennis, Garvey, and another paramedic, Rodney Jewell. Haines again announced that he had AIDS and that he was going to show everyone else what it was like to have the disease and die. At one point, Haines bit Garvey on the upper arm, breaking the skin.”— The Sentence “The court of appeals held that the state need not show Haines’s conduct could have actually killed. It was sufficient to show that Haines did everything he believed necessary to attempt the murder, regardless of whether it was actually possible. Thus, the case was reversed and returned to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict and resentence Haines for three counts of attempted murder.”

Money Laundering To Combat Financial Crime

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Kinita Shibchurn

Mr S.K.Joy Ramphul

Money laundering and an effective AML/CFT framework to combat financial crime

INTRODUCTION

Money laundering is generally defined as “transferring illegally obtained money or investments through an outside party to conceal the true source.” This activity may prevent law enforcement from uncovering or confiscating the proceeds of crime, or using the proceeds as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Such processing may involve concealing the beneficial owner of either the actual criminal proceeds or of other property that might be subject to confiscation.

Money Laundering is the process used to disguise the origin of ill-gotten money to make it seem as though such funds were obtained from legitimate sources or businesses. Simply put, Money Laundering is the process of washing ‘Dirty Money’ in order to make it look ‘Clean’.

The activities of launderers do not only impact on the criminal justice systems, but they also have the capacity to destabilize financial institutions and financial systems. In addition, Money laundering also undermines the integrity of the Private sector, democracy and the rule of law and leads to reputational damages.

Let us take into consideration an important fact on ‘how money is laundered’ in simple terms; how are profits generated in the financial system?

In the initial – or placement stage of money laundering, the launderer introduces his illegal profits into the financial system. This might be done by breaking up large amounts of cash into less conspicuous smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, or by purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money orders, etc.) that are then collected and deposited into accounts at another location. After the funds have entered the financial system, the second – or layering stage takes place. In this phase, the launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements of the funds to distance them from their source. The funds might be channeled through the purchase and sales of investment instruments, or the launderer might simply wire the funds through a series of accounts at various banks across the globe. This use of widely scattered accounts for laundering is especially established in those jurisdictions that do not co-operate in anti-money laundering investigations. In some instances, the launderer might disguise the transfers as payments for goods or services, thus giving them a legitimate appearance. Having successfully processed his criminal profits through the first two phases the launderer then moves them to the third stage – integration – in which the funds re-enter the legitimate economy. The launderer might choose to invest the funds into real estate, luxury assets, or business ventures.

Money laundering is a truly global phenomenon; helped by the International financial community which is a 24hrs a day business. As a 1993 UN Report noted: The basic characteristics of the laundering of the proceeds of crime, which to a large extent also mark the operations of organised and transnational crime, are its global nature, the flexibility and adaptability of its operations, the use of the latest technological means and professional assistance, the cleverness of its operators and the vast resources at their disposal. In addition, a characteristic that should not be overlooked is the constant pursuit of profits and the expansion into new areas of criminal activity. Despite the considerable body of work in this area, there remains a need for further research into the operation, regulation and supervision of TCSPs; the challenges caused by the illegal use of TCSPs; and the ineffective implementation of the international AML/CFT requirements relating to TCSPs. It is also stated that, money which is laundered by criminals worldwide is estimated to be the equivalent to 2-5% of the world’s Growth Domestic Product (GDP) . Whilst smaller criminal organisations deal in diminutive amounts of cash, the more serious criminals have a propensity to locate a safer place for the proceeds of their crime in another country, quite possibly a self-governing state, where there is less suspicion and more security for themselves. This safeguard arrangement is a renowned precaution for criminals to distance the proceeds of their crime from the crime itself.

As J D Mclean has outlined:

From the point of view of the criminal, it is no use making a large profit out of criminal activity if that profit cannot be put to use…putting the proceeds to use is not as simple as it may sound. Although a proportion of the proceeds of crime will be kept as capital for further criminal ventures, the sophisticated offender will wish to use the rest for other purposes…If this is done without running an unacceptable risk of detection, the money which represents the proceeds of the original crime must be “laundered”; put in an estate in which it appears to have an entirely respectable provenance”.

UK’s APPROACH IN RESPONSE TO MONEY LAUNDERING PROBLEM

The Hard Law
The 4MLD improves corporate transparency by attempting to set up central registers detailing data on beneficial ownership and control of corporate and legal entities in order to improve the current system. In the UK, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is the major financial crime statute.

The Soft Law
The FCA encourages its consumer protection goal through the FCA Systems and Control Sourcebook (SYSC) and the guidelines of the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) to be used by the financial industry to detect and combat money laundering. Furthermore, the guidance identifies certain persons within the financial by placing them under reporting duties to help the FCA and law agencies in combatting money laundering.

CHALLENGES

The FCA recognises the importance of having an effective mechanism for registering suspects of money laundering as being part of an efficient money laundering prevention technique. Furthermore, financial services firms must guarantee they are certain of the source of the client’s riches with which they are dealing.

It is clear from available reports that the volume of money laundering suspicions presented to authorities in the UK is not proportionate to the size of firms under the FCA regulatory regime. There is evidence that the quality of suspects of money laundering in the UK is not as comprehensive and efficient as it might be. This could be because financial services companies do not fully comprehend their reporting responsibilities and appreciate them. The collaboration of financial companies is needed in order for the FCA to fulfil its statutory responsibilities of protecting clients and securing the resilience of the financial services industry in the UK. This collaboration can be achieved through prompt disclosure of money laundering suspicions to the FCA.

According to National Crime Agency, it was evident that the suspicious activity report submitted by some firms was imprecise and lacked the necessary details. The evidence points to the fact that firms are struggling with developing detailed reports. Companies would not want to lose their clients by placing them under investigations by the FCA. As such, this will influence FCA’s attempts to reduce the incidence of money laundering.

Politically Exposed Persons (PEPS)
With regard to PEPs, the range of people caught within the definition is hard to identify. The study conducted by UK regulators highlights the challenge with the UK anti-money laundering efforts and PEPs. The regulators noted the challenges faced by financial institutions compliance with money laundering in relation to PEPs’ operations by suggesting that around 75% of financial companies did not efficiently manage their risk of money laundering. The regulator also stated that more than 50% of financial services companies concealed severe complaints and suspicions about customer’s operations. In addition, 65% of banks have not implemented EDD measures to identify their clients.

It is not all a gloomy report, though. The FCA used regulatory hammer on companies in some instances. For example, for failing to comply with the Money Laundering Regulations, the FCA fined Standard Chartered £7.6m. Standard Chartered has neglected to carry out money laundering controls for some of its corporate customers linked to PEPs.

This provides evidence that money laundering provisions are being enforced by the FCA in certain cases.

Effective classification of a PEP is necessary for the FCA to be able to meet its regulatory objectives of protecting customers and making the UK financial architecture resilient.

Courts pronouncements on suspicious reports
POCA specifies the offence of arrangements. Arrangements relate to participation in an arrangement where the launderer is aware or helps in the process of acquiring or disposing of criminal property. In Meer Care and Desai case, the defendant was found guilty for failing to report money laundering suspicions relating to dishonest assistance for breach of trust (A.G of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai, 2006). The court held that the defendant ought to report the suspicion as it was highly likely and clear that money laundering could result from the breach of trust. In a decided case, the court held that a solicitor who failed to follow the guidelines of the Solicitor Regulation Authority (SRA) with respect to reporting suspicions of money laundering was careless but not dishonest (AG of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai, 2008). It has been held that a vague feeling is not sufficient, the suspicion by the defendant ought to be based on reasonable grounds. These cases point to the fact that the courts do not follow a strict approach or clear parameters when reaching decisions on reporting of suspicious transactions relating to money laundering offence. Therefore, this can create confusion as individuals may not be clear on what to do impacting on the ability and efforts of the FCA in promoting its regulatory objectives. If it is not possible to predict the result of a suspicious situation with any degree of certainty, it will influence the FCA’s capacity to initiate action against certain individuals. Moreover, while interpreting certain elements of money laundering regulations, the judiciary use unnecessary technicalities. In the case of R v Amir, it was held that property would be classified as criminal where the property was criminal property at the time of commission of the offence. The court found the defendant not guilty because at the time the property came into possession of the defendant it was not criminal property.

THE UK SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING REGIME

According to the recent National Crime Agency SARs study, the amount of suspicious activity reports (SARs) obtained by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit moved up to nearly half a million a year, putting increased demand on the unit in terms of quantity and complexity.

The rise in the amount of SARs submitted by the private sector should not mask the inadequacy of the UK’s financial crime prevention system. Transparency International stated: “The NCA report states that less the one per cent of the more than £100 billion in illicit funds estimated to pass through the UK each year is stopped as a result of SARs, this echoes the recent FATF UK review that found the system of reviewing SARs being unfit for purpose.”

Banks have a general sentiment of being trapped in an ocean of heavy and frequent regulations coupled with an increasing cost of compliance and impressively high cost of ownership caused by complex system implementations. However, as per The Financial Times, banks have agreed to pay £6.5m over the next year to improve the regime for reporting suspicious activity, which can be a red flag for money-laundering. The so-called SARs regime was one area that global standard-setters have highlighted as needing improvement.

Defensive reporting
Enforcement organisations acknowledge that they are struggling with a substantial amount of low-quality SARs generated by banks and other financial institutions (on average 2000 SARs per working day are obtained). Majority of the SARs are irrelevant, with little practical impact, or merely bad quality , meaning that vital resources are being diverted.

However, blaming banks and financial institutions alone would be incorrect. The way in which the failure to report money laundering offences in sections 330-332 of POCA are currently drafted triggers high volume of defensive reporting.

DEVISING AN EFFECTIVE AML/CFT FRAMEWORK; THE KEY AREAS

Clearly, an effective AML/CFT regime requires significant collaboration and cooperation from the country’s stakeholders in the public sector. Also crucial to the success of the regime, however, are relevant stakeholders from the private sector, namely the financial institutions and designated nonfinancial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) subject to compliance obligations. These should also be included in the collaborative process.

The primary responsibilities of any AML/CFT supervisor are:

  • Monitor AML/CFT compliance in the banking industry
  • Enforce AML/CFT regulations set out by policy makers
  • Ensure a level playing field to promote fair competition in the financial sector
  • Work with the industry to build an effective AML/CFT regime

 Safe-guarding the Banks in Financial Systems
A country’s AML/CFT regime needs to start with its banks. Because of their crucial role in the financial system, any banks not having effective AML/CFT programs are the ones most likely to be exposed to ML/TF risks, and hence can most easily be exploited by domestic and international criminals. In order to protect the integrity of its financial system, therefore, the UK must have an effective AML/CFT regime that satisfies international standards. The FATF recommendations do provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate different sets of national domestic conditions and can also allow access-expanding innovations like branchless banking. It is also noteworthy that, if these citizens do find themselves discouraged from using the formal banking system, they will find alternative systems that, by definition, are subject to no controls.

A Political Will: Importance of cooperation and collaboration
In order to have a successful AML/CFT regime, UK government must have the political will to undertake all the necessary steps to establish and implement it, and having done so, the government must then demonstrate a clear commitment to the process it has put in place. This means that the government must pass and enforce appropriate laws and regulations, must dedicate the necessary resources to the task, must grant suitable powers to relevant agencies, and must prosecute cases and obtain convictions. Without such political commitment from the highest governmental levels, there is little chance for success for any AML/CFT regime. Indeed, without it, there is little incentive for officials to develop an effective AML/CFT supervisory system. That is because other stakeholders are unlikely to commit themselves either to contribute or participate effectively in the process. Money laundering and terrorist financing are complex crimes and, for this reason, multiple national agencies must be involved in the various aspects of preventing, detecting, and prosecuting them. The specific agencies involved may vary from country to country, but the collaboration of the following areas is needed for an effective, overall AML/CFT regime:

  • Legislature
  • Executive Branch or Ministries
  • Judiciary
  • Law Enforcement, including police, customs, and so forth
  • FIU
  • Supervisors of banks, including the central bank, of other financial institutions, and of DNFBPs. Where there are different national agencies involved, there are likely to be different objectives and priorities. It is important, nevertheless, to establish a unified set of objectives and priorities for the overall regime, and to have collaboration and coordination among the various public sector constituencies.

Even so, while collaboration among the relevant public sector constituencies is necessary, it is not sufficient to assure effectiveness for a country’s regime. There must also be collaboration with those private sector stakeholders (such as banks, other financial institutions, and DNFBPs) that are required to comply with the country’s AML/CFT obligations. This group has specialized perspectives on the regime’s objectives, as well as on the practicability of the timeframes for achieving them. In addition, the regime will be more effective overall, and the level of compliance will be higher, if the concerns of the private sector are addressed.

Organisation’s approaches to an effective framework
Supervision by the Bank Supervisor

Supervision of AML/CFT compliance in banks by the bank supervisor is probably the most common organizational model, and it produces a number of benefits.

First, supervisory bodies are usually both highly skilled and knowledgeable about assessing risks in banks, as well as about the policies and procedures to manage those risks. Second, ML/FT risks are monitored like other types of compliance risks for which bank supervisors are responsible. Third, supervisors are knowledgeable about how banks operate and about the products and services they offer. Fourth, supervisors understand the differences between the ways small local banks and large international banks operate. This international dimension to the supervisor’s responsibilities is particularly useful in cross-border supervision. Finally, most bank supervisors have at least some experience in enterprise-wide, consolidated supervision. Many banking institutions are part of large financial organizations, and these include securities firms, insurance companies, and other types of financial entities. Such organizations often adopt an enterprise-wide approach to AML/CFT compliance, just as they do to risks in consolidated credit, market, or general operations. This approach requires a consolidated understanding of the entire organization’s risk exposure for ML/TF across all activities, business lines, and legal entities. Such a centralized function often includes the ability for the organization to comprehend the enterprise-wide, indeed worldwide, exposure of a given customer, particularly one considered to be high risk. It is a complex undertaking, but bank supervisors are well equipped to understand the capabilities and limitations of such a system.

This model does have some disadvantages. Bank supervisors, because of prudential concerns, may not give AML/CFT the same priority as governments do, or may not have sufficient resources to do so. In consequence, compliance issues may get neither the quantity nor quality of attention that is necessary. As well, supervising compliance with the AML/CFT regime is not a traditional prudential supervisory responsibility. It is a new concept to some extent, not only for bank staff, but also for the supervisory body, which must learn new skills. This situation may initially be reflected in staff difficulties.

Supervision by the FIU or Other Entity
As an alternate to the bank supervisory model, AML/CFT compliance supervision may be conducted by the FIU or another governmental agency. Under this model, it is the FIU (or alternative), not the bank supervisory body, which must be authorized, first, to have access to all relevant bank information and, second, to conduct examinations. Such authority is needed to enable the FIU or governmental supervisor to determine a bank’s compliance with its AML/CFT obligations.  This model has a number of benefits. First, because collection of information and analysis are the core of its duties, the FIU has expertise in certain AML/CFT matters. Second, AML and CFT are its only responsibilities. Third, the FIU has direct access to suspicious transactions reports (STRs) and related information. According to FATF Recommendation 26, the FIU should have timely access, directly or indirectly, to the financial, administrative, and law-enforcement information required for it to undertake its functions properly, and these include the analysis of STRs.  This model also presents several drawbacks. If the FIU is the supervisor, it may well be inexperienced both in financial inspections and in bank supervisory matters. As well, the FIU is not likely to be sufficiently well equipped to undertake AML/CFT supervision on an enterprise-wide basis. On the other hand, if a body other than the FIU is the supervisor, that body may well not have access to STR information.

Examinations are likely to become more limited in scope and expertise, and multiple regulators and different approaches to compliance supervision may generate some confusion for banks.

The ML/FT Risk Assessment Process from the Bank Perspective

Bank’s Risk Assessment Process
As part of its risk management, and as the first step of any ML/FT risk assessment, a bank should understand the main criminal threats to which it might be exposed, for example, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and corruption. Only banks with effective analyses of the risks involved are sufficiently well equipped to take the appropriate actions to mitigate them. A reasonably designed risk-based approach will provide a framework for identifying the degree of potential money laundering risks associated with specific customers and transactions, and allow an institution to focus on those customers and transactions that potentially pose the greatest risk of money laundering. Having analysed the money laundering or terrorist financing risk, bank management should then communicate those risks to all business lines, to other management, to the board of directors, and to all appropriate staff. To communicate the risk effectively, the assessment should, wherever possible, be written in language that can be easily understood by those who will use it, including the bank’s supervisors.

The benefits of an effective AML/ CFT regime (Framework)
An effective AML regime is a deterrent to criminal activities in and of itself. Such a regime makes it more difficult for criminals to benefit from their acts. In this regard, confiscation and forfeiture of money laundering proceeds are crucial to the success of any AML program. Forfeiture of money laundering proceeds eliminates those profits altogether, thereby reducing the incentive to commit criminal acts. Thus, it should go without saying that the broader the scope of predicate offenses for money laundering, the greater the potential benefit.

This will also influence the public confidence in financial institutions, and hence their stability, is enhanced by sound banking practices that reduce financial risks to their operations. These risks include the potential that either individuals or financial institutions will experience loss as a result of fraud from direct criminal activity, lax internal controls, or violations of laws and regulations.  Money laundering has a direct negative effect on economic growth by diverting resources to less productive activities. Laundered illegal funds follow a different path through the economy than legal funds. Rather than being placed in productive channels for further investment, laundered funds are often placed into “sterile” investments to preserve their value or make them more easily transferable. Such investments include real estate, art, jewellery, antiques or high-value consumption assets such as luxury automobiles. Such investments do not generate additional productivity for the broader economy.

CONCLUSION

Current regulations and regulations do not help the SARs process. As seen throughout this thesis, the legal obligation to report suspicious activity leads to a tendency for compliance experts to “over-report”. For a more flexible and proactive anti-money laundering effort, higher public-private involvement and partnership is required. Greater use of technological tools to improve identification of the qualities separating a useful report from a less valuable one, should be made.

The focus on taking a risk-based approach (after implementation of MLR 2017) is driving the need for experts to gain a profound knowledge of potential risk exposure a relationship presents, creating additional demand for solid investigative skills.

Furthermore, because of the proliferation of digital channels now being used to create accounts, onboarding customers also poses growing issues. Remote onboarding being more prevalent has resulted into a rise in volume of new accounts created fraudulently.

With so many challenges facing the AML industry, the use of technology plays a vital role in assisting business tackle financial crime. Technology can assist with data sharing, with many calling for a single utility in the AML regime that gathers and collects the common information businesses need to conduct due diligence. Maybe the UK can learn from the Nordic countries, where banks are exploring the possibility of setting up a KYC utility together with setting up a joint venture to achieve this. The Nordic utility will focus on creating “an effective, common, safe and cost0effective infrastructure platform to share confidential credentials with customers”. This will assist in decreasing the time taken to carry out KYC checks and embed new clients by offering a centralized common resource they can all draw on.

There are significant difficulties facing the compliance sector. Money launderers are becoming more advanced and technology is being adopted as rapidly as it is released- unhindered by laws and regulations, they leave business on the back foot indefinitely. From past reports we noticed that even though many organisations and laws are created, it is not enough to challenge this problem. So by formulating such framework, we are sure to fight money laundering and terrorism financing in a better way and with more ability. These do affect a country’s economy and with the implementation of the proposed framework, money laundering can be minimized to a least number if not stop completely. We cannot afford to lose sight of the ultimate objective. Money laundering has a real-life human impact, and we must do all can to stem it.

Interaction Between Blockchain Technology And Arbitration

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Miss Ashita Alag

Mr S.K.Joy Ramphul

Interaction Between Blockchain Technology And Arbitration

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, words such as cryptocurrency, bitcoins and blockchain have been doing the rounds. With the advent of this new manner of doing business, things are bound to get shaken up in the arbitration world as well. Since arbitration is relevant to any scenario where a dispute (specifically a business/trade/commercial/contractual) may arise, the advent of a new manner in which people interact with each other commercially will automatically become relevant to arbitration. It is another avenue where a dispute may arise, and hence may require a dispute resolution method (which can be arbitration). However, before going to the link between blockchains and arbitrations, it is important to understand what these terms mean and how they work.

Cryptocurrency in simple terms is a digital currency. However, it is different from Fiat Money (money which the government has declared as legal tender), in one very important way, i.e. cryptocurrency is decentralized. This means that it is not controlled by central banks or governments, and it operates outside this framework. Bitcoin is a type of cryptocurrency just like Namecoin, Ether, etc.

Each cryptocurrency is based on a different blockchain technology platform. Blockchain is essentially the mechanism that authenticates a cryptocurrency. Blockchain can be understood as a register that records the transfers or transactions done using cryptocurrencies. However, it is decentralized. Blockchain is akin to a ledger, but is not maintained by any one person. Everyone on that blockchain has access to it. It is continuously updated as transactions occur on the blockchain. To put it simply, transactions are conducted using cryptocurrencies, and these transactions are conducted on the blockchain. Blockchain is like the plane on which these transactions are conducted. Before any transaction is added to the blockchain/decentralized ledger it is validated by a network of computers and this is how blockchain authenticates cryptocurrencies. Hence, every blockchain updates an ever growing ledger to track the ownership of the underlying asset (the cryptocurrency). All members on the blockchain platform can access the ownership information contained in this decentralized ledger.

Smart Contracts are legal instruments that rely on blockchains and are self-executory in nature. These are e-instructions given in the form of a code which will execute themselves on fulfillment of a specified set of conditions. Smart Contracts essentially include instructions for doing something on the happening of a contingency. As soon as that contingency happens (condition is fulfilled), the instructions are executed. In a nutshell, Smart Contracts are different from traditional contracts in two major ways. Firstly unlike traditional contracts, Smart Contracts are not written in traditional languages such as English or German, but are expressed entirely in code. Secondly, Smart Contracts will self-execute upon happening of the contingency mentioned in the code and on receiving the trigger. For instance, if A and B enter into a Smart Contract, whereby A agrees to sell an item to B, upon payment by B to A, then ownership of the item would automatically transfer to B once he makes the payment to A.

Hence, it is the blockchain that gives practical use to cryptocurrencies and Smart Contracts. Although Cryptocurrency and Smart Contracts may exist in a void, they are useful only when they can be transferred and executed, and this can only be made possible on a blockchain.

II. BLOCKCHAINS AND THE LAW

There have been speculations that the blockchain technology and self-executing Smart Contracts might replace the need for lawyers. This is far from the truth. Technology has been developing for years, and law has been dynamic enough to stand the test throughout years. Law has found ways to interact with new technology. Moreover the fact that any new technology has to pass the test of law in order to exist, only goes on to show how the blockchain technology may bring with it new avenues for lawyers. In fact, lawyers might favour recommending Smart Contracts as a measure to overcome enforceability issues of traditional legal agreements that they may be hired to draw up. Lawyers who make such recommendations will have to understand the types of clauses that go into Smart Contracts and how they function. Smart Contracts include operational and non-operational clauses. Operational clauses contain some kind of conditional logic. Such clauses would require that on the happening of a certain event, or on the fulfillment of certain conditions, or at a particular time, some specific determinative action is required to be taken. Non-operational clauses are those clauses that do not have a such a conditional logic. For instance, a clause that defines governing law if disputes arise, or what jurisdiction should the dispute be in, etc. Non-operation clauses would require the lawyer to exercise personal judgment with a sound knowledge of the consequences while giving advice with respect to Smart Contracts. Hence, with the coming of the blockchain technology and Smart Contracts, lawyers will have to adapt themselves to this new technology and their role will only become even more important at the time of advising their clients with respect to entering into and drawing up the operational and especially non-operational clauses.

III. ARBITRATION AND BLOCKCHAIN

Blockchain has brought with it a new way of doing trade and as with any avenue where trade is involved, disputes are bound to arise. With the fast paced growth of cryptocurrencies, the need for an effective dispute resolution mechanism which is suited to unique nature of blockchains is bound to arise.

Arbitration has provided parties with a mechanism through which they can resolve their contractual disputes outside a court of law, and it has given them the freedom to choose their arbitrators, the governing law, the procedure, etc. It is by virtue of this flexibility and neutrality that arbitration has come to establish itself as a favoured dispute resolution mechanism for contractual disputes. Arbitration has established itself as the preferred dispute resolution mechanism especially international contractual disputes, as it tackles cross-border enforceability issues that come with other dispute resolution mechanisms. These are the characteristics that will make arbitration the go-to dispute resolution mechanism for disputes arising out of the use of decentralized digital assets as well.

1. WHY ARBITRATION IS IDEAL FOR SMART-CONTRACTS

Smart Contracts and arbitrations have one very important feature in common i.e. decentralization. Decentralization makes arbitration the most suited dispute resolution mechanism for disputes arising out of Smart Contracts. It is in this decentralized aspect of international arbitration, that its flexibility and ease of enforcement find place.

International Arbitration provides a decentralized substitute to domestic tribunals and also results in enforceable awards recognized under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards. Going under the traditional mechanism, i.e. national courts, would not only go against the decentralized manner of functioning that persons functioning over blockchains recognize, but will also not assure a problem-free enforcement. This is strengthened by the fact that there is no single convention for recognition of national court judgments across the board, however with respect to arbitral awards we have the New York Convention to which almost 160 states are parties. It is well-recognized that the blockchain technology is fairly new and is a departure from the traditional way of conducting transactions. This specialized way in which trade is conducted, will also require experts who understand how blockchains, Smart Contracts and cryptocurrencies work and interact with legal obligations of the parties in question. International Arbitration provides parties with this flexibility of choosing experts as arbitrators who understand the complexities of this technology as well as of choosing an arbitral seat in a jurisdiction that is more supportive of this technological advancement.

Persons indulging in transactions over blockchain will have a preference for a manner of functioning that is decentralized, simple and fast right when they initiate a transaction. It is due to these preferences that they have chosen to trade over Smart Contracts rather than trading through traditional contracts. To begin with, they would have already moved away from traditional contracts involving paperwork and other complexities. It is only natural that such persons will look for a dispute resolution mechanism with the same characteristics. This need is met by arbitration more than it is met by another dispute resolution mechanism. Arbitration provides them with the greatest freedom to choose a convenient place for the arbitral process, to choose experts in the requisite field as arbitrators, to choose the procedure most convenient to them (in fact with the advent of online-arbitration, they may even pick that as the means of dispute resolution, if the dispute is not excessively complicated), etc. Moreover arbitration is widely accepted as the most efficient and effective means of resolving commercial disputes leading to an enforceable award. It will help parties of Smart Contracts to steer clear of having appearing state courts, which may, very often be a jurisdiction in another corner of the world, and face unfamiliar and in some cases unfair procedures of foreign courts. Hence, it can reasonably be concluded that expectations of parties to Smart Contracts will be met more by arbitration than by any other dispute resolution mechanism.

2. PRACTICAL INTERACTION BETWEEN ARBITRATION AND BLOCKCHAIN

While arbitration seems to be the most suited mechanism for resolution of disputes arising out of Smart Contracts, blockchain technology also provides the world of arbitration with the opportunity of further decentralization, and perhaps to move towards a digital dispute resolution forum. The interaction between blockchain and arbitration could help both the mechanisms grow and become more convenient for their users.

While critics may say that technology in today’s world changes at the drop of the hat and blockchains and Smart Contracts are buzzwords that would vanish as soon as they become viral; there is some merit in believing that decentralized ledger technology in the form of a blockchain is here to stay. Hence, it is beneficial if we tailor a dispute resolution mechanism to tackle disputes arising form the same. Introducing and pushing for arbitration in Smart Contracts, and adapting arbitration to the needs of disputes arising out of Smart Contracts, will be beneficial in the long run for both the world of blockchain and the world of arbitration.

a. Traditional Clauses in Smart Contracts
Simply because Smart Contracts are self-executory in nature and based on codes, does not mean that disputes will not arise. It is not enough for parties to enter into Smart Contracts containing instructions on taking a designated action on the happening of a certain event. It is also important for parties to link these Smart Contracts to traditional agreements, in the sense that parties must agree on a dispute resolution mechanism, an institution for resolution of the dispute, the law governing their obligations, etc. Although Smart Contracts might be the modern technology for doing business, including some of these traditional non-self-executing clauses in will help the parties in case a dispute arises. Without such clauses, parties will be met with uncertainty, and this uncertainty will go against their intention of implementing convenient ways of carrying out transactions. The parties would be in the dark with respect to the laws governing them, the forum to which the dispute has to be submitted, and they might even be dragged to national courts of one of the parties. To avoid these situations, it makes sense for the parties to include certain traditional clauses to ensure smooth functioning of their transactions in case a dispute arises. Such a mechanism will ensure that the operational clauses of a Smart Contract continue to function, and the instantaneous execution and convenience that Smart Contracts come with is not compromised; and at the same time, in case of a dispute, the parties are not left in the dark and they have a fixed dispute resolution mechanism/institution in place.

However, in case of Smart Contracts, it is not simply two parties entering into a contract and performing their parts. These contracts are self-executory and rely on blockchains. For instance, if A and B have a Smart Contract whereby A supplies goods to B, the host management arrangement or the administrator will operate through computers physically located in one country to trigger payments (determinative action) from B to A, on supply of the goods (happening of the certain event). If the Smart Contract between A and B provides for arbitration in London, and the agreements entered into between the parties and the administrator (A and the administrator, B and the administrator) provide for litigation/arbitration in Singapore, it could lead to certain complications. Disputes could arise due to various reasons such as non-delivery of goods, non-payment or a failure in the software to carry out the self-executing part of the Smart Contract, etc. One party could move against the other in London, and one party could move against the administrator in Singapore. Similarly, one proceeding could result in arbitral proceedings, and the other in litigation proceedings. This would only cause confusion and lead to multiple proceedings in different jurisdiction, which might even lead to conflicting awards/judgments.

Therefore, each blockchain can consider specifying certain standard traditional clauses for all Smart Contracts entered into by relying on that particular chain.

In order to avoid this, the solution of an umbrella dispute resolution clause has been proposed by Mr. Lee Bacon of Clyde & Co. One umbrella clause providing for the governing law and dispute resolution mechanism throughout the chain will avoid multiple proceedings and multiple awards. It will provide for uniformity in resolution of all the disputes arising from that particular blockchain.

In fact, such an umbrella clause will cut the time and costs parties would incur for entering into individual dispute resolution and governing law clauses. Assuming that for parties entering into Smart Contracts, convenience and speed of transactions is a priority, pre-decided traditional arbitration and governing law clauses which will help the parties get speedier and enforceable awards in case of a dispute, will only further this intention.

However, one of the very basis of arbitration is party autonomy. This party autonomy gives the users of arbitration the freedom to chose what law to apply to their transaction, the freedom to choose the seat for the arbitration, etc. By providing for a standard umbrella clause all across the blockchain, we might be attacking the autonomy of the parties trading over that blockchain. The questions whether it is fair to almost force parties to accept a certain seat or a certain governing law chosen by the blockchain for all its participants will have to be considered. However, the contrary, where all parties are free to choose their own specifications (considering that millions of people would trade by relying on one blockchain), leading to multiple proceedings for the same cause of action over differing jurisdictions is also not desirable. In fact, such a scenario will make using blockchains and Smart Contracts excessively inconvenient for its users. One way of finding an equilibrium can be that there can be a few variations in these traditional clauses to give options to entities trading on that blockchain in order to give them a certain degree of flexibility. For instance, it can be considered to give options between a few different institutions, that parties may opt for depending on locational convenience. A balance will have to be struck between absolute flexibility given to parties and the uniformity required through the blockchain with respect to disputes related to Smart Contracts on that blockchain.

b. Dispute Resolution Platforms on Blockchain
In recent times there have been many attempts to create platforms for dispute resolution in cases involving smart contracts on blockchains.

CodeLegit is one such platforms that conducted its first blockchain based smart contract arbitration in 2017. As per its website, its mission is to “…bridge the gap between technology and law by auditing the compliance of software code.” Among other things it provides for a blockchain arbitration library providing ready made smart contracts which include the Codelegit Arbitration Certificate. It provides for an appointing authority which will appoint the arbitrators and all communication for the proceedings occurs via email or through videoconferencing for the oral hearings. Disputes are referred to the arbitrator and during this the execution of the smart contract is paused. Once the decision is rendered the smart contract continues its execution as per that decision.

Kleros, is another platform and it titled itself as the “Blockchain Dispute Resolution Layer”. It purports to connect the parties requiring dispute resolution to skilled jurors. The smart contract must choose Kleros as the dispute resolution platform, and on the occurrence of a dispute, the dispute is submitted to Kleros that draws a Tribunal from the crowd. These jurors eventually cast their vote and the decision is enforced by the smart contract.

An example of how end-to-end blockchain based arbitration will work in its practicality has been presented by OpenLaw. A party can sell its product on a marketplace and it will create a legally complaint bill of sale that incorporates OpenCourt arbitration system. After the agreement is signed, any payments by the buyer are placed in an virtual escrow account. The smart contract enables either of the parties to trigger online arbitration. Once certain formalities are completed OpenCourt will send a smart contract notice of a confirmed dispute and then it will transfer all the digital assets to a virtual escrow account, thus, locking them until the arbitral tribunal renders a decision. The interface allows the party to submit a statement of facts, agree on the blockchain address of who they choose as the arbitrator, etc. The interface allows the arbitrator to review the statement of facts, render a decision which is automatically transferred through from the assets locked in the escrow.

Even though these and many more platforms provide for a simplified view of how dispute resolution in case of smart contracts might work, it is a start that will lead us to a more convenient process of resolving disputes involving smart contracts.

IV. WAY FORWARD

To push arbitration in the area of blockchains, we would need arbitration clauses tailored to the need of cryptocurrencies. Arbitral Institutions will also have to mould their rules and procedure to suit the needs of Smart Contracts. Smart Contracts present a whole new world for arbitration to make its way into. Arbitration and the blockchain technology have a lot in common in their manner of functioning and in the convenience they provide to their users. It is for that reason that arbitration can prove to be the most suitable dispute resolution mechanism for disputes arising out of the blockchain technology.

While the arbitral community will have to adapt itself to the challenges brought forward by the blockchain technology and prove to be the most suitable dispute resolution mechanism, those entering into Smart Contracts must also consider the advantages of including certain traditional non-operational clauses in their Smart Contracts which might come handy on a rainy day when a dispute arises. The situation is complicated by the fact that in Smart Contracts it is not just the two parties that may be involved, and the fact that the Smart Contract relied on a blockchain for its execution which may also falter only adds to the difficulties while dealing with dispute resolution. While the suggestion of a standard umbrella clause with standard clauses for all those trading over that blockchain to provide for uniformity has some merit, how this will play out with the inherent characteristics of party autonomy provided to the users of arbitrations is uncertain. While have standard clauses with a few variations to give options to the users of the blockchain, could be a manner of a sticking a balance between absolute uniformity and absolute party autonomy, how this plays out practically is yet to be seen.

Both arbitrations and blockchains have a lot to learn and gain from each other. Arbitration may be the most suited mechanism for blockchains, but it has to adapt itself to the challenges posed by this new technology to gain the faith of its users. Arbitral institutions will also have to go that extra mile to increase their presence in the blockchain world, so as to have more Smart Contracts rely on arbitration. Exciting times lie ahead, as we get to see the interplay between arbitrations and the blockchain technology and how they act and react with one another.

References:

1. Francisco Uríbarri Soares, ‘New Technologies and Arbitration’, in Indian Journal of Arbitration Law (Vol. VII Issue 1) (2018), at pp.84-103

2. Dena Givari, How Does Arbitration Intersect with the Blockchain Technology that underlies Cryptocurrencies?, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (May 5, 2018)

3. Derric Yeoh , Is Online Dispute Resolution The Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution? Kluwer Arbitration Blog (March 29, 2018
)

4. Dispute resolution in blockchain: do you need an umbrella? By Lee Bacon, Clyde & Co., availble at https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/dispute-resolution-in-blockchain-do-you-need-an-umbrella

5. Whitepaper: Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger – A Legal Perspective, Linklaters (August, 2017) available at: https://www.isda.org/a/6EKDE/smart-contracts-and-distributed-ledger-a-legal-perspective.pdf

6. How Smart Contract Arbitration Works, available at: http://codelegit.com/2017/06/24/how-smart-contract-arbitration-works/

7. CodeLegit Website: http://codelegit.com

8. Kleros Website: https://kleros.io

9. “OpenCourt: Legally Enforceable Blockchain-Based Arbitration”, available at: https://media.consensys.net/opencourt-legally-enforceable-blockchain-based-arbitration-3d7147dbb56f