Pre-Award Waiver of Annulment – Where Does it Now Stand in International Commercial Arbitration?

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Stephanie Papazoglou
Lawyer
MIDS Geneva 2018

S.K.Joy Ramphul
Senior Partner
MIDS Geneva 2014

Pre-Award Waiver of Annulment – Where Does it Now Stand in International Commercial Arbitration?

The use of advanced waiver of annulment in civil and common law systems has gained popularity in the last few decades[1]. The main reason of its popularity is because it demonstrates the trust that parties to an arbitral agreement have in such process. However, the issue of advanced waiver is particular problematic as there is a tension between finality and fairness, a subject of a never-ending debate within the international arbitration community. The scope of this paper is to provide the detailed overview of the debate and to understand how currently international commercial arbitration deals with this legal framework.

A comparative approach of the validity of advanced waiver of setting-aside an award

  1. Legal systems allowing advanced waiver

 Domestic legal systems explicitly allowing parties to fully waive a set-aside action

 It is true that multiple legal systems tend to allow parties to fully waive a set-aside award. For instance, Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (“CPIL”) in its Article 192 (1) affords the parties an opportunity to conclude an exclusion agreement, waiving expressly their right to challenge an award before the courts of the seat of the arbitration. According to Article 190 (2) of the CPIL, the parties may exclude one, more or any grounds for annulment of arbitral awards.

  1. Legal systems restraining or even prohibiting the practise of advanced waiver Under German Law GCPC

Nevertheless, other legal systems prefer to take a more restrictive approach to the practice of advanced waiver. Under Section 1059 (2) of the German Civil Procedure Code (“GCPC”), the possibility to waive is limited into four grounds including validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, the parties’ right to be heard, the formation of the arbitral tribunal. These grounds are in the interest of the parties, thus can be waived. Section 1059 (2) prohibits the waiver when questions of non-arbitrability and violation of public policy are raised. These grounds are considered as mandatory grounds and thus cannot be waived under any condition.

  1. Advanced Waiver recognized by International Arbitral Institutions

The use of advanced waiver of annulment is also recognized by a considering number of international arbitration institutions through their arbitration rules. For instance, Article 35 of Arbitration Rules of the Jerusalem Arbitration Centre (JAC) provides a clear and express waiver of set-aside and states that “the parties shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse, including appeal and setting aside or annulment, before any judicial authority against any decision of an arbitral tribunal and the Court, insofar as such waiver can validly be made”.

The arbitration rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) provide also the possibility to waive its right to object an award, but there isn’t any express reference to set-aside proceedings. Article 26 (8) of the LCIA Rules 2017 provides that “every award shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out any award immediately and without any delay (subject only to Article 27); and the parties also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other legal authority, insofar as such waiver shall not be prohibited under any applicable law”.

A critical analysis of the effect of advanced waiver of annulment

In light of the above, it is important to examine the effectiveness of those types of waivers. Indeed, if the parties’ waiver is valid and enforceable, the immediate consequence is that the latter are barred from seeking to set aside the award before the national courts at the seat. Evidently, this can be problematic in a situation when there is a tension between finality and fairness or even correctness of the award. However, and importantly, this does not mean that those national courts cannot control the award in any way whatsoever[2]. In many jurisdictions the stage of recognition differs from the stage of annulment. This is specifically provided under Swiss and French law; Article 1522(2) of the French Civil Procedure Code (CPC) states that even in case of a set-aside waiver, “the parties nonetheless retain their right to appeal an enforcement order on one of the grounds set forth in Article 1520”. Similarly, according to Article 192(2) of the Swiss PILA, “if the parties have waived fully the action for annulment against the awards and if the awards are to be enforced in Switzerland, the New York Convention applies by analogy”. In other words, the local award (ie made in France or Switzerland) is treated as if it was foreign (ie made outside France/Switzerland), and is thus submitted to the control of foreign awards at the recognition and enforcement stage.  In the same logic an award can be enforced outside Switzerland in a member of state of New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards (NYC). As a result, even if the parties have expressly waived the right to set-aside an award by concluding an exclusion agreement, the final award can still be challenged on any of the grounds provided by the Article V of the NYC. So national courts are able to maintain some control even where waivers are valid, given the grounds for setting aside an award are typically repeated as the grounds for challenging enforcement.

Furthermore, the use of exclusion agreement raises another question, which addressed whether arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract and if so, why shouldn’t parties have the autonomy to define by concluding an agreement what is fair and what is not fair? In the author’s view, the interaction between parties and society is very tide and parties cannot act independently. Excess on the freedom to waive any grounds of annulment may render arbitration an unattractive adjudicative process repugnant to natural justice and public policy. In Hoeft v. MVL Group 2003 decision from the United States, the court held the waiver invalid on the basis that contractual freedom must have certain limits. The Second Circuit Court considered that it is not for private parties to agree to restrict public interests. Waivers are therefore appropriate only for excluding private (party) rights and interests, and not for excluding grounds in the public interest. The public interest includes ‘public policy’, the ‘fundamental notions of justice and fairness’, including the rules of natural justice.

Conclusion

To summarize, on a practical level, whether a waiver of the right to challenge an award is desirable, will depend on the goals that the parties are trying to achieve in light of the nature of the contract, the amount potentially in dispute and the risk of dilatory tactics by one party. As a result, a partial waiver may be more often suitable rather than a full waiver. Finally, the tide of time is yet to provide legitimate reasons to fundamentally alter or not this paradigm.

[1] Kenneth M. Curtin, “An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards” (2000) 337, 359

[2] Domitille Baizeau, “Commentary on Chapter 12 PILS, Article 192 (Waiver of annulment) (2007), 283, 288

A Guide To Survive And Thrive In The Post-Pandemic World, COVID-19

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Ajay Advani
Vice President, Tableau Partners,
Asia Pacific & Japan

S.K.Joy Ramphul
Senior Partner

A guide to survive and thrive in the post-pandemic world

COVID-19 has changed the world. Over the past six months, our lives have been upended by the viral outbreak, and we have had to drastically change the way we live and work. There have been numerous commentaries about what the “new normal” looks like in a post-pandemic world, and businesses are busy planning for this. What must they do to stabilize things now? What can they do to safely restart offices and operations and what can they do to grow and thrive in the future?

At the core, businesses need to have empathy. We are in an unusual situation where everyone is faced with similar concerns and challenges at the same time. Customers are experiencing heightened levels of stress and uncertainty. Bearing that in mind, businesses have a unique opportunity to connect with their customers in a meaningful way. By putting the customer at the heart of the organization and listening to their needs, businesses can strengthen existing relationships. and grow trust with with their customer base.

Being agile and adaptable to changes is another key attribute that can help businesses successfully navigate these difficult times. With changing business priorities, what has worked a few months ago may no longer be relevant. While staying close to customers, businesses need to pivot quickly to solve customers’ most pressing challenges. Starbucks is one company that has managed to do that. For instance, when its customers were staying at home due to lockdown measures, it modified its operations to focus on Drive-Thru, Delivery, Mobile Order and Contactless Pick-up, or Entryway Handoff only, store by store. Not that the lockdown is being eased, it has quickly brought back the store experience valued by its customers.

The crisis has provided all of us a window into the future. One of the key differentiators for organizations that are able to succeed is their ability to predict customers’ future needs and innovate fast enough to meet them. Some of the greatest brands that we know today have emerged out of crises. Apple and Netflix are great examples. They transformed themselves in the dot com crisis and have revolutionized how we listen to music and watch television. Their genius was that none of us knew we needed these new ways to enjoy music and television, but now we cannnot live without them. We can say the same thing about Uber and ride hailing, Grab and good delivery and Amazon and shopping. As with past crises, this downturn will also spur organizations to think about what customers really need which will, in turn, inspire new innovations to make life better.

For those in the technology world like me, the pandemic has unveiled trends we can all learn to ride on, one of them being the importance of helping businesses to see and understand data. Governments have turned to data when the pandemic hit to learn about the spread of the virus and to how to respond appropriately. As economies open up, businesses, too, will leverage data to make decisions about how to get back to business safely. With the abundance of data collected during the first wave, insights gleaned from this data can help organizations to put in place the planning, logistics, and communication to resume operations, monitor change and respond to new demands while protecting employees.

Another trend that businesses will prioritise is building resilience. Many will transform their business to be able to operate from anywhere and at any time; diversify and strengthen their supply chains and reduce redundancy. Companies that support these needs will thrive. At the same time, let’s not forget that there are also new growth opportunities. Industries like health and wellness are seeing a huge boom as people start to pay more attention to their well-being. Organizations that can unlock these new opportunities will continue to find new revenue streams to stay in business.

Over the last 20 years, we have faced many challenges—the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the 9/11 economic downturn, the SARS outbreak, the global financial crisis of 2008, and now, the COVID-19 pandemic. Each time the world’s economy crashed, it has managed to bounce back. However, the world that emerged was very different. Businesses that can adapt quickly to changes, identify new trends innovate to meet customers’ needs will be the ones that thrive in the post-pandemic economy.

Trend In Investor State Settlement In Asia Pacific

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Datuk Prof. Sundra Rajoo

TRENDS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC: REASSESSING THE ROLE OF ASIAN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE (AIAC)

INTRODUCTION

The profile of international transactions in South East Asia has no doubt owed its existence to the development of trade and investment throughout the region. This ‘Golden Asian Era’ of growth began to find its roots in the late 20th Century and has continued relentlessly into the 21st Century, as evidenced by the influx of foreign and domestic investments within the region.

Such tremendous development in an increasing globalized world has induced deep and significant changes in South East Asian countries’ policies regarding foreign investments.

For example, the multiplication of international investments agreements is particularly insightful. These agreements date back to the 1960s and aim to create a neutral legal environment conducive to foreign investments, notably by setting up a framework for the settlement of investor-state disputes and ensuring that commitments that countries have made to one another to protect mutual investments are respected. Today there are more than 2,900 international investment agreements containing investor-state dispute settlement (‘ISDS’) provisions. 2

Behind this trend, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) has played a significant role. ICSID is the leading arbitration institution whose purpose is to facilitate alternative dispute resolution(‘ADR’) between foreign investors and states.Establishedin1966by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and Nationals of Other States (the ‘ICSID Convention’ or ‘Washington Convention’) under the auspices of the World Bank, the ICSID Convention counts over 150 countries as members. 3

Since their emergence, ISDS mechanisms have met with a resounding success. One of the most striking testaments to this success is the steady increase in the number of investor-state arbitrations over the past several years.

However, over the past decade an increasing sceptical attitude of states towards ISDS mechanisms is palpable. One of the recurring themes in the current debate around investor-state dispute settlement clauses is that they are tools of crafty multinationals or big capitalist investors looking to dictate policy to governments or impede their sovereign regulatory power.

The overall consensus that this article intends to draw out would be the discernible shift in the approach to ISDS whose culmination is the note worthy Philip Morris v Australia case and whose repercussions extend to South East Asian waters and beyond.

Focus will also be on the debate surrounding the inclusion of ISDS clauses in major Free Trade Agreements (‘FTAs’) such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (‘TTPA’) under negotiation between several groups of states in the region and Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BITs’) more broadly.

The discussion reveals that ISDS mechanisms are also making headline news around the world, and particularly in Europe within the context of the now not so successful attempt a trade pact, namely, the Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Partnership (‘TTIP’).

Building on the Asian International Arbitration Centre example, the article finally examines the role of Asian arbitral institutions have played so far in promoting ISDS in the region and in fostering the trust and confidence of states and investors in ISDS mechanisms as a response to the growing tense climate.

OVERVIEW OF THE PHILIP MORRIS CASE AGAINST AUSTRALIA

The Philip Morris v Australia case is one of the main chapters of along running saga and legal battle initiated by one of the biggest players in the international tobacco industry.

Following a first pending case started on February 2010 against Uruguay,4 a second case won against the Thai Government5 and a third case lost against Norway in 2012,6 Philip Morris’ action against Australia stands testament to the company’s ambition to hinder states from adopting restrictions targeting the tobacco industry.

The Philip Morris v Australia case is the first investor-state dispute that has been brought against Australia.

Philip Morris Asia (‘PMA’) is a company incorporated in Hong Kong and is the regional command post of the Philip Morris International group of companies for the Asia Region since 1984.7

PMA holds all of the shares of the Australian branch of the group, Philip Morris Australia (‘PM Australia’),8 which in turn owns all of the shares of Philip Morris Ltd (‘PML’), a trading company in corporated in Australia, whose corporate purpose is the manufacturing, import and export, sale, marketing and distribution of tobacco products within Australia, New Zealand the Pacific Islands.9

On 1st December 2011, the Australian government passed the Tobacco PlainPackagingAct2011(‘theAct’).10TheActformsarangeoftobaccocontrol measures aiming at making tobacco products less attractive to consumers in Australia. The Act requires notably that all tobacco products sold in Australia were to be sold in plain packaging from 1 December 2012. In concrete terms, the Act obliges players in the tobacco market to cover a substantial portion of their products with health warnings and prohibits all logos, visual specificities along with different colouring and layout on cigarette packs.

Following UK’s and New Zealand’s winding attempts to adopt similar restrictions for cigarette packaging,11 Australia was the first country to implement such measures.12

Building on the provisions of the agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (‘the Hong Kong agreement’),13 PMA challenged the Australian tobacco plain packaging legislation.

The two main grounds of PMA’s challenge were article 2(2) relating to the parties’ commitment to give the other party’s investors fair and equitable treatment, and article 6, which addresses the issue of expropriation.

The arbitral tribunal that has been constituted is composed of three prominent arbitrators. PMA appointed Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, while Australia appointed Professor Don McRae of the University of Ottawa. The Secretariat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration appointed Professor Dr Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel as the chair arbitrator.

The arbitration is being conducted under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) Arbitration Rules 2010.

In its Notice of Arbitration, PMA has raised a number of arguments. As already mentioned, PMA alleged that the Australian measure constitutes an expropriation of its Australian investments that is inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under the Hong Kong Agreement.

The Claimant further argued that those new restrictions are in breach of the respondent’s commitment to accord fair and equitable treatment to Philip Morris Asia’s investments in the light of article 2(2) of the investment agreement. In addition, the company asserted that the new legislation constitutes an unreasonable and discriminatory measure, violating their trademarks and intellectual property rights, and would make it difficult for consumers to distinguish cigarette brands from one another.14

Concluding its notice of arbitration, PMA sought the suspension of the enforcement of the legislation and compensation for the loss suffered through compliance of the legislation; or the compensation for loss suffered as a result of the enactment and continued application of the legislation.

Australia, on the other hand, argued that those restrictions do not breach the Hong Kong agreement as they are just part of a reasonable approach to public health issues raised by tobacco consumption in Australia. By adopting those measures, Canberra alleged that the government’s simply exercised its legitimate regulatory powers with the aim of protecting the health of its citizens.15

Besides, the Australian government raised three procedural objections relating to the admission of the claimed investments and an abuse of process and claimant’s legal ownership of key assets including cigarette trademarks.16 Canberra requested that its procedural objections be heard in a preliminary phase of the proceedings, prior to any consideration of the merits of PMA’s claim.

In a decision on bifurcation, the arbitral tribunal decided that the Respondent’s first and second procedural objections should be examined in a solepreliminaryphaseandruledthattheanalysisofthethirdobjectionshallbe reserved to an eventual merits phase.17

The arbitral tribunal agreed to the procedural objections raised by the Respondent.18 PMA not only lost but was criticised by the Arbitral Tribunal which found the case to be ‘an abuse of rights’.

The Philip Morris’ collateral effects are far reaching. Apart from Australia’s attitude change towards ISDS, this case has influenced the negotiations surrounding major FTAs and by way of consequence, investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms.

IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (‘TPPA’) AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (‘BITS’)

Philip Morris’ legal battles have changed the landscape of investor-state arbitration. The Australian chapter of the saga, whose bill for the country reached about USD50 m19 has significantly impacted its international relations and attitude towards investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms.

In the wake of Philip Morris’ notice of arbitration, Australia announced that it would no longer include investor-state arbitration provisions in its future international treaties.20

In its statement, the Australian Government noted that the greater legal rights granted by international treaties to foreign investors are unfair for local business which cannot benefit from the protection deriving from such instruments. It has also noted that such dispute resolution mechanisms have gutted the country’s legitimate right to determine its own public policy, and by way of consequence its sovereignty.21

Indeed, opponents of ISDS provisions argue that such clauses effectively undermine free trade, by giving an unfair advantage to globa corporations who can dictate legislation and cement their market power.22

As one concrete illustration of the Australia’s rejection of investor-state arbitration, the Australia-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement (‘MAFTA’), which entered into force on 1 January 2013, contains no investor-state dispute settlement provisions, but limits itself to establish a dispute resolution mechanism for inter-state disputes.23

In this respect, Chapter 20 of MAFTA establishes a process for consultations and for settlement of disputes between contracting states but it does also specify that its scope does not extend to disputes arising from Chapters on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Chapter on Electronic Commerce, the Chapter on Economic, technical co-operation and the Chapter on Competition policy.

The Chapter sets out procedures and timelines for consultations and if they are unsuccessful, it also provides for arbitration. The Chapter then provides for implementation of the findings of such arbitral tribunal.

The Chapter also contains commitments on non-violation complaints, which will provide for consultations between the Parties in the event that any measures are taken by a contracting state, which, while not inconsistent with MAFTA, have the effect of nullifying and impairing benefits that could reasonably have been expected to accrue to the other Party. Should the Parties not be able to resolve the matter through consultations, the matter may be referred to the FTA Joint Commission, which may meet at Ministerial level.

The Australian intelligentsia also expressed its concerns about the impact of ISDS provisions on the Australian judicial system and the country’s sovereignty. Robert French, Chief justice of the High Court of Australia, expressed the following views in the Eli Lilly v Government of Canada case:24

After losing two cases before the appellate courts of a western democracy should a disgruntled foreign multinational pharmaceutical company be free to take that country to private arbitration claiming that its expectation of monopoly profits had been thwarted by the court’s decision? Should governments continue to negotiate treaty agreements where expansive intellectual property-related investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement are enshrined into hard law?25

Likewise, in the context of negotiation of the TPPA, Australia is resisting other prospective parties’ requests to include such kind of provisions in the instrument,26 and is raising numerous restrictions and exceptions to the application of a dispute resolution clause.27

There is then a question whether other countries will follow Australia’s attitude and join the backlash and the answer is seemingly yes.

Within the framework of negotiation of the TPPA, other countries have expressed reluctance to the inclusion of ISDS provisions,28 notably New Zealand,29 Mexico,30 Chile31 and Canada,32 in such a way that the current version of the draft dispute resolution clause is surrounded by numerous exemptions.33

On a wider scale, a shift in the attitude of a certain number of states towards investor-state arbitration is perceptible.

A number of countries beyond the Pacific waters are actively reconsidering their exposure to these processes. One may say that Australia is setting a trend, but more likely, the country is following a trend that finds its roots in the beginning of the second millennium.

In Latin America, Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2007, then in July 2009, Ecuador in turn announced its withdrawal from the ICSID Convention;34 example followed by Venezuela in 2012, which has also signalled its intention to terminate its existing BITs.35 Argentina, facingclaims totalling USD65 billion, announced in early 2013 that it would withdraw from the ICSID Convention.36

Nicaragua has passed legislation to avoid investment arbitration.37 Romania attempted to withdraw from the Swedish-Romanian BIT, while the Philippines negotiated to exclude investment arbitration in its free trade treaty with Japan in 2007.38 In South Africa, the Government Cabinet decided to stop negotiating new BITs and to re-negotiate existing ones.39

Recently, India started a review of its existing BITs and suspended all BIT negotiations to protect itself from frivolous litigation.40

A palpable increasing phenomenon is also noticeable in South East Asia, close to Malaysia’s borders. After having terminated the BIT with Germany in 2014, Indonesia announced on 12 May 2015 its intention to renegotiate its BITs with the aim of providing greater certainty and balance both to foreign companies carrying out business in Indonesia and to the Indonesian government.41 It also highlighted its intention to narrow the dispute resolution clauses’ scope and to all eviate the protection granted to foreign investors under those treaties.42

Someobserversnotethatthisrecenttrendinthedevelopingcountriesfinds its roots in the growth of their economies that allows them to share the same playground as established economies and, by way of consequence, to renegotiate or reject the international treaties they have signed when their economies were just starting to flourish.

Another common critic to ISDS, and that explains the frustration of a growing number of emerging countries, is the developed-countries based framework: on one hand, the main investment arbitration institutions are based in developed countries, so are the vast majority of key players such as arbitrators and counsels. Indeed, it has been reported that only 15 arbitrators, nearly all from Europe, the US or Canada, have decided 55% of all known investment-treaty disputes in the world.43

With regard to Malaysia, sofar, the government’s attitude towards investor state arbitration is much more friendly. Malaysia has signed more than 70 BITs and the vast majority of them provide for arbitration as one of the dispute settlement procedures available to foreign investors.

Malaysia is also a signatory to the ICSID Convention44 and enacted the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act in 1966.45

Malaysia is also a signatory of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement that was signed by the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2009 (‘the 2009 ASEAN Agreement’). It is worth mentioning that section B of the said agreement provides for the resolution of investment disputes between an investor and a member state. In particular, article 33 the same section allows for such disputes to be referred, inter alia, to the AIAC.

In the discussions on major FTAs, notably the TPPA, Malaysia’s position has been on the whole supportive of the inclusion of an ISDS clause in the treaty.46 However,itdoesnotmeanthattheISDSisnotacontroversialissuein Malaysia. Indeed, several business, professional and public-interest groups exert pressure on the government aiming to exclude ISDS from the TPPA negotiations.47

InthelightofthewordsofthethenPrimeMinisterofMalaysia,investment policy and ISDS are one of the issues in the TTPA that may impinge on national sovereignty.48

Nevertheless, Putrajaya said yes to the inclusion of the ISDS clause in the treaty.49

THE DEFUNCT TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (‘TTIP’)

The discussions surrounding the now defunct TTIP, a major international trade and investment agreement between the United States and the European Union (‘EU’) mark the culmination of the increasingly sceptical attitude of EU Member States and more strikingly the EU, which handles trade policy for 28 European Countries, towards ISDS mechanisms.

On 8 July 2015, while debates and negotiations relating to the agreement were raging, the European Parliament voted favourably on a non-binding resolution that aims to remove investor-state arbitration from the TTIP.50 As an alternative, the European Parliament moved towards:

[A] new system for resolving disputes between investors and states which is subject to democratic principles and scrutiny where potential cases are treated in a transparent manner by publicly appointed, independent professional judgesin public hearings and which includes an appellate mechanism, where consistency of judicial decisions is ensured, the jurisdiction of courts of the EU and of the Member States is respected, and where private interests cannot undermine public policy objectives.51

ISDS is dead. It must be replaced by a new public and transparent system of investment protection, in which private interests cannot undermine public policy and which is subject to public law.52

Although the European Parliament in not involved in theTTIP negotiations, a final agreement would be impossible to reach without its prior approval. By drawing up recommendations on the TTIP, the European Parliament sends a clear message on what it wants to see in the final version of the agreement.

Another addition to the hot debate on the ISDS issue has to be mentioned. Matthias Fekl, the French Minister of Foreign Trade, submitted to the European Commission a comprehensive set of proposals regarding the ISDS mechanism that was inserted in the previous version of the draft.53

The measures proposed by the Minister included provisions aiming to safeguard and ensur estates’ legitimate power to decide on their public policy as to regulate, and states’ power to sanction foreign investors for violation of national legislation or regulation; and above all, the creation of an European permanent court for investment arbitration that would have jurisdiction over arbitrations against the EU or EU Member States.54

Although this proposal did not encounter the success that was hoped by its initiators, it can be argued that it echoes the perceptible shift in developed states’ policies and attitude towards investor-state arbitration, to such an extent that some observers wonder if the end of the era of investment treaties and investment arbitration has come.

Throughout the discussions, Germany has also expressed its concerns through its Economy Minister, Brigitte Zypries: ‘From the perspective of the [German] federal government, US investors in the European Union have sufficient legal protection in the national courts’, therefore, there is no reason for the inclusion of a ISDS mechanism in the treaty.55

In such a tense atmosphere, arbitral institutions may play a key role in rebuilding trust in investor-state arbitration.

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF AIAC
The AIAC, a mission based international organisation established under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organisation, has made a point of setting up a comprehensive and efficient framework for investment disputes in South East Asia.

The abiding cooperation between the AIAC and leading institutions devoted to investment dispute settlement stands testament to this.

Since 1979, the AIAC and ICSID have been collaborating partners. The AIAC signed its first collaboration agreement with ICSID in 1979 and this latter agreement has been renewed and updated in 2014. The present agreementsupersedesthepreviousversionandfurtherencouragescooperation and knowledge sharing between the two institutions.56

In addition to fostering cooperation between the AIAC and ICSID, the agreement provides, inter alia, that the AIAC can be used as an alternative hearing venue for ICSID cases and participate in the administration of cases, should the parties to proceedings conducted under the auspices of ICSID desire to conduct proceedings at the seat of the AIAC. The AIAC was in the process of finalising a similar agreement with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Besides the agreements concluded with key institutions in the investment arbitration field, the AIAC is one of the designated venues for settlement of disputes that may a rise from the 2009 ASEAN Agreement.57 Indeed, pursuant to Article 33 of the agreement, investors are allowed unilaterally to commence a claim against an ASEAN host state. It also provides for dispute resolution through various fora, including ICSID and the AIAC.

Knowledge sharing and capacity building is also a cornerstone of AIAC’s policy with regard to investment arbitration that also aims to restore the trust of the main key players in ISDS.

TheAIACcommonlyshareswithvariousplayers,eclectictypesofresources and expertise, and cultivates with them a dynamic information and discussion platform through seminars, conferences and numerous other events.

As an illustration, AIAC had conducted workshops to educate legal stakeholders on the workings and advantages of using ICSID as a preferred institution for settlement of investment disputes. It is through such education that both sides inforeign investment will boast greater awareness of their rights and obligations under international law.58

CONCLUSION

The ISDS system was designed to create neutral dispute resolution fora for both investors and states and to promote capital exchanges and investments in an increasingly globalised economic world.

Proponents of ISDS state that it benefits nations at every stage of development. It allows states to enhance their attractiveness towards foreign investors while companies can invest safe in the knowledge that, if they end up in a dispute with the host state arising out of their investment, they can take their dispute to a neutral forum that complies with widespread practices and applies international standards. It ensures that foreign companies will be treated on an equal footing with their competitors and that their investments are safeguarded.

Today, over 2,900 treaties providing for ISDS mechanisms link numerous countries around the world; they connect emerging countries with developed nations and leading companies with resourceful nations.This multilateral flux of information, technology and capital fostered by investment treaties is crucial for the global economy and each player in this field, states just as well as investors. Proponents opine that such bridges are essential and have to be preserved.

However, opponents say that ISDS mechanisms as in the Philip Morris v Australiacasehavebeenmisused.Theyinsistthatitisnotrandomabuse.There is now an element of disquiet in the ‘Investment Dispute Resolution Era’. Further developments are to be expected as states opt to settle disputes outside the ISDS system. How these mechanisms will emerge and morph is left to be seen.

Only the future will tell whether the palpable mistrustful state’s attitude towards ISDS is volatile and purely the result of a transitory trend or if it is indeed an established and irreversible approach.

1 President, Asian Institute of Alternate Dispute Resolution (AIADR), Certified International ADR Practitioner (AIADR) (2019 to date), Chartered Arbitrator (CIArb) (1999 to date), Advocate & Solicitor (Non-Practising). Architect and Town Planner, Director, Asian International Arbitration Centre (2010–2018), Chairman, Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (2018), Deputy Chairman, FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber (2018), Member of the Monetary Penalty Review Committee under the Financial Services Act 2013 (2014–2019), President, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2016), President, Asian Pacific Regional Arbitration Group (APRAG)(2011), Founding President, Society of Construction Law Malaysia, Founding President, Malaysian Society of Adjudicators, Founding President, Sports Law Association of Malaysia.

2 Investment Treaties (International Institute for Sustainable Development), http://www.iisd. org/investment/law/treaties.aspx accessed 4 May 2020.

3 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes | ICSID Arbitration (International Arbitration Law) http://www.internationalarbitrationlaw.com accessed 4 May 2020.

4 The company brought its claim before ICSID under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. It claims that Uruguay’s regulatory measures violated the investment protection agreement signed in 1991 between Uruguay and Switzerland, where Philip Morris is headquartered. Specifically, Philip Morris complained about three measures imposed by Uruguay: (1) an increase in the size of health warnings on cigarette packets from 50% of the total pack size to 80%; (2) the design of six messages that will fill the 80% space; and (3) a regulation that forces companies to sell only one variation of cigarettes per brand. For more information: Jim Armitage, ‘Big Tobacco puts countries on trial as concerns over TTIP deals mount’ (TheIndependent,21October2014),http://www.independent.co.uk/accessed2September 2015.

5 In June 2013, Philip Morris International and The Thai Tobacco Trade Association (TTTA), which represents 1,400 retailers across the Kingdom, sued theThai government over a new anti-tobacco regulation that required the area covered by graphical health warnings on cigarette packs be increased from 55% to 85% on each side. In August of the same year, the court ordered suspension of the government’s 2nd October deadline to implement the new rule until it reaches a decision on the pending litigation. For more information: Khettiya Jittapong, Jason Szep & Michael Perry, ‘Thailand to appeal after PhilipMorriswinstobaccocase’(Reuters,28August2013),http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2013/08/28/us-thailand-tobacco-philipmorris-idUSBRE97R0AB20130828 accessed 10 September 2015.

6 Philip Morris sued Norway before the Oslo District Court, alleging that the Norwegian ban on tobacco advertising, which included a prohibition on visual product displays in retail locations, was incompatible with the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA). Accordingly, quantitative restrictions on imports and measures having the same effect are prohibited unless they are justified by non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory public health grounds. Prior to issuing an opinion in the case, the district court requested two preliminaryrulingsfromtheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanFreeTradeAssociationStates (EFTA) Court. The EFTA Court determined that if the ban did not affect the tobacco products manufactured in Norway as much as it affected the tobacco products imported from other EEA States, the ban would be incompatible with the EEA. Further, the EFTA Court declared that the district court would have to decide whether Norway’s ban was necessary—thatNorway’slegitimatehealthobjectiveofreducingtobaccousecouldnotbe achieved by measures less restrictive than a tobacco product display ban. Formoreinformation:‘PhilipMorrisLosesTobaccoLawsuitagainstNorway’(TheNorway Page, 14 September 2012), http://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/3204-philip-morrisloses-tobacco-lawsuit-against-norway accessed 2 September 2015.

7 Pmi.com, ‘Philip Morris International Hong Kong’, http://www.pmi.com/marketpages/ pages/market_en_hk.aspx accessed 2 September 2015.

8 Pmi.com,‘PhilipMorrisInternationalAustralia’,http://www.pmi.com/marketpages/pages/ market_en_au.aspx accessed 2 September 2015.

9 ‘Philip Morris (Australia) Limited — Retail’ (IBIS Word), http://www.ibisworld.com.au/ enterprisefull/default.aspx?entid=94 accessed 2 September 2015.

10 Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (No 148, 2011).

11 Hannah Kuchler, Jim Pickard & Duncan Robinson, ‘UK government abandons plain cigarette packaging plan’ (Financial Times, 2013) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ d44ff478-b2ff-11e2-b5a5-00144feabdc0.html accessed 10 September 2015). Howard Schneider, ‘Australia ‘plain packaging’ stubs out cigarette branding, prompting backlash’ (WashingtonPost,29October2013),http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ australias-plain-packaging-stubs-out-cigarette-branding-prompting-backlash/2013/10/29/ 317e58cc-3ccd-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c_story.html accessed 10 September 2015).

12 ‘PhilipMorrisLaunchesLegalBattleOverAustralianCigarettePackaging’(BridgesVolume 15 – Number 24, 29 June 2011, http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/philipmorris-launches-legal-battle-over-australian-cigarette-packaging accessed 2 September 2015).

13 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments [1993] ATS 30.

14 Notice of Arbitration — Philip Morris Asia, (21 November 2011). http://www.ag.gov.au/

15 Response to Notice of Arbitration — Australia, (21 December 2011). http://www.ag.gov. au/.

16 Philip Morris Asia Challenge (Mccabecentre.org, 2015), http://www.mccabecentre.org/ focus-areas/tobacco/philip-morris-asia-challenge accessed 2 September 2015).

17 LukeEricPeterson,’LatestdevelopmentsinthePhilipMorrisarbitrationsagainstAustralia and Uruguay’ (Investment Arbitration Reporter, 12 February 2015) http://www.sfc.org.nz/ documents/263-latest.pdf.

18 PhilipMorrisAsiaLimitedvTheCommonwealthofAustralia,UNCITRAL,PCACaseNo. 2012-12 | (italaw, 2015) http://www.italaw.com/cases/851 accessed 2 September 2015).

19 GlynMoody,‘Australia’sLegalBillForFightingPhilipMorrisCorporateSovereigntyCase: $35 million — So Far’ (Techdirt, 5 August 2015) http://www.techdirt.com/ accessed 2 September 2015.

20 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and prosperity spec. 14 and seq. (2011).

21 Ibid, p 14.

22 For illustration: Finbarr Bermingham, ‘Meet the Aussie politicians hoping to derail TPP’ (Global Trade Review, 17 June 2015) http://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/australia-tppopponents/ accessed 10 September 2015.

23 Malaysia-AustraliaFreeTradeAgreement(MAFTA),enteredintoforceon1January2013.

24 Eli Lilly and Company v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No UNCT/14/2 — See more at: http://www.italaw.com/cases/1625#sthash.jJtWkUY8.dpuf.

25 Melissa Parke, ‘Why support the TPP when it will let foreign corporations take our democracies to court?’ (The Guardian, 29 October 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2014/oct/29/why-support-the-tpp-when-it-will-let-foreign-corporationstake-our-democracies-to-court accessed 2 September 2015.

26 ‘Leaked TPPA trade chapter: Australia says no to investor rights to sue, fair trade groups demand release of all text’ (Australian Fair Trade & Investment Network Ltd, June 2012), http://aftinet.org.au/cms/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement/leaked-tppa-trade-chapteraustralia-says-no-investor-rights-sue- accessed 2 September 2015.

27 Tom Iggulden, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership opposition blamed on dispute clauses’ (ABC News, 31 March 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-01/ transpacific-partnership-why-so-much-opposition/6363326 accessed 2 September 2015.

28 Henry Farell, ‘People are freaking out about theTrans Pacific Partnership’s investor dispute settlement system.Why should you care?’ (Washington Post, 26 March 2015), http://www. washingtonpost.com/ accessed 2 September 2015.

29 Liam Hehir, ‘Concerns about redress overstated’ (Stuff, 20 July 2015), http://www.stuff. co.nz/national/politics/opinion/70360101/concerns-about-redress-overstated accessed 2 September 2015

30 Symone Sanders & Lori Wallach, ’TPP Leak Reveals Extraordinary New Powers for Thousands of Foreign Firms to Challenge U.S. Policies and Demand Taxpayer Compensation’ (Public Citizen, 25 March 2015), http://www.citizen.org/documents/tppinvestment-leak-2015-release.pdf accessed 2 September 2015.

31 Greg Grandin, ‘Never Mind ISIS, It’s ISDS That’s the Real Threat’ (The Nation, 11 November 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/never-mind-isis-its-isds-thats-realthreat/ accessed 2 September 2015.

32 Scott Sinclair & Stuart Trew, ‘The implications for Canada of a fast-tracked Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 4 June 2015), http://www.policyalternatives. ca accessed 2 September 2015.

33 ‘Sovereigntyatstake?WikileaksreleasesdraftTPPAchapteroninvestment’(CutYourTeeth, 2015), http://cutyourteeth.co/2015/03/27/sovereignty-at-stake-wikileaks-releases-drafttppa-chapter-on-investment/ accessed 2 September 2015.

34 Tolga Yalkin, ‘Ecuador Denounces ICSID: Much Ado About Nothing?’ (Ejiltalk.org, 30 July 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ecuador-denounces-icsid-much-ado-about-nothing/ accessed 2 September 2015.

35 Sergei Ripinsky, ‘Venezuela’s Withdrawal From ICSID: What it Does and Does Not Achieve’ (Investment Treaty News, 13 April 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/ venezuelas-withdrawal-from-icsid-what-it-does-and-does-not-achieve/accessed2September 2015.

36 DanielEGonzálezetal.,‘IfArgentinawithdrawsfromtheICSIDconvention:implications forforeigninvestors’(Lexology,4February2013),http://www.lexology.com/library/detail. aspx?g=080c79bc-cce7-485f-97aa-27a5b2bdec5c accessed 10 September 2015.

37 Scott Appleton, ‘Latin American arbitration: the story behind the headlines’ (International Bar Association, 31 March 2010) http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail. aspx?ArticleUid=78296258-3B37-4608-A5EE-3C92D5D0B979 accessed 2 September 2015.

38 Leon Trakman, ’Investor State Arbitration or Local Courts: Will Australia Set a New Trend?’(2012)46JournalofWorldTrade83-120http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1333&context=unswwps-flrps12.

39 ‘South Africa begins withdrawing from EU-member BITs’ (Investment Treaty News, 30 October2012),http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9/accessed10September 2015.

40 Kavaljit Singh of Madhyam, ‘Guest post: India and bilateral investment treaties – are they worth it?’ (Financial Times, 2015), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/01/21/guestpost-india-and-bilateral-investment-treaties-are-they-worth-it/ accessed 10 September 2015.

41 Out-law.com, ‘Indonesia ‘to renegotiate investment treaties’, says economic minister’ (Pinsent Masons, 20 May 2015), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/may/ indonesia-to-renegotiate-investment-treaties-says-economic-minister/ accessed 10 September 2015.

42 JohnLumbantobing,‘RenegotiatingthebiteofourBITs’(TheJakartaPost,18May2015), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/05/18/renegotiating-bite-our-bits.html accessed 2 September 2015.

43 Martin Khor, ‘Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom’ (IDN-InDepthNews, 2013), http://www.indepthnews.info/index.php/global-issues/ 1702-fuelling-an-investment-arbitration-boom accessed 2 September 2015.

44 Signature (22 Oct 1965); Deposit of Ratification (8 August 1966).

45 (Act 392).

46 Sheridan Mahavera, ‘Putrajaya okay with investor-state dispute clause in trade pact, says DAP lawmaker’ (The Malaysian Insider, 2015), http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ malaysia/article/ putrajaya-okay-with-invester-state-dispute-clause-in-trade-pact-says-dap-la accessed 10 September 2015.

47 Martin Khor, ‘Investor treaties in trouble’ (The Star, 24 March 2014), http://www.thestar. com.my/ accessed 11 September 2015.

48 Ibid.

49 Sheridan Mahavera, op. cit.

50 RobinEmmott,‘EUlawmakersbackarbitrationinU.S.tradedeal’(Reuters,28May2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/28/eu-usa-trade-idUSL5N0YJ25120150528.

51 European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘TTIP: EP recommendations for an EU-US trade deal’ (European Parliament Research Service Blog, 14 July 2015), http://epthinktank. eu/2015/07/14/ttip-ep-recommendations-for-an-eu-us-trade-deal/ accessed 2 September 2015. Text of the resolution: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0252+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.

52 Aline Robert, ‘European Parliament backs TTIP, rejects ISDS’ (EurActiv, 9 July 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/european-parliament-backs-ttip-rejectsisds-316142 accessed 2 September 2015.

53 CécileBarbière,‘MatthiasFekl:‘TheEUshouldhaveitsownarbitrationcourt’’(EurActiv, 3 June 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/matthias-fekl-eushould-have-its-own-arbitration-court-315073 accessed 2 September 2015.
54 Athina Fouchard Papaefstratiou, ‘TTIP:The French Proposal For A Permanent European Court for Investment Arbitration’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 22 July 2015), http:// kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/07/22/ttip-the-french-proposal-for-a-permanenteuropean-court-for-investment-arbitration/.

55 Sheridan Mahavera, op. cit.

56 Icsid.worldbank.org, ICSID News Release (2014), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ AllNewsItems.aspx.

57 ASEANComprehensiveInvestmentAgreement(2013),http://investasean.asean.org/files/ upload/Doc%2005%20-%20ACIA.pdf accessed 8 June 2020. Date of adoption: 26 Feb. 2009; Date of entry into force: 29 March 2012.

58 ‘ICSID 101: ICSID Practice & Current Trends In Investment Arbitration’ Asian International Arbitration Centre, 21 November 2014), http://www.aiac.world/news/79/ ICSID-101:-ICSID-Practice-&-Current-Trends-In-Investment-Arbitration accessed 8 June 2020.

Avocats Et Service En Ligne

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Par Me Nicolas Torrent
Titulaire du brevet d’avocat (Genève, Suisse)

AVOCATS ET SERVICE EN LIGNE À LA CLIENTÈLE RÈGLES D’HYGIÈNE, TRAVAIL À DISTANCE ET PERSPECTIVES POUR LE FUTUR POST-COVID 19

1. La situation évolue, nos clients évoluent, nous évoluons

1.1 La situation évolue – état des lieux 
En tant qu’individus ou entreprises, nous nous organisons progressivement pour effectuer nos tâches de la manière qui nous convient le mieux. Et nous itérons quotidiennement, améliorant notre façon de fonctionner, en fonction de nos priorités. Cette manière qui nous convient n’est pas optimale ou déficiente en elle-même; simplement, elle nous convient le mieux.

Pour réaliser ces tâches, nous utilisons et leur allouons nos ressources (temps, disponibilité d’esprit, argent, équipes, matériel) selon nos priorités, des critères d’allocation de ressources qui nous sont propres. D’après mon expérience, dans les études d’avocat, ces critères comprennent souvent:

  • Respecter les règles sur la profession d’avocat et des codes de déontologie;
  • Trouver de nouveaux clients;
  • Respecter le devoir de diligence, des délais et autres règles de procédure;
  • TimeSheet et recherches juridiques;
  • Encaissement de factures.

Or, ces critères d’allocation de ressources ne nous laissent guère le temps de nous tenir informés des évolutions du marché, d’effectuer des enquêtes de satisfaction auprès des clients, de découvrir les nouveaux outils technologiques qui arrivent sur le marché.

Ainsi, un avocat choisira souvent de prendre un entretien ou un déjeuner client – même si celui-ci n’est pas prioritaire – plutôt que de recevoir un représentant voulant lui proposer une solution de gestion de documentation. Il ne s’agit pas d’une erreur – il s’agit d’une décision allouant des ressources en priorité à la clientèle, par rapport à la modernisation de son étude.

Souvent, les priorités des avocats n’allouent que peu de ressources à la satisfaction client, à la modernisation de l’étude et à l’écoute des tendances du marché.

Il en résulte un décalage croissant entre les attentes des clients et les services juridiques proposés par les avocats. Ainsi, depuis de nombreuses années on observe une stagnation du marché du droit [PDF]1:

“In terms of demand growth for law firm services (…) stagnation continued in 2019, with demand growth virtually flat from the preceding year.”

Et ceci était la situation ante-covid 19. Il semble que cette situation soit appelée à se péjorer post-covid. La façon de fonctionner traditionnelle apparaissant peu compatible avec les exigences d’hygiène pour bloquer la propagation du coronavirus.

1.2 Nos clients évoluent – Tendances dans les autres industries et l’amélioration continue
Dans les autres industries, on observe naturellement l’utilisation d’autres critères d’allocation de ressources. Mais on observe surtout l’utilisation d’un processus d’amélioration continue.

Ce processus permet, en résumé, de définir des indicateurs de performance pour l’entreprise et de mesurer l’évolution de ces indicateurs. Ceux-ci révèlent notamment leur importance et leur utilité lorsque l’entreprise souhaite tester une nouvelle idée ou un nouveau service sur sa clientèle ou lorsqu’elle souhaite améliorer sa performance.

Dans le cas d’une étude d’avocat, on peut imaginer de mesurer – par exemple – les indicateurs suivants:

  • Satisfaction client – via un formulaire de satisfaction
  • Taux de succès de l’étude en procédure
  • Taux de succès de de l’étude en négociation
  • Taux d’encaissement des factures et rapport entre le montant finalement encaissé et le montant de la facture initiale
  • Taux de clients qui font appel à nouveau aux services de l’étude
  • Rapidité de traitement d’une demande client – combien de temps un client doit-il attendre en moyenne avant de recevoir une réponse de son avocat?
  • Combien de clients sont amenés par un client satisfait?
  • Visibilité de l’étude et retours clients sur les médias sociaux

Quels que soient les indicateurs de performance choisis par l’étude, il est important pour elle de les surveiller constamment, car ils lui permettront à la fois de détecter une tendance préjudiciable – et donc la nécessité de prendre des contre-mesures – ou de savoir quelles décisions/actions prendre si elle souhaite améliorer sa performance sur un indicateur ou de manière générale.

L’amélioration continue consiste à chercher, en continu, à améliorer nos indicateurs de performance en fonction de nos objectifs stratégiques.

Ceci est important car, en parallèle, nos clients évoluent et s’habituent à d’autres façon de consommer. Les géants de l’internet investissent en effet des sommes colossales dans la satisfaction client et dans la recherche sur les comportements utilisateur. Ainsi, leurs produits sont souvent les plus attirants et faciles à consommer pour la clientèle. Les tendances définies par les GAFAM et autres grandes plateformes internet sont ainsi reprises par la majeure partie des acteurs du marché. Ainsi, Coop@home
2 affiche les produits de sa boutique en ligne selon les mêmes codes qu’Amazon et le “like” de Facebook s’est propagé sur la majeure partie des plateformes en ligne, comme le 20min (qui, comme Facebook, n’autorise pas le “dislike” pouce bleu vers le bas).

Le client, progressivement, s’est habitué à cet environnement et ses modes de consommation. Il s’attend ainsi à pouvoir lire des avis d’autres consommateurs, à consulter une évaluation de service, à pouvoir commencer une démarche en ligne, à gérer ses données personnelles et disposer d’un compte utilisateur.

Si l’industrie du droit n’est pas compatible avec toutes ces évolutions, elle est certainement compatible avec certaines d’entre elles; il appartient à chaque étude d’envisager quels outils sont pertinents pour son activité et, pour ce faire, elle doit définir ses objectifs commerciaux.

C’est à ce stade que nos critères d’allocation de ressources évoqués plus haut agissaient en obstacle à l’évolution des études. Aucun d’eux ne permettait d’allouer des ressources, telles que du temps et de la disponibilité d’esprit, pour mesurer la performance de l’étude au moyen de ses indicateurs – encore moins pour mettre en oeuvre un système de management pour leur gestion et leur maintenance.

Ceci a toutefois été remis en cause par la covid-19. En effet, le respect des règles professionnelles, réglementaires et contractuelles a contraint les avocats à prendre en compte les nouvelles technologies.

1.3 Nous évoluons – Le travail à distance rendu nécessaire par la covid-19
Quel que soit le modèle prédictif examiné, il est vraisemblable que la pandémie de covid-19 ne soit pas prête à s’éteindre, n’en déplaise à certains dirigeants. La plupart des modèles la voient encore présente en 2022. La distanciation sociale semble dès lors devoir perdurer au point qu’elle devrait progressivement entrer dans nos habitudes comportementales – dont une persistance du travail à distance.

Ainsi, récemment, de grandes entreprises ont commencé à réévaluer leur besoin en immobilier3: “Selon une enquête du géant du conseil immobilier Cushman & Wakefield, réalisée en avril auprès de 300 entreprises dans le monde, 89% d’entre elles estiment que le recours au travail à distance se poursuivra au-delà de la pandémie.”

Ainsi, de nombreux consoeurs et confrères se sont également adaptés et ont travaillé davantage à distance. Les tribunaux ne s’étant pas arrêtés avec la pandémie, les avocates et avocats, se sont vus contraints d’explorer les outils technologiques afin de respecter leurs obligations contractuelles et réglementaires.

La covid-19 a ainsi eu pour effet inattendu d’intégrer la technologie dans les critères d’allocation de ressources des avocates et avocats.

Pour les études d’avocats, ceci présente des avantages: on peut notamment envisager une opportunité de réduction des coûts en réduisant la taille des locaux. Cette possibilité n’est pas anecdotique, car toute entreprise cherche en permanence à réduire ses coûts – en accord avec son modèle économique – afin de rester compétitive. Il va de soi que chaque étude d’avocat a sa propre clientèle et ses propres besoins, ses propres services, son propre modèle économique; une solution globale n’existe pas.

Ainsi, une grande étude de la place appliquant une stratégie de différenciation concentrée sur une très haute – et toujours plus haute – qualité de service aura une structure de coûts et un modèle économique bien différents de celles d’une étude boutique spécialisée.

Quoi qu’il en soit, chacune d’elles pourra saisir l’occasion de s’interroger sur nombre de facteurs pouvant influencer sa structure de coûts et – par voie de conséquence – sa rentabilité. Ainsi, l’étude pourrait se demander:

  • Si ses dossiers peuvent être entièrement numérisés pour éviter le stockage physique;
  • Si l’étude fournit essentiellement des services sur internet ou chez le client et pourrait donc se passer de salles de réunion;
  • Si les collaborateurs et associés ont besoin d’être physiquement présents dans des locaux de l’étude toute la semaine ou non – certains préférant travailler à distance pour éviter les interruptions;
  • Quel est le besoin réel en surface de travail et si une optimisation est possible;
  • Si la qualité des locaux est en adéquation avec les demandes de la clientèle: celle-ci est-elle d’accord de payer plus pour être reçue dans de beaux locaux ou, au contraire, refuserait-elle (ou refuse-t-elle) de payer un surplus pour cette qualité?

Toutes ces questions reviennent à mettre l’accent sur le client en le plaçant au centre des préoccupations et à ainsi appliquer le concept de “Customer-centricity4”. Ainsi, le client et sa satisfaction pourraient occuper une place plus importante dans les critères d’allocation de ressources des études d’avocats.

Être customer-centric, i.e. centré sur le client, demande de pouvoir mesurer et améliorer sa performance en permanence par rapport aux objectifs stratégiques et à la satisfaction du client.

2. Quels services en ligne pour le client post-covid?

2.1 Les règles de l’OSFP5 risquent d’être coûteuses et rendre complexe le travail en étude
Servir un client post-covid va demander de l’adaptation. Ainsi, non seulement les contacts physiques sont appelés à être durablement réduits mais la clientèle, soucieuse de sa santé, devrait également privilégier les prestataires de services juridiques qui lui évitent de se déplacer. Ainsi, l’entretien traditionnel en l’étude devrait devenir moins fréquent.

La réglementation, elle, engendre un changement important dans la gestion de l’étude et ses coûts. L’OSFP prévoit notamment dans son Plan pour les entreprises dont l’activité comprend du travail de bureau et un contact occasionnel avec la clientèle [PDF]6 les mesures suivantes pour l’accueil physique des clients (non-exhaustif):

  • À leur arrivée, les clients se lavent les mains à l’eau et au savon. Mettre à disposition une possibilité de se laver les mains avec du savon ou, si ce n’est pas possible, du désinfectant pour les mains. Informer la clientèle.
  • Les clients peuvent garder une distance de deux mètres entre eux. Ne pas aménager de zone d’attente, ou alors installer des chaises espacées de deux mètres et condamner des places sur les bancs avec du ruban de signalisation.
  • Ne pas toucher les objets appartenant à la clientèle (p. ex. ne pas suspendre leur veste).
  • Si possible, laisser les portes ouvertes afin qu’il ne soit pas nécessaire de les toucher.
  • Les personnes évitent de toucher les surfaces et les objets.
  • Enlever les objets inutiles que les clients pourraient toucher, p. ex. les magazines et les documents dans les salles d’attente et dans les parties communes (comme les coins café et les cuisines).
  • Privilégier le paiement sans contact.
  • Séparer les différentes zones : zones de passage, zones de travail et zones d’attente. Indiquer la distance à respecter à l’aide de marquages au sol ou de ruban de signalisation. Si nécessaire, indiquer clairement les voies et les marques de distance avec un ruban adhésif de couleur.
  • Déterminer le nombre de personnes pouvant être présentes dans l’établissement (collaborateurs et clients) de sorte qu’une distance de deux mètres puisse toujours être maintenue.
  • Demander aux clients de prendre rendez-vous avant de se rendre dans l’entreprise. Éviter ou réduire la clientèle de passage.
  • Si possible, ne proposer des entretiens de conseil que sur rendez-vous, ou utiliser des moyens de communication numériques (p. ex. téléphone, vidéoconférence).
  • Garantir le maintien d’une distance de deux mètres dans les salles de réunion et limiter le nombre total de collaborateurs à une personne pour 4 m2 environ. Condamner ou supprimer des sièges dans les salles de réunion et de séjour afin de respecter les distances.
  • Proposer d’autres possibilités d’interaction aux clients vulnérables (p. ex. entretien téléphonique, représentation par un proche).
  • Afficher les mesures de protection de l’OFSP devant chaque entrée.
  • Informer les clients que les personnes malades doivent être placées en auto-isolement, conformément aux consignes de l’OFSP.

Ainsi, non seulement les entretiens traditionnels physique en l’étude devraient décroître, mais le coût de leur mise en oeuvre devrait augmenter significativement – avec la menace par ailleurs constante de l’inspection du travail: mise en place de procédures complexes et de nettoyages fréquents, stock de savon et gel hydroalcoolique, interruptions fréquentes du travail, etc. A noter que cette évaluation du coût ne tient pas compte du risque accru pour l’équipe de l’étude d’elle-même contracter la covid-19 et se retrouver ainsi handicapée, potentiellement à une période délicate.

Il est à relever que ces règles seront difficilement mises en oeuvre dans certaines plus petites structures, exposant ainsi davantage avocats et clients.

Ces exigences, et le coût de leur mise en oeuvre, combinés au risque sanitaire, devraient ainsi conduire avocates et avocats à une digitalisation anticipée et à repenser leurs services, avec un accent tout particulier sur la fourniture de services en ligne.

2.2 Le service en ligne pour la clientèle – que lui proposer?
Penser les services au client de façon customer-centric, c’est-à-dire centrée sur le client, doit conduire l’étude à se demander comment le client peut effectuer chacune des tâches qu’il effectuerait normalement selon les process traditionnels.

La réponse à cette question dépend principalement des objectifs stratégiques de l’étude et de ses indicateurs de performance. Mais nous pouvons donner quelques exemples de tâches que le client pourrait devoir accomplir en ligne:

  • Comment prendre rendez-vous?
  • Comment transmettre un dossier?
  • Comment conduire un entretien avec le client et les collaborateurs?
  • Comment évaluer un dossier en interne avec l’équipe et proposer un debrief au client?
  • Comment préparer le client à l’audience?
  • Comment le tenir informé de l’évolution de son dossier?

C’est ici que le site web de l’étude peut prendre une importance particulière. Bon nombre de services peuvent en effet être rendus au client par l’intermédiaire du site web de l’étude, qui peut ainsi devenir un élément à part entière du modèle économique de l’étude. A titre personnel, il me paraît évident qu’un site web d’une étude doit être conçu pour générer de la clientèle – si certains parmi vous souhaitent un conseil, n’hésitez pas à me contacter par email: nicolas.torrent@elex.io.

Parallèlement au site web, des outils tels que Jitsi 7(pour la vidéo conférence) peuvent aider, zoom n’étant pas considéré comme sûr8. On peut aussi songer à la numérisation des dossiers clients, via un service cloud, dans le respect des recommandations de la FSA9 et des plateformes de travail collaboratif pour avancer sur les dossiers client et travailler en équipe, à distance.

L’investissement dans les outils technologiques apparaît ainsi d’autant plus justifié aujourd’hui et peut permettre aux avocats de moderniser leur offre, réduire leurs coûts et contrer la stagnation du marché du droit.

Par surabondance de motifs, le déploiement de la plateforme Justitia 4.010 est également appelé à avoir un fort impact sur la digitalisation des études et des process. Cela me semble une bonne raison de commencer déjà ce travail de modernisation.

3. Gestion d’une équipe à distance – quelques propositions

Il ne paraît pas inutile de proposer quelques pistes pour aider à l’organisation du travail à distance. Voici un résumé de celles qui me paraissent le plus important:

  • Fonctionner par objectifs: un collaborateur qui travaille à distance livrera en principe de meilleurs résultats s’il s’est vu fixer des objectifs clairs à atteindre. Exemple: Réaliser un projet de courrier; rédaction de la duplique, effectuer une recherche juridique sur tel ou tel sujet.
  • Chaque objectif doit être associé à un délai: le collaborateur doit savoir quand chacun des objectifs est dû.
  • Clarifier les critères d’évaluation des objectifs: il est important pour le collaborateur de comprendre selon quel(s) critère(s) son travail sera évalué. L’objectif est ici d’éviter les itérations inutiles ou le travail superflu. Exemple: travail de fond, structuré, sans fautes, selon la stratégie discutée, mise en page non-nécessaire à ce stade.
  • Utiliser un outil de suivi d’objectifs: Pour avoir un aperçu de l’avancée du travail, il est très utile d’utiliser un outil de gestion – de nombreux outils sont disponibles sur internet mais un simple calendrier Outlook ou une fiche Excel pourront faire l’affaire.
  • Responsabiliser le collaborateur: Lorsque le collaborateur travaille à domicile, sa réalité et son environnement sont différents. Ainsi, il peut notamment avoir des urgences domestiques. Responsabiliser le collaborateur signifie principalement partir du principe que le travail sera livré dans les délais. Si le travail exige des vérifications intermédiaires, alors celles-ci devraient idéalement être placées dans l’outil de suivi des objectifs. Le corollaire de la responsabilisation est que, du moment que le travail est livré dans les délais, il n’est pas nécessaire de savoir ce que fait le collaborateur ou le collègue à telle ou telle heure de la journée. Seul importe qu’il ou elle soit présent ou présente aux moments convenus et qu’il y ait une réactivité en cas d’urgence.
  • Priorisation des objectifs: Lorsque des objectifs sont fixés, il est important de convenir avec le collaborateur quels objectifs peuvent être livrés pour quels délais. Les délais de livraison sont idéalement convenus d’un commun accord, sous réserve de délais légaux qui s’imposent d’eux-mêmes. En effet, il est souvent contre-productif d’imposer un délai sans tenir compte de la charge de travail du collaborateur; celui-ci la connaît mieux et connaît également mieux sa force de travail. Fixer les délais et priorités avec le collaborateur contribue à responsabiliser ce dernier.
  • Exploiter les outils collaboratifs: On trouve de nombreux outils sur internet qui permettent à une équipe de travailler en commun sur un projet: cloud sécurisé, gestion d’objectifs, gestion de documents, gestion de versions de documents, répertorier les recherches, priorisation des tâches, transfert de relais à la prochaine personne dans la chaîne, etc. Ces outils permettent de mieux suivre l’évolution d’un projet (soit un ensemble d’objectifs) et de détecter les éventuels blocages.
  • Sécuriser les échanges: Dans un tel contexte, il est fortement recommandé de s’assurer que les échanges sont sécurisés – l’envoi d’emails n’est souvent pas considéré comme sûr.
  • Clarifier les rôles: Chacun doit savoir à qui s’adresser pour chaque requête; ainsi les responsabilités devraient être clairement établies pour fluidifier les échanges et éviter que l’équipe ne se gêne.
  • Itérer: Il est vraisemblable que les premiers essais révéleront des dysfonctionnements; en effet, s’habituer à une nouvelle façon de travailler demande du temps. L’équipe affinera toutefois progressivement ses process pour que le modèle initial devienne efficient. L’importance est de pouvoir faire évoluer le travail à distance pour que l’équipe gagne en efficacité. Attention toutefois : certains points, tels que la sécurité, ne devraient pas être sujet à régression.

4. Conclusion

Chaque étude a sa propre réalité, son organisation, sa structure, ses ressources et ses priorités. Il semble toutefois clair que chacune sera impactée – de façon positive ou négative par ailleurs – par la pandémie et l’évolution sociétale qui en découle. Cet article avait pour but d’explorer les pistes à disposition des études et contribuer à la réflexion.

Le point essentiel pour l’avenir de la profession étant à mon sens que la façon de fonctionner traditionnelle risque de devenir plus coûteuse et moins acceptable pour les clients, ce qui était d’ailleurs déjà le cas avant la pandémie vu la stagnation du marché du droit malgré le contexte d’une économie croissante.

Ma proposition modeste est de saisir l’occasion pour repenser les services de l’avocat autour du besoin client, de repenser la façon de fonctionner et de réaliser les adaptations nécessaires en explorant notamment les opportunités offertes par un site web performant, les outils collaboratifs et la digitalisation en général.

Mon expérience dans le domaine de la digitalisation aurait tendance à montrer qu’il faut du temps à une équipe pour adopter de nouvelles façons de travailler, développer des réflexes et se sentir à l’aise avec et comprendre les clients / s’adapter aux clients.

Plus l’équipe est à l’aise avec les outils, plus elle comprend et peut influencer ses indicateurs de performance, mieux elle connaît les besoins de ses clients, et plus elle est capable d’être pertinente pour la clientèle. Commencer tôt signifie prendre une avance qu’il sera difficile à la concurrence de rattraper.

Si certains parmi vous souhaitent évoquer leur situation de manière plus concrète, n’hésitez pas à m’écrire sur nicolas.torrent@elex.io.

Corona Virus and Contractual Obligations

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Vinod Boolell
Former Judge Supreme Court, Mauritius
Former Judge, United Nations

Corona Virus and Contractual Obligations

The corona virus presents a unique and an unprecedented situation. Though its occurrence was unforeseeable and unpredictable, could measures have been taken to limit its spread right from the moment when it came to be known, in view of its impact on people’s health, the business and economic sector? The difficulty arises, as China waited, according to available information, 40 days before disclosing the virus to the world. And it was only on 30 January 2020 that the World Health Organisation declared the Covid 19 “a public health emergency of international concern”.

 Was it open to countries to take necessary measures from the moment of disclosure to prevent   its spread which could have avoided a total lockdown in many jurisdictions? In countries around the world, including Mauritius, it was business as usual. Gradually the grim reality hit the world and countries had to resort to the extreme measures of a complete lockdown and curfews to prevent the spread of the pandemic and to save lives. The health of the population, and not the economy, became the priority in the initial stage.

It is beyond dispute that the corona virus has brought about a real turmoil in many sectors of personal life and economic activities. In the midst of the health crisis, many individuals, business people and professionals are asking questions about the fulfilment of their obligations, whether contractual or not. Some may feel they are covered for any breach of their obligations because of the epidemic, whereas others may be grinding their minds at the idea of not being able to execute a contract as planned. But the one question that has to be addressed is whether the corona virus can be a cause of exemption in the event of a breach of a contractual obligation?

In contractual matters, there are two types of exemptions that would allow a party to a contract to escape liability. Some are legal while others are conventional. The legal exoneration cases are the force majeure for a total or partial exemption of liability. Conventional cases are limiting liability clauses and penal clauses.

A party who fails to fulfil his obligations will be held liable for the breach of the contract in the absence of good grounds to justify the breach. In the context of the corona virus, one of the grounds that may be raised is force majeure resulting from the mandatory lockdown decided by the government.

Force majeure is a legal concept that is known in many legal systems. In Mauritius it is provided for in the Civil Code under the chapter dealing with contracts. As a general rule contracts will have a force majeure clause and list out the different events that may amount to force majeure, like natural cataclysms or epidemics. Whether contracts would have included a clause on complete lockdowns as a force majeure remains to be seen. And it would be important to decide whether the government restrictions made performance under a contract impossible.

Force majeure has been explained as an event which is reasonably unforeseeable [imprévisible] at the time the contract was entered, irresistible [irrésistible] during the performance of the contract, and beyond the control of the person who is invoking it as he cannot no longer perform his obligations. In a very interesting decision in 2011, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court, five judges, held in relation to force majeure, that “It is not enough to stop at the element of prévisibilité or imprévisibilité to determine force majeure. One should move one step further. Prévisible or imprévisible, the question to ask is whether the event was irresistible either by its occurrence or by the manner in which the dire consequences of its occurrence were managed.  What is irrésistible is judged from the objective point of view to decide whether it is so overpowering as to go beyond the means of humans to resist or manage its consequences.” 

The situation created by the corona virus is not comparable to other epidemics and pandemics. The lockdown and curfews are having an impact on businesses. For example, supply chains may have been affected. As the situation is uncertain, a party to a contract may seek to rely on force majeure to avoid liability for non-performance of his contractual obligations.

Can force majeure therefore be successfully invoked on the ground that the measures taken following the corona virus were unforeseeable, irresistible and beyond the control of a contractual party and over which he could not have any control and performance was impossible? There cannot be a definite or straightforward answer. The strain on businesses will no doubt give rise to all types of legal issues or disputes.

Could the virus have prevented contractual obligations from being implemented? There was a gap between the outbreak of the virus and the measures taken by the government on lockdown and curfews. During his gap could businesses still have   functioned?

Epidemics by themselves cannot amount to force majeure. Courts are usually reluctant to uphold the force majeure defence when there is a breach of a contractual obligation. In a very interesting article that appeared in Business Magazine, issue 1435,  15 to 21 April 2020,  Barrister Bilshan Nursimulu after analysing the case law in Mauritius on force majeure,  concludes that “The court’s analysis… did not consider whether the epidemic in itself constituted force majeure, but rather the relationship of cause and effect between the epidemic and the non-performance of a specific contractual obligation”.

French courts, English courts and courts in the United States, just like the Supreme Court in Mauritius, have ruled that a pandemic or an epidemic is not sufficient by itself to constitute force majeure. In a recent decision given on 12 March 2020, the Cour d’Appel of Colmar held that the absence of an asylum seeker at a hearing « était justifiée en raison des circonstances exceptionnelles et insurmontables revêtant le caractère de force majeure liées à l’épidémie en cours de Covid-1». This is a very interesting decision and it remains to be seen to what extent it can be used in contractual obligations.

The following epidemics were held not to constitute force majeure by the French Courts: H1N1 influenza; the plague bacillus; the dengue virus; the chikungunya virus; SARS; Ebola. The major difference between the corona virus and the other epidemics or pandemics is that the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has led to complete lockdown and the imposition of curfews with a number of persons being quarantined. With the onset of other epidemics or pandemics, there was no total lockdown and businesses continued their activities.

In 1918, the Spanish Flu infected millions of people worldwide. Many events were cancelled. People were quarantined.  Many died. The situation was no more different from what we are experiencing with the corona virus. The United States imposed restrictions on activities and people were quarantined. In such a context the question arose whether employers were bound to pay their workers. Two courts reached different conclusions on this point.  One court held  that an employer who did not pay its employees during this time was excused from performance, Another court concluded that  the restriction on activities could not excuse non-performance of obligations because an employer knew that the government “had authority to shut down facilities and, thus, the employer should have included a provision in the contract explicitly excusing performance in the event of a government shutdown”. 

A party invoking force majeure will have to establish that there was a causal link between the inability to perform contractual obligations and the measures taken by the government to combat the spread of the virus. If working from home was an option following the mandatory lockdown, can force majeure be invoked? Could alternative measures have allowed the execution of the contractual obligation?

Businesses today are conducted transnationally and many, if not, all around the world, are suffering from the effects of lockdowns.  Many parties to such contracts may be unable to execute their contractual obligations due to coronavirus lockdown and they may invoke force majeure. To what extent will a force majeure clause in such transnational contracts be successfully invoked in different jurisdictions remains to be seen? It has been reported, for example, that in China, the Council for the Promotion of International Trade, has issued several force majeure certificates to companies to enable them to avoid execution of their contracts. These certificates may work between Chinese companies but it is not certain they would in relation to international contracts.  One such example is the rejection by the French oil giant Total of a force majeure notice from a liquefied natural gas buyer in China. There is no doubt that this is an area where difficulties will crop up.  

Given that unprecedented situation where contracting parties may find themselves in uncertain waters legally, views expressed at international level, advise that parties should seek ways and means to mitigate damages. One advice that been given is that “downturn in revenue will have a huge impact on working capital, and those businesses without sufficient reserves may find themselves suffering cash-flow issues. If this occurs, business operators should seek assistance immediately to try to minimise the impact”.

Contracting parties, who find themselves in that situation, would be well advised to send notices to their counterpart to explain and discuss the difficulties they may be facing or will face. Negotiations must be started to see whether the execution of the obligations can be suspended during the pandemic and whether the contract can be renegotiated. In contracts where time is of the essence there would be no point in suspending its operation and the contract will have to be terminated subject to conditions.

English law encourages parties to enter into negotiations. The French Civil Code enables parties to renegotiate the contract if there is a change in circumstances that was unforeseeable at the time of signing of the contract and which renders performance excessively onerous for a party who had not accepted the risk of such a change. If negotiations fail the parties may agree to the termination of the contract, on a date and under the conditions to be determined, or request the court by mutual agreement to adjust the content the contract. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable time, the court may, at the request of a party, revise or terminate the contract, on the date and on the conditions it chooses.

Thank you.
1st May 2020

Arbitration And Its Development In Malaysia

Author And In Collaboration with ADR Arbitration Chambers

Datuk Prof. Sundra Rajoo

Dr. Joy Ramphul

Arbitration And Its Development In Malaysia

Introduction

Arbitration is one of the methods of alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’).2 The importance of the history and origin of arbitration cannot be overstated. Pearl S Buck has stated that ‘[i]f you want to understand today, you have to search yesterday’. An examination of the background presents a platform for understanding the prevalence of certain practices in present-day Malaysia as compared to the position globally.

Similar to the ancient use of the mediation process in China and the panchayat system of village justice in India, the customary method of dispute resolution inMalaysia is associated with adat. It represents an archaic system of dispute resolution practised as customary rites.

The Shariah inMalaya dealt with personal and family law inMalaya and the coastal areas of Borneo. During the 15th Century, it evolved into Islamic dispute resolution practices like shafa’a and tahkshim. This form of a

1. Certified International Arbitrator (AIADR) (2019 to date), Chartered Arbitrator (CIArb) (1999 to date), Advocate & Solicitor (Non-Practising). Architect and Town Planner, Director, Asian International Arbitration Centre (2010-2018), Chairman, Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (2018), Deputy Chairman, FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber (2018), Member of the Monetary Penalty Review Committee under the Financial Services Act 2013 (2014–2019), Founding President, Asian Institute of Alternate Dispute Resolution, President, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (2016), President, Asian Pacific Regional Arbitration Group (APRAG)(2011), Founding President, Society of Construction Law Malaysia, Founding President, Malaysian Society of Adjudicators, Founding President, Sports Law Association of Malaysia.

2. It is sometimes referred to as external dispute resolution and includes meditation, conciliation, neutral evaluation, expert determination, mini-trials and last-offer arbitration (where disputing parties submit their final offers to an arbitral tribunal who must decide on one of the offers). The last method pushes the parties to make a reasonable offer and is intended to counter any tendency by the arbitral tribunal to make compromise decisions between the parties’ offers as in John SMurray, et Al, Arbitration 240–243, Foundation Pr s2003.

peremptory type of arbitration used for dispute resolution was part of the long-standing arrangement of resolution of differences in the community.3

The Quran, Sunnah (the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad), Ijma’ (consensus among recognised religious authorities) and Qiyas (inference by precedent) combine to form the Shariah.The Shariah provides a foundation of principles that apply to arbitration as well. Peremptory-like prescription for arbitration can be derived from the Quran and Prophetic traditions.

For example, in the following Quranic verse, arbitration was prescribed as the primary method to resolve a marital dispute:

If you fear a breach between them twain (husband and wife), appoint (two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from her (family); if they both wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation. Indeed, Allah is ever All-Knower, Well-Acquainted with all things. (Surah al-Nisa’ (4):35).4

Another verse in the Quran states:

And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. However, if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. Moreover, if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed,

Allah loves those who act justly.5

Arbitration in Islamic Law is limited essentially to property and personal matters where private rights are involved. Parties to a dispute relating to property can go for arbitration. The arbitration agreement has to be fulfilled as a matter of principle. Arbitration clauses are valid as they are necessary for the efficacy of the contract and are beneficial to both the parties.

In Malaya, the origin of the common law legal framework for arbitration as enacted by the dominant colonial power started with the Arbitration Ordinance XIII 1809 in the British-controlled Straits Settlement of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. Thereafter, all states of the Federation of Malaya adopted the Arbitration Ordinance 1950. This was subsequently replaced by the Arbitration Act 1952 (‘the AA 1952’) and later the Arbitration Act 2005 (‘the AA 2005’) followed by subsequent amendments in 2011 and 2018.

3. See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (2nd Ed Kluwer Law

International, 1999).

4. Dato Syed Ahmad Idid and Umar AOseni, Appointing a Non-Muslim Arbitrator in Tahkim

Proceedings: Polemics, Perceptions and Possibilities [2014] 5 MLJ xvi.

5. Quran 49.9.

While arbitration is the focus of this article and is reflective of the developments in dispute resolution in Malaysia, the growth of other areas of ADR cannot be overlooked. They are indeed equally important. With the world of commerce rapidly innovating at a fast pace, dispute resolution has also had to evolve from dispute avoidance, dispute prevention, dispute management and finally when all fails into dispute resolution.

When arbitration is considered as conventional and rigid, there have been attempts to seek alternatives to it. Normally such ADR methods like mediation, conciliation and adjudication preceding arbitration are used as part of a multi-tiered dispute resolution regime. Such regimes were either set up by way of legislation or through institutional structures.

Even though in the international domain frameworks for domestic legislation are provided by international texts such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation (2002), this has not been necessarily the case in Malaysia. For example, the Mediation Act 2012 is a mere facilitative legislation without any bite.

Most commercial disputes often resort either to court or to arbitration. Other forms of ADR are gaining popularity. Although the AIAC is the leading arbitral body and ADR provider in Malaysia, it operates in a competitive environment where arbitrations, both domestic and international, and other niche forms of ADR, are also administered by other associations and professional bodies.

They include the Malaysian Institute of Architects (‘PAM’), the Institution of Engineers Malaysia (‘IEM’), the Institution of Surveyors Malaysia, the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce, and the Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Chambers of Commerce, as well as commodity associations like the Malaysia Rubber Board and the Palm Oil Refiners Association of Malaysia (‘PORAM’).

With the rise in transactions in the capital markets, the Security Industry Dispute Resolution Centre (‘SIDREC’) was constituted to cater to the needs of disputes related to unit trusts, derivatives and other capital market products. Presently, all capital market intermediaries, which are corporations holding licenses under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 to deal in securities and futures and engage in fund management, are members of SIDREC. SIDREC offers an evaluative dispute resolution mechanism. It is efficient and effective, based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness.

Another prominent ADR provider in Malaysia is the Financial Mediation Bureau (‘FMB’), which was set up under an initiative taken by Bank Negara Malaysia to resolve disputes between financial service providers and their customers. The FMB’s jurisdiction is limited to conventional and Islamic banking products and services, as well as insurance and takaful products and services.

Islamic finance, as an alternative to conventional banking, is a growing financial industry, with a unique set of commercial challenges and issues. The different basis and nature of Islamic finance mean that there are far fewer legal experts and judges with the requisite training and knowledge than in conventional finance.

The AIAC emerged as the first institution to constitute ‘i-Arbitration Rules’ to balance the principles of Islamic finance with arbitration. The AIAC’s i-Arbitration Rules 2018 are Shariah-compliant and provide for, amongst other provisions, the power for the arbitral tribunal to seek reference from the Shariah Advisory Council or a Shariah Expert.6

The rise of sports in Malaysia has seen the emergence of multiple professional and amateur associations being formed to advocate and uphold the interests and well-being of their respective fields. The Sports Law Association of Malaysia which has no restrictions on foreign membership was formed to support the study and practice of sports law.

While the Sports Development Act 1997 was amended in 2018 to provide for a Sports Dispute Committee, the AIAC had been providing sports arbitration training with the attendant aim of encouraging the use of arbitration in sports-related disputes. It has also proposed an Asian Sports Arbitration Tribunal with its own arbitration rules and panel of sports law trained arbitrators to provide sports dispute resolution services.

Malaysia’s maritime sector has a well-defined set of domestic and international maritime laws, regulations, standards and practices. However, the increasing complexity of the maritime sector has demanded a system that has a good grasp of the law to enable governments, industry players and other maritime stakeholders to ensure their interests are protected and not be

Over whelmed by the vast and complex ecosystem of the maritime sector.

6. See the AIACi-Arbitration Rules 2018, r 11.The Shariah Advisory Council was established

in May 1997 as a part of Bank Negara Malaysia. The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009

(Act 701) stipulates the roles and functions of the Shariah Advisory Council.

The Malaysian maritime community welcomed the establishment of the International Malaysian Society of Maritime Law (‘IMSML’) in 2015.The idea of IMSML was mooted and promoted by AIAC, which now provides the premises for the IMSML’s secretariat. The eventual aim is to build capacity and provide ADR services for maritime disputes.

Malaysia has introduced statutory adjudication for payment disputes in the construction industry in the form of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (‘the CIPAA’). It came into force on 15 April 2014. It has been a runaway success. The number of disputes being resolved under the CIPAA has continued to increase year by year.

The CIPAA applies to all construction contracts made in writing after 22 June 2012 including those entered by the Government of Malaysia. The procedure applies to construction contracts, and adjudicators are appointed by the AIAC unless otherwise chosen by the parties.

The adjudicator has 45 working days after the issue of a response to an adjudication claim (or a reply) in order to issue a written decision. The CIPAA has absorbed the most successful features of adjudication and security of payment legislation that have been enacted around the world.

Mediations are conducted by the FMB, the Malaysian Mediation Centre (‘MMC’), the AIAC and the Biro Bantuan Guaman (‘BBG’). Not all types of complaints can be referred to the FMB.Only claims involving Islamic banking and financial matters not exceeding RM100,000, and insurance and takaful product and services, can be referred.

The MMC offers a comprehensive range of services including professional mediation services, training in mediation, accreditation and maintenance of panel mediators, and the provision of consultancy services.

The BBG only provides mediation services for civil and Shariah cases. The Mediation Act 2012 came into force on 1 August 2012, with the main aim of promoting and facilitating the mediation of disputes for settlement in a fair, speedy, and cost-effective manner.

The Mediation Act 2012 does not provide for mandatory mediation. Parties can mediate concurrently with any civil court action or arbitration. The judiciary has set up its own mediation centre to cater for court-annexed mediation as set out in the Chief Justice’s Practice Direction.

The AIAC, apart from arbitration, also provides mediation services under the AIAC Mediation Rules 2018. The AIAC Mediation Rules 2018 is a set of procedural rules covering all aspects of the mediation process to help parties resolve their domestic or international disputes.

As part of its improved services, the AIAC has produced the updated Arbitration Rules 2018 with the name change from KLRCA. The Rules are modern and up-to-date. It caters for most types of disputes or differences including investor-State disputes. As a result, it is one of the institutions in the region and globally to model its rules after the IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation.

One of the more recent developments in ADR is that of Domain Name Dispute Resolution. The Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre (‘ADNDRC’) is one of only four providers in the world, and the first and only one located in Asia, to provide dispute resolution services for generic top-level domain names.

The ADNDRC (Kuala Lumpur office) is governed by the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (‘UDRP’) and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy Rules as well as the ADNDRC Domain Name Dispute Supplemental Rules adopted by the ADNDRC.

Only disputes over ‘.my’ country code top-level domain name can be settled through domain name dispute resolution proceedings in Malaysia. This is because only ‘.my’ country code top-level domain names can be registered in Malaysia with the Malaysian Network Information Centre (‘MYNIC’).

All domain name disputes are governed and administered in accordance with MYNIC’s Domain Name Resolution Policy (‘MYDRP’), Rules of the MYDRP and the AIAC Supplemental Rules. The Malaysian model of the UDRP is the Malaysian Network Information Centre’s Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy succinctly known as MYDRP. MYDRP was designed by MYNIC together with the Rules of the MYDRP and the Supplemental Rules for the AIAC.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARBITRATION LEGISLATION

During the 19th Century, the English Common Law was introduced in what was then called Malaya. It began in the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore and spread into the Federated and Unfederated Malay States as English colonial power expanded.

Likewise, the English Common Law followed British privateers and commercial trading companies that colonised the northern states of Borneo of Sarawak and Sabah. Later, the administrations of these states were taken over by the British authorities.

Arbitration in Malaysia can be traced back to as early as 1809 with the first arbitration legislation being Ordinance XIII of the Straits Settlement 1809 in the pre-independent states of Malaya, comprising what is now known as Penang, Malacca and Singapore.

The 1809 ordinance was replaced by the Arbitration Ordinance of 1890. Later in 1950, the Arbitration Ordinance 1950 (No 12 of 1950), which was based on the English Arbitration Act 1889 replaced the Arbitration Ordinance of 1890 for all Malayan states. The Arbitration Ordinance 1950 remained in force after the Declaration of Independence in 1957.

Subsequently, the English Arbitration Act 1950 was adopted by British North Borneo (now known as Sabah) in 1952 as its primary legislation on arbitration. The same was enacted as the Sarawak Ordinance No 5 of 1952. North Borneo (now known as Sabah) and Sarawak were incorporated into the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Thereafter, the arbitration laws of Sabah and Sarawak became the backbone of Malaysian arbitration legislation.

This is because, pursuant to the Revision of Laws Act 1968, the Sarawak Ordinance No 5 of 1952 was extended to the rest of Malaysia and became the Malaysian AA 1952. The AA 1952, like its English precursor, was a model of clarity and simplicity. It was the lex arbitri until 2005.

Unfortunately, such longevity in an era of relentless economic change and growth revealed its shortcomings. The AA 1952 failed to maintain its early usefulness as promised by its simplicity and clarity. By the early 2000s, the general view was the need for reform.

The AA 1952 was decried as a product of a bygone era. Complaints arose regarding excessive court supervision which was viewed as a negative interference in the arbitral process (including in case management and the enforcement of the award). The net result was that the interweaving of court processes undermined the arbitral process.

In addition, the 1952 Act itself was deficient in promoting party autonomy, not providing the arbitral tribunal with sufficient powers to carry out its functions effectively. It did not deal sufficiently with interim measures.

Its test for the challenge against the arbitral tribunal was couched in terms of misconduct of the arbitral tribunal itself or misconduct in conducting the proceedings.

The notions of equality and due process were implied but not explicitly laid out. The grounds to challenge the arbitral tribunal were not rooted in the notions of justifiable doubts arising out of partiality or the lack of independence. This had to be constructed in the light of the availability of the UNCITRAL Model Law recommended for enactment as an adjunct to the New York Convention.

Malaysia’s ratification of the New York Convention in 1985 constituted a milestone in that it became a modern arbitral jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. By then, the AA 1952 was an archaic anomaly. This did not dampen the increasing popularity of arbitration as arbitration agreements were being inserted in standard form contracts domestically and in international commercial matters involving transnational arrangements.

In turn, this led to more court applications and the resulting case law while generally, pro-arbitration did regularly throw up decisions which exposed the shortcomings of the AA 1952 for a modern economy. In addition, there were two separate enforcement regimes for domestic and international awards. In 1978, the AIAC, then known as the Regional Centre for Arbitration,

Kuala Lumpur (‘RCAKL’) was established under the auspices of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (‘AALCO’). It was the first regional centre established by AALCO in the Asia Pacific Region to provide institutional support as a neutral and independent venue for the conduct of domestic and international arbitration proceedings.

RCAKL was also established pursuant to a host country agreement with the Government of Malaysia. Being a non-profit, non-governmental and independent international body, interestingly, it was also the first arbitral centre in the world to adopt the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976.

At this point, it is pertinent to highlight that there was a solitary amendment in 1980 to introduce a new s 34 to the AA 1952, which created an odd divide based on the choice of regime dictated by the arbitration agreement (‘1980 Amendment’). Section 34(1) of the AA 1952 stated:

Notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or in any other written law but subject to subsection (2) in so far as it relates to the enforcement of an award, the provisions of this Act or other written law shall not apply to any arbitration held under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 1965 or under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 1976 and the Rules of the Regional Centre for Arbitration.

The 1980 Amendment totally excluded the operation of the AA 1952 and any written law for the two categories of arbitrations named in the section. All other institutional arbitrations, whether conducted under other institutional rules such as HKIAC, SIAC, ICC, and LCIA or conducted ad hoc, remained subject to the full supervisory jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts under the AA 1952. In effect, it re-emphasised the dichotomy between arbitrations conducted under the Centre and other types of arbitration.

The purpose of the 1980 Amendment was clearly to try to encourage the use of RCAKL by parties who did not want the Malaysian courts to be involved in any form in their arbitral process except for enforcement.7 There was then no opportunity for any party to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, thereby causing delay and escalation of costs. There was no issue regarding interference by the court either in support of or in supervising the arbitral process.

In effect, the statutory exclusion of the AA 1952 under s 34 was based on the choice of arbitration rules provided for in the arbitration agreement. It did not require the parties to agree on the exclusion specifically. It was not only the AA 1952 which was not to apply but also ‘other written law’.

In practice, the court’s jurisdiction was totally ousted. In turn, there emerged concerns on whether Malaysian courts could play a supportive role in the arbitral process which was the hallmark of modern arbitral regimes. As it then stood, the courts could not intervene nor assist.

The lacunae were highlighted by situations where the arbitral tribunal did not always possess the powers like the court to ensure the arbitral proceedings were conducted properly and led to a fair and just award. An example of this was the production of witnesses by way of subpoena of the court in aid of arbitration.

This odd divide introduced by s 34 as per the 1980 Amendment did not follow the normal and logical divide between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ arbitration, it followed the choice of regime in the arbitration agreement.

7. See PG Lim, Practice and Procedure under the Rules of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration [1997] 2 MLJ lxxiii.

The decision in Jati Erat Sdn Bhd v City Land Sdn Bhd 8 confirmed that the 1980 Amendment applied to any arbitration held under the then RCAKL Rules regardless of whether the parties were local or international (as compared to the earlier curiously reasoned decision of Syarikat Yean Tat (M) Sdn Bhd v Ahli Bina Pamong Sari Sdn Bhd 9 which seemed to suggest otherwise).

The uncertainty coupled with the anomalous dichotomy away from arbitral regimes in other developed jurisdictions set the stage for a wholesale reform of the arbitral regime itself.

THE ARBITRATION ACT 2005

On 30 December 2005, Parliament enacted the AA 2005 (Act 646) which was based on the UNCITRALModel Law. The AA 2005 repealed and replaced the AA 1952. It also incorporated provisions of the New York Convention relating to the recognition and enforcement of international awards. The AA 2005 came into force on 15 March 2006.

Thus, since 15 March 2006, all arbitral proceedings have been conducted under the AA 2005 which applies to all arbitrations commenced after its commencement date, including matters relating to the setting aside, recognition and enforcement of awards.

The AA 2005 categorised arbitrations into two types, namely international and domestic arbitrations. While the AA 2005 applies to both international and domestic arbitrations, Part III of the AA 2005 contains provisions that only apply to all domestic arbitrations. The default position is that Part III does not apply to international arbitrations. The parties will have to by way of an

agreement opt-in for Part III to apply to international arbitrations. For domestic arbitrations, the parties can nevertheless agree expressly to opt out of Part III. This is regardless of whichever arbitration rules are involved.

Despite the change in the law, the High Court in Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd v Digital Green Sdn Bhd 10 decided that parties may choose whether to be governed by the previous enactment or the prevailing enactment.

Unfortunately, it can be said that this is an example of the court’s intervention in arbitration proceedings that appears not to be supportive of the AA 2005.

8. [2001] MLJU 768; [2002] 1 CLJ 346.
9. [1996] 5 MLJ 469; [1995] 2 AMR 2058.
10. [2008] 7 MLJ 757; [2008] 3 AMR 177.

The facts show that the defendant in Putrajaya Holdings had carried out some works for the plaintiff company, and since the plaintiff defaulted in making payment and owed a debt to the defendant, the defendant commenced winding-up proceedings against the plaintiff, to which the plaintiff objected. The defendant then filed a defence and counterclaim.

There was an arbitration clause in the agreement. The plaintiff sought to stay the court proceedings, as it wanted to proceed to arbitration. Since the arbitration was commenced in 2007, the plaintiff naturally assumed that the AA 2005 would be the governing law. The defendant contended that the matter should be governed by the AA 1952.

The issue before the court was which statute was applicable. The salient issues to be considered were as follows: If the AA 2005 was to apply, then the defendant would not have been able to proceed with its court proceedings, and the matter would have had to go to arbitration. There was no provision under the AA 2005 for the court to set aside the proceedings, or to revoke the power of the arbitrator as provided for in s 25 of the AA 1952.

Under the AA 2005, the court could only stay proceedings if there was no arbitration agreement, or if there was no dispute that could be arbitrated. It appears that theHigh Court was dissatisfied with the removal of s 25 of the AA 1952 from the AA 2005. The court explained:

The changes in the new 2005 Act is very substantial as it oust [sic] the court’s jurisdiction to interfere when the parties agree in writing to refer the dispute to arbitration and there is no similar provision to s 25(2) of the 1952 Act in the new 2005 Act. The defendant shall have not entered into the arbitration agreement with the plaintiff if the defendant were aware that it cannot refer the dispute to the court as provided under s 25(2) of the 1952 Act.

Although this reasoning seems inconsistent with the provisions of the AA 2005, it is tied back to a translation error perhaps because of misunderstanding or incompetency in translating ability as shown in the Bahasa Malaysia version when compared to the English version. The result was there was a discrepancy between the Bahasa Malaysia version and the English version of the AA 2005 as regards the commencement date.

Unfortunately, the court failed to appreciate that the English version of the AA 2005 was the authoritative text as it was declared so by the then Prime Minister under the National Language Acts 1963/67.11

An English representation of the Bahasa Malaysia version of s 51(2) of the AA 2005 would read as follows:

Where the arbitration agreement was made or the arbitral proceedings were commenced before the coming into operation of this Act, the law governing the arbitration agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be the law which would have applied as if this Act had not been enacted.

The court held that an arbitration even if commenced today, may fall within the ambit of the AA 1952 so long the arbitration agreement was executed before the coming into force of the AA 2005.

However, the approach has been remedied in Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang v Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor,12 where the court held that although the subject arbitration clause referred to the AA 1952, the applicable legislation was the AA 2005. The ratio is that s 51 of the AA 2005 provided for the repeal of the AA 1952.

The enactment of the AA 2005 was a reform which was overdue. The AA 2005 at its original enactment was modelled extensively on the UNCITRAL Model Law and, for the most part, is applicable to both international and domestic arbitrations except for Part III. Although the AA 2005 was based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, the level of court intervention that was maintained by ss 41–43 in Part III was primarily aimed at domestic arbitrations. By so doing, it distinguished international and domestic arbitrations.

Given that it has been more than a decade since the commencement of the AA 2005, the jurisprudence surrounding the legislation has evolved as the courts have interpreted the various provisions of the AA 2005. Also, the AA 2005 was amended in 2011 and 2018. These amendments affect the law and practice of arbitration in Malaysia. This book analyses and comments on the various provisions of the AA 2005 as it stands with all amendments as of 8 May 2018.

11. PU(B) 61/2006; see also Sundra Rajoo Law Practice and Procedure of Arbitration —The Arbitration Act 2005 Perspective [2009] 2 MLJ cxxxvi.

12. [2007] MLJU 523; [2007] 10 CLJ 318 (HC).

THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITRATION ACT 2005

The Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2010 was passed as the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2011 (Act A1395). It came into force on 1 July 2011 (‘2011 Amendments’).

The amendments dealt largely with areas of ambiguity and inconsistency in the interpretation of the provisions of the AA 2005, bringing the clarity sought by the arbitral community. The 2011 Amendments modified ss 8, 10, 11, 30, 39, 42 and 51 of the AA 2005.

Section 8 was recast to restrict court intervention. The amended s 8 makes it clear that court intervention should be confined to situations specifically covered by the AA 2005. This thus excludes the application of common law or the inherent powers of the court.

The amendment to s 10 removes the court’s power to stay arbitration proceedings where the court is satisfied that there is no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters to be referred to arbitration. The old provision placed an undue restriction on the arbitration process which was not contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law or the New York Convention.

In line with article 8A of the UNCITRAL Model Law, under the currents 10 of the AA 2005 the High Court is under the obligation to refer the parties to arbitration unless the High Court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. A further amendment was made through the inclusion of ss 10(2A)–10(2C) to deal specifically with admiralty proceedings.

This amendment enables the court to order that any property arrested, or bail or other security given, is to be retained as security for the satisfaction of any award that may be given in the arbitration proceedings, or to order that a stay of court proceedings be conditional upon equivalent security being provided for the satisfaction of any award that may be given in the arbitration proceedings.

The 2011 Amendments also introduced s 10(4), making it clear, in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, that the curial powers of the High Court apply not only to Malaysian seated arbitrations but also to foreign seated arbitrations.

Section 11 of the AA 2005 was similarly amended to recognise the court’s powers to order interim relief (particularly in admiralty proceedings) and to clarify that those powers applied both to arbitrations seated in Malaysia and elsewhere.

The 2011 Amendments to s 30 dispensed the arbitral tribunal from applying Malaysian law to the merits of the dispute where the parties to the dispute had agreed that the dispute was to be governed by the laws of a jurisdiction other than Malaysia. This amendment removed the mandatory imposition of Malaysian law in domestic arbitrations and upheld party autonomy to choose the substantive law applicable to the dispute.

The 2011 Amendments to s 42 of the AA 2005 imposed an obligation on the court to dismiss a question of law arising out of an arbitral award if the court finds that the question of law does not substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties. This amendment created a threshold for reference to the High Court for appeals against arbitral awards on a question of law.

It has been found that the s 42(1A) requirement ‘substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties’ has proved insufficient to restrict the use of the court system by parties to challenge the award issued in domestic arbitration.

In practice, the High Court and the Court of Appeal have valiantly attempted to interpret the scope of s 42 restrictively. However, it was ineffective in reducing litigation in challenging the finality of arbitration awards through the three tiers of appeal to the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. There have been complaints that domestic arbitration had effectively become the first instance hearing from which all awards can be challenged until the Federal Court.

The Federal Court in Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor v Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang and other appeals13 decisively confirmed the same by expanding further the scope of matters which can be referred to the High Court pursuant to s 42 of the AA 2005. It essentially meant that every question of law arising out of an award could now be ventilated at and revisited by the courts starting from the High Court and moving up to the Federal Court.

13. [2018] 1 MLJ 1; [2017] 8 AMR 313.

There have been even further suggestions that there existed now the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts to set aside arbitral awards: both under ss 37 and 42.14 The existence and the exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction undermined the principles of finality of awards and minimum court intervention which underpinned the enactment of the AA 2005.

As such, it was no surprise that, with the support of the Bar Council, various arbitral bodies and business institutions, Parliament dealt with the difficulties by passing the Arbitration (Amendment) (No 2) Act in 2018. It became operative on 8 May 2018.

THE 2018 AMENDMENTS TO THE ARBITATION ACT 2005

In December 2017, Parliament passed the Arbitration (Amendment) (No 1) Act 2018 to change the name of KLRCA to the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC). Parliament later passed the Arbitration (Amendment) (No 2) Act 2018 in April 2018. Both the Amendment Acts received royal assent and came into operation on February 28 and 8 May 2018 respectively (‘2018 Amendments’)

It is necessary to consider the background to the 2018 Amendments. Pursuant to the 2018 Amendments, the definition of ‘arbitral tribunal’ in s 2 of the AA 2005 has been amended to include emergency arbitrators. Emergency arbitrator applications have become common practice in international arbitration. This is consonant with Schedule 3 to the AIAC Arbitration Rules and the AIAC i-Arbitration Rules which set out the procedure for emergency arbitrator proceedings.

With these amendments, it is expected that emergency arbitrator proceedings will be made more efficacious as the status of an emergency arbitrator and its orders or awards in relation to emergency relief is now recognised in the AA 2005 itself.

Following the coming into force of the amendments to s 2 of the AA 2005 and the introduction of the news 19H into the AA 2005, the orders or awards granted by an emergency arbitrator would become enforceable.

14. See Huawei Technologies (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Maxbury Communications Sdn Bhd [2019]

MLJU 1755 (CA) and Bijak Teknik Sdn Bhd v Lembaga Pertubuhan Peladang (Court of

Appeal NoW-02 (NCC)(A)-1429–07 of 2017).

Foreign lawyers are allowed under an unrestricted fly in and fly out provision in the Legal Profession Act 1976 to represent parties in arbitrations seated in Malaysia. According to s 37A of the Legal Profession Act 1976 introduced by the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2014 that came into force on 3 June 2014:

Sections 36 and 37 [of the Legal Profession Act that does not allow non-

Malaysian qualified lawyers to practise] shall not apply to —

(a) any arbitrator lawfully acting in any arbitral proceedings;
(b) any person representing any party in arbitral proceedings; or
(c) any person giving advice, preparing documents and rendering any other assistance in relation to or arising out of arbitral proceedings except for court proceedings arising out of arbitral proceedings.

The 2018 Amendments also introduced a new s 3A into the AA 2005 that provides for parties’ freedom to choose any representative, not just a Malaysian lawyer or any foreign lawyer, to advise and represent their case in arbitral proceedings.

Such flexibility is necessary for commercial arbitrations. There may be situations where a party would prefer a representative with practical subject-matter expertise or even a foreign lawyer with whom they are more comfortable.

Such foreign representatives would be adept at responding to the queries of the arbitral tribunal. This can provide more choice to the parties when selecting their representative as opposed to appointing someone who is trained in the legal arts but requires the support of an expert witness to address such queries. Section 3A of the AA 2005 can be considered to have enhanced the concept of party autonomy in arbitration — that is, the generally recognised concept that parties to an arbitration agreement are free to choose for themselves the law (or legal rules) applicable to that agreement. The news 3A would also allow parties to arbitrations seated in Sabah or Sarawak to be represented by foreign legal practitioners or West Malaysian legal practitioners.

Section 4 of the AA 2005 has also been amended to make it explicit that the question of arbitrability not only requires consideration of public policy but also requires a consideration of whether the subject matter of the dispute is capable of settlement under the laws of Malaysia.

These amendments bring s 4 in line with the New York Convention and s 39 of the AA 2005, according to which the enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused, if the subject matter of a dispute is not capable of being settled by arbitration.

The writing requirement in s 9 of the AA 2005 has been expanded to include arbitration agreements concluded orally or otherwise, provided that the contents are recorded in any form. The definition of writing has also been broadened to include electronic communication.

The inclusion of electronic communications in the definition of written arbitration agreement promotes alternative dispute resolution as a go-to method for parties engaged in the business of electronic commerce (ie e-commerce), especially those with businesses in the recently established Malaysian Digital Free Trade Zone.

Historically, powers to order interim measures were reserved to national courts only. However, one of the most important improvements in the 2006 revision of the UNCITRAL Model Law was the introduction of the comprehensive framework for interim measures to balance the powers of

arbitral tribunals and national courts and to ensure efficient and effective resolution of disputes.

The 2018 Amendments follow the UNCITRAL Model Law framework by amending ss 11 and 19 of the AA 2005 and adding new ss 19A–19J. Now, arbitral tribunals will be able to issue the specified interim measures, just as the Malaysian courts are able to do so. However, these changes make it clear that the power of arbitral tribunals cannot and do not exceed the power available to the courts.

To the contrary, the courts retained additional powers to grant interim measures, namely, arrest of property or bail or other security pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction. This deviation from the UNCITRAL Model Law regime, albeit minor, is of great importance to the development of the Malaysian maritime industry.

The overhauled provisions on interim measures do also deal with the issue of recognition and enforcement of interim measures and provide for safeguards for parties against whom such measures are sought. As noted above, this brings much greater clarity in the enforcement process of interim measures, including those granted by an emergency arbitrator.

Section 30 now follows article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. This is a significant departure from the former expression of this provision. The wording of the AA 2005 prior to the amendments was restrictive and questioned the parties’ right to apply foreign law in arbitration proceedings. Section 30 now does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitrations. It requires the arbitral tribunal to decide disputes in accordance with the rules of law chosen by the parties to govern the substance of the dispute.

It has become the norm that a party is entitled to be compensated for the loss of opportunity to use money that is not paid in the form of interest (both pre-and post-award).

However, the Federal Court in Far East Holdings Bhd & Anor v Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang15 upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment that the AA 2005 does not empower the arbitral tribunal to give pre-award interest. As such, the right to pre-award interest is restricted to situations where the arbitral tribunal is empowered by the arbitration agreement or by arbitral institution rules.

The amended s 33 of the AA 2005 reinstates the powers of the arbitral tribunal to award interest. It is in line with the law in England, Singapore and Hong Kong.

The arbitral tribunal is now explicitly empowered to award either simple or compound interest at such rate and with such rest as considered appropriate for any period prior to the date of payment of: (a) the sum ordered by the arbitral tribunal; (b) the sum in issue before the arbitral tribunal but paid before the date of the award; or (c) costs awarded or ordered by the arbitral tribunal. The 2018 Amendments have also introduced confidentiality provisions, analogous toHong Kong’s ArbitrationOrdinance (Cap 609), through the new ss 41A and 41B.

Finally, and most importantly, the 2018 Amendments have repealed ss 42 and 43 of the AA 2005. The repeal of s 42 of the Act has two important implications.

Firstly, parties will no longer be able to bring questions of law before the High Court after an award has been rendered. Rather, if the parties, or the

15. [2018] 1 MLJ 1; [2017] 8 AMR 313.

arbitral tribunal, require clarification on a question of law, they will have recourse to the High Court during arbitral proceedings pursuant to s 41 of the AA 2005.

Secondly, s 37 of the AA 2005 is now the only recourse parties may have in seeking to set aside an award. This is the provision which has been used by Malaysian courts to set aside arbitral awards. The grounds for setting aside an award under s 37 is similar to the grounds under article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the relevant provision of the New York Convention.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration in Malaysia is here to stay. The recent developments are indicative of the approach taken by the jurisdiction to address shortcomings, improve the arbitral process and strengthen the finality of arbitral awards. The 2018 Amendments make Malaysia a safe seat for domestic and international arbitration. Ultimately, it is hoped that more international commercial arbitration will be attracted to Malaysia. Also, it will be more attractive to use arbitration domestically to resolve disputes thereby reducing the case burden in the courts and bringing tangible benefits to the country.

Also, the name change of KLRCA to AIAC is intended to enable the Centre to take a more international approach in offering its services. Given that the arbitral regime has now been overhauled and Malaysia is in tandem with the leading arbitral seats, it is likely that both domestic and international commercial arbitrations will thrive in Malaysia.

Recent regulatory taken by UAE Government in light of Covid-19

Ahmed Elmahdy
Author

History of Federal Law No. 14 for the year 2014 on combating the communicable diseases, analysis of the said law from the criminal perspective and the recent regulatory measures taken by UAE Government in light of the current global outbreak of Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic by Ahmed Elmahdy

April 15, 2020

A – Introduction and history of the Law No. 14 for the year 2014

Following the Emirates Union on 2 December 1971 and the formal declaration of the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, notable plans and strategies have taken place to encourage investments and economic growth. The positive outcome of the said economic growth strategies turned the UAE to be a very attractive environment for foreign investment. Large global economic entities and companies started to pump their investments in the UAE and the country became one of the largest destinations in the region and the world for foreign employment.

In the light of the above-illustrated facts, huge numbers of foreign employment, workers and aids began to enter and settle in the UAE, resulting in the  population statistics to jump from 232,000 in 1970 to 1,016,000 in 1980 with an increase rate of 337.9%. Considering the known global pandemics and communicable diseases at that time such as Plague, Cholera, and Malaria, the UAE government took the first legislative approach and issued Federal Law No. 27 for the year 1981 issued on 7 November 1981 concerning the prevention of the communicable diseases (the “1981 Law”).

The  1981 Law was significantly sought and required at that time to provide for and establish the requisite and necessary health standards and precautionary measures to ensure the public health of the UAE population and people living within its territories. The law defined communicable diseases as  diseases transferable to others by human beings or by animals, insects, foodstuffs, places or other things and substances contaminated by the microbes and toxins of such diseases. The 1981 Law further provided penalties applicable on the violators of the relevant provisions of the said law, which penalties include provisions for fines and imprisonment.

Post enforcement of the 1981 Law in the UAE, in 2014, one of the Corona Viruses Family began to spread in the Middle East Region and was called the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-Related Coronavirus (MERS-CoV). MERS-CoV, akin to the current global Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic, related to the infection and inflammation of the respiratory tract On 24 April 2014, the statistic shared by the World Health Organization confirmed 254 reported cases in the world, with 93 confirmed deaths. The statistic shared by UAE confirmed 33 reported cases with 9 confirmed deaths. It ought to be pointed out that the MERS-CoV was not identified as a communicable disease under the 1981 Law.

In light of outbreak of MERS-CoV in the UAE and considering the fact that the 1981 Law did not legally identify the same as a communicable disease, the UAE government realized the necessity of issuing  another law which provided legal coverage for a broader spectrum of “Communicable Diseases”.

In this regard, UAE issued the Federal Law no. (14) for the year 2014 dated 20 November 2014 on combating communicable diseases (“2014 Law”). The 2014 Law provides a broad and detailed schedule of the communicable diseases and is inclusive of more diseases which were not identified in the 1981 Law and provides for more effective and broad measures to be taken in regards to the same. Such diseases include, without limitation, (HIV/AIDS), Influenza Avian, Rubella, SARS, and any unusual emerging disease specified by the concerned department in the UAE Ministry of Health. It ought to be pointed that the 2014 Law shall now apply to the COVID-19 Coronavirus, as it has been formally identified as a communicable disease by the World Health Organization and consequently by the UAE Ministry of Health.

B – Preventive measures as prescribed by 2014 Law and comparing the respective penalties concerning the violation thereof with the relevant conducts penalized under the UAE Penal Code

In the light of the unprecedented outbreak of the pandemic viruses, including the Corona Viruses Family such as SARS-CoV in 2003 and MERS-CoV in 2013 and 2014 (discussed above), the UAE legislators provided for a more detailed and stricter preventive measures, obligations and penalties in the 2014 Law in order to combat the risk of such pandemics and to ensure the wellbeing of the society. The UAE Ministry of Health has announced that the 2014 Law shall also apply to the Covid-19 Coronavirus, and legally identified the Covid-19 Coronavirus as a communicable disease under the 2014 Law. The 2014 Law, amongst other things, provides for the following preventive measures, which, if breached, are punishable by imprisonment, fine or both (as applicable):

  1. the doctors, pharmacists, pharmaceutical technicians, and medical professionals are obligated to inform the competent health authorities that a person is suffering from or died of a communicable disease within a 24 hours’ time period. Any failure in this regard would subject the violator to be liable for imprisonment or a fine of no more than AED10,000 or both. The same obligation applies to any adult who came in contact with an infected person but failed to inform the UAE Ministry of Health, including, without limitation any professional superior, educational supervisor captain of a ship or airplane or a driver of a public transport vehicle who knowingly transports infected individuals etc.
  2. as per Article 38 of the 2014 Law, anyone who knows that he or she is infected or suspects an infection and fails to inform the health authorities while visiting any place other than a medical facility without the approval of the UAE Ministry of Health or any other concerned authority shall be punished with imprisonment and/or a fine of no less than AED10,000 and no more than AED50,000. The same applies to individuals who fail to show up for tests and treatment despite knowing that they are infected or suspect the possibility of an infection. Likewise, the law applies to those who refuse to adhere to the preventive measures advised or prescriptions and instructions given to them.
  3. as per Article 39 of the 2014 Law any person who knows that he or she suffers from a communicable disease and yet intentionally indulges in behavior that exposes others to transmission shall be punished with imprisonment of up to five years in jail and/or a fine between AED 50,000 to AED 100,000. In the case of repeated offences, such individuals shall be imprisoned for a period twice as that is stipulated by the said law.

Could a person get punished legally if any of the above stated prohibited acts were conducted  regardless of the issuance of the 2014 Law?

The answer to the above questions is absolutely yes. Such actions could potentially have been covered by Federal Law no. (3) for the year 1987 concerning the UAE Penal Code (“UAE Penal Code”).

The above discussed provisions and penalties stipulated by 2014 Law can be compared with the relevant and similar provisions and penalties stipulated in the Federal Law no. (3) for the year 1987 concerning the UAE Penal Code (“UAE Penal Code”). The said comparison would depict that the provisions of the UAE Penal Code provided for a comparatively lenient penalty, which was considered by the UAE legislators in 2014 Law, considering the severity of violations thereof.

The relevant provisions of the UAE Penal Code discussed are as follows:

Article 343 of the UAE Penal Code stipulates:

“Shall be punished with the detention for a term not exceeding one year and/or to a fine not in excess of ten thousand dirham, whoever transgress through his fault the body safety of others“.

The element of “fault” is discussed in Article 38 of the UAE Penal Code which states:

“the fault arises if a criminal result occurs by reason of the offender’s fault whether such fault is negligence, inadvertence, carelessness, recklessness, imprudence or non-compliance with laws, regulations, rules or orders“.

Article 348 from UAE Penal Code stipulates:

“Shall be sentenced to detention and/or to a fine, whoever deliberately perpetrate san act that exposes the life, health, security or freedom of human beings to danger. Without prejudice to a   prejudice any more severe penalty prescribed by law, the penalty shall be detention in case the act results in a prejudice of any kind“.

The period of detention is defined in Article 69 of the UAE Peal Code which states:

“Unless the law provides otherwise, the minimum period of detention is one month and the maximum may not exceed three years” 

Analysis of the relevant penalties prescribed under UAE Penal Code and 2014 Law (stated herein above)

  • Comparison of Articles 343 of UAE Penal Code and Article 38 of 2014 Law

Article 343 of the UAE Penal Code could be compared with the Article 38 of 2014 Law. It is evident that the fine prescribed in Article 343 of the UAE Penal Code is limited to AED 10,000, whereas the fine for the similar prohibition under Article 38 of 2014 Law is prescribed to be not less than AED10,000 and not more than AED50,000.

  • Comparison of Articles 348 of UAE Penal Code and Article 39 of 2014 Law

Article 348 of the UAE Penal Code could be compared with the Article 39 of 2014 Law. It is evident that the penalty prescribed under Article 348 of the UAE Penal Code is for the detention of maximum three years, whereas for the same offence, the punishment prescribed under Article 39 of 2014 Law is imprisonment up to five years in jail and/or a fine between AED50,000 to AED100,000.

The above stated comparative analysis indicate that the UAE legislators realized the severity of the violation of these respective obligations and recognised the requirement for the imposition of stricter penalties in this regard to ensure the public’s compliance with the same. Consequently, the UAE legislators enforced the 2014 Law to address this issue, which shall now also be applicable to the violators of the preventive measures put in place for Covid-19.

C – Recent regulatory measures taken by the UAE Government given the global outbreak of the Covid-19 Coronavirus pandemic

UAE is one of the leading countries in the healthcare field and has set precedents in achieving the idealistic strategic planning towards effectively curtailing the crises and emergencies posed by the unpresented global pandemics. This can currently be seen by the UAE Governments constant and consistent efforts to put in place requisite measures to control and prevent the current global outbreak of the Covid-19 Coronavirus pandemic.

In addition to the application and enforceability of the relevant provisions of 2014 Law, various other decisions and regulations have been promulgated by the UAE Government to combat the outbreak of Covid-19. On 24 March 2020, the UAE Cabinet promulgated Cabinet Decision No. (17) for the year 2020 (“Decision”), which requires all natural and juristic persons to comply with the measures mandated by the concerned authorities to combat Covid-19. The Decision further states that the failure to comply with these measures would be treated as a violation which shall expose the offender to penalties, including responsibility to bear the costs of any remedial measures, closure of premises, and fines (as applicable). The rationale of the imposition of such penalties is to deter individuals from the non-compliance of the preventive measures that have been put in place to control the spread of the Covid-19 virus and ensure that the public safety is not further and unnecessarily jeopardized by the violators.

The UAE Attorney General published Resolution No. 38/2020 (“Resolution”) comprising a list of violations and fines. The Resolution, taking effect from the date of its promulgation (i.e. 26 March 2020), provides for inter alia, the following fines:

  1. Violation of an order for mandatory hospitalisation and failing to abide by home quarantine or re-testing instructions – AED 50,000;
  2. Violation of prohibitions or restrictions on gatherings, meetings, private and public celebrations, and on gathering or being present at public locations, private farms, or agricultural estates:
    • AED 10,000 for the organisers; and
    • AED 5,000 for the participants/ attendees;
  3. Leaving home for unnecessary reasons, or for purposes other than work or the purchase of basic needs – AED 2,000;
  4. Exceeding the maximum permitted number of passengers in a car by more than three persons – AED 1,000 for the vehicle’s driver;
  5. Failing to wear medical facemasks in closed places or failing to observe the safe distance between individuals AED 10,000.

D – Conclusion:

Based on the discussion above, it is evident that UAE has always done all that is necessary and requisite, including putting in necessary measures in place to combat the outbreak of the various pandemics over time. In this regard, UAE has inter alia, passed and enforced requisite legislation to ensure the public’s compliance with the said measures. In the light of the statistics being announced every day regarding the increase of Covid-19 cases confirmed all over the world and especially in UAE, the individuals should now recognize the importance of the preventive measures and prohibitions put in place by the relevant laws and regulations issued by the UAE Government and more importantly, the consequences and penalties of the violations thereof.

Thank you!